

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

NOVEMBER, 1976

## AFRICA, 1976

AFRICA AND THE SUPERPOWERS .....	<i>W. A. E. Skurnik</i>	145
THE CONFLICT IN RHODESIA .....	<i>Richard W. Hull</i>	149
ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE: INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION	<i>Thomas H. Henriksen</i>	153
AFRICA AND THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST .....	<i>Richard E. Bissell</i>	158
POLITICAL CHANGES IN NAMIBIA, BOTSWANA AND SWAZILAND	<i>Richard Dale</i>	161
NIGERIA'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE .....	<i>Levi A. Nwachuku</i>	165
MILITARY RULE IN ETHIOPIA .....	<i>John G. Merriam</i>	170
SOUTH AFRICA: WHITE LAAGER UNDER PRESSURE .	<i>Christian P. Potholm</i>	174
BOOK REVIEWS • <i>On Africa</i> .....		177
CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>Toward Majority Rule in Rhodesia:</i>		
<i>Ian Smith's Address to the Nation</i> .....		178
<i>Statements of 5 African Presidents</i> .....		178
THE MONTH IN REVIEW .....		186
MAP • <i>Africa</i> .....		Inside Back Cover

# Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

NOVEMBER, 1976  
VOLUME 71 NUMBER 421

## Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

## Assistant Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

JOAN B. ANTELL

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT

## Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

State University of New York

O. EDMUND CLUBB

U.S. Foreign Service Officer (retired)

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY

Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Portland State University, Emeritus

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College, Emeritus

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

## President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

## Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

Published monthly (combined issues July/August) by Current History, Inc., 4225 Main St., Box 4647, Phila., Pa. 19127. Second class postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright © 1976, by Current History, Inc.

## Coming Next Month

### SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1976

In our December, 1976, issue eight authors discuss the current problems of Southeast Asian countries and United States foreign policy in that area. Articles include:

#### U.S. Foreign Policy

by L. EDWARD SHUCK, JR., Bowling Green State University

#### Philippines

by ROBERT O. TILMAN, North Carolina State University

#### Burma

by RICHARD BUTWELL, State University of New York, Fredonia

#### Vietnam

by GARETH PORTER, Indochina Resource Center

#### Thailand

by FRANK C. DARLING, DePauw University

#### Laos

by JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF, University of Pittsburgh, and  
MACALISTER BROWN, Williams College

#### Cambodia

by LAURA SUMMERS, The University of Lancaster

\$1.50 a copy • \$13.50 a year  
Canada \$14.50 a year • Foreign \$15.00 a year  
Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

**NO ADVERTISING**

# Current History

NOVEMBER, 1976

VOL. 71, NO. 421

*How stable are the governments of the African nations? What underlying factors are causing the continuing tensions in Africa? In this issue, specialists evaluate the situation in Africa south of the Sahara. As our introductory article points out: "Among the imponderables of African politics, the African commitment to black majority rule in southern Africa has become urgent and irreversible, and this issue will continue as a major irritant in international relations until an acceptable resolution is found."*

## Africa and the Superpowers

BY W. A. E. SKURNIK

*Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado*

Property of  
AMBASSADOR COLLEGE LIBRARY  
Big Sandy, Texas

IN 1976, the African nations south of the Sahara moved center stage in international relations. The catalyst was the unprecedented Soviet and Cuban military action to install a compatible minority government in Angola after that country's independence from Portugal. Immediately in the wake of Angola, the Soviet Union emerged as the champion of liberty for the black majority in southern Africa; the People's Republic of China withdrew quietly and suffered some setbacks; and the United States gained the onus of defending the status quo and supporting the region's racist white minority regimes.

United States strategy in Angola came in two phases. In a first phase, the United States government worked toward a coalition government by aiding the majority factions that opposed the faction favored by Moscow. This policy included cooperation with Angola's chief neighbors, Zaire and Zambia. It was also supported by many other African states, whose leaders were genuinely concerned about possible international ramifications of Communist inroads and who feared Communist destabilization attempts inside their borders.

This strategy might have succeeded except for two unforeseen events: massive Soviet and Cuban intervention and a more limited intervention by South Africa. These interventions transformed the issue as well as the battle. The first ensured the military victory of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the second discredited the MPLA's ad-

versaries and the United States in the eyes of many Africans.

The second phase of American strategy in Angola depended in part on continued African support, on Soviet and Cuban intentions, and on congressional approval. On all three counts, the administration misread events.

In late December, 1975, the United States government was still supporting African diplomatic pressure for a negotiated settlement in Angola. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), at its January, 1976, meeting, debated whether to recognize either the MPLA or a coalition including all significant factions as the legitimate and first government of the newly independent state of Angola. But the OAU deliberations trailed behind African opinion. For many Africans, the issue was no longer Angola or even superpower intervention: it was the imperative of resisting the far more odious intervention by South Africa, intervention that was seen as the unacceptable extension of white racial discrimination beyond the borders of the white redoubt. Once South African troops crossed the border to secure the Cunene hydroelectric project and engaged in armed combat against black African soldiers, the issue became symbolic and irreconcilable.

In view of the evolving situation in Angola in early 1976, the United States initiatives consisted of a slim, belated attempt to spend more money and of apparently empty threats to the Soviet Union and Cuba. By October or, at the latest, November, 1975, Soviet

assistance and the Cuban military offensive were in full swing; heavy weapons and skilled personnel promised a rapid military victory for the MPLA. Moscow may have hesitated in December, and the American press then speculated that the Kremlin was carefully reevaluating its Angola policy.

Hopes for a change in Soviet and Cuban policy were shattered when Soviet supplies resumed on a large scale at the end of December. The Soviets apparently spent between \$200 million and \$300 million in Angola and supported Cuban armed forces. Thus, in February, 1976, the administration requested a congressional appropriation of some \$30 million to help the forces opposing the MPLA, at a time when Cuban troops were deciding the issue in the field and when additional American aid could no longer affect the military balance.

Another aspect of American ineffectiveness relates to the concept of détente with the Soviet Union. The public record leaves the impression that the United States government seemed mesmerized by false hopes: a passive expectation that Soviet leaders would use restraint and thus control the Cuban troops, perhaps on the assumption that they had been brought to Angola merely for symbolic purposes.

Related to this erroneous view of détente was the question of the credibility of United States warnings and threats toward the Soviet Union and Cuba. Given the limited nature of United States policy objectives, no effective levers could be applied should the warnings be ignored. Moscow seems to have realized that neither the SALT talks nor the sale of grains important to American farmers would be affected by what happened in Angola. Thus the warnings and threats were ineffective.

The administration seems also to have seriously miscalculated the mood of Congress. In an atmosphere pervaded by revelations about intelligence agency abuses, the Senate, on December 19, barred the use of further funds for American support of Angola's warring factions, despite numerous briefings of key congressional leaders. That this weakened the administration's hands in Angola there can be no doubt.

It was only after the stinging defeat in Angola that the United States government reassessed its Africa policy. United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's April, 1976, visit underlined the change and was hailed as ushering in a new policy. The novelty lay in the belated recognition of the magnitude and consequences of developments in southern Africa and in new initiatives to implement United States objectives of long standing.

The Angola affair itself served as a catalyst. The decolonization process that began with the Portuguese

military takeover in April, 1974, brought to light and reinforced Africa's indivisible commitment to end white minority rule in southern Africa. There were fears of continued, massive, and perhaps decisive Soviet and Cuban intervention in other areas of southern Africa, the fears of some African leaders for the security of their nations, and the blow to American prestige.

There were other profound reasons for growing African resentment of United States policy. The United States image has, in fact, long been tarnished, and its policy has evoked considerable skepticism. Shortly after Portugal's announcement of independence for her former colonies, there were strong adverse reactions to the public disclosure of United States relaxation of policy toward southern African white minority regimes and toward the continued assumption of long-term white control. In an unprecedented move, an OAU foreign ministers meeting asked for the withdrawal of the nomination of Nathaniel Davis to become United States Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Such nominations are sovereign acts and the OAU position amounted to interference in American domestic politics. It was nonetheless one indication of the depth of African feelings.

The African states were indignant when United States Ambassador to the U.N. Daniel P. Moynihan suggested that the choice of Ugandan President Idi Amin as OAU chairman was unfriendly and when he proposed an invidious blacklist of third world nations to be punished for United Nations voting behavior considered unfriendly to the United States. On a more general plane, there is a growing African disposition to regard the United States as pursuing outmoded and self-defeating policies fundamentally opposed to change.

## A NEW POLICY

While one of Angola's three factions was well on the way to military dominance, Washington cast a wider policy net. The new elements of American policy singled out three objectives: political negotiation in the rest of southern Africa, support for meaningful change, first in Rhodesia, and the maintenance of United States influence elsewhere in Africa.

Speaking at Lusaka, Zambia, on April 27, 1976, Secretary Kissinger redefined United States policy toward southern Africa, in terms recalling the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto.<sup>1</sup> "Racial justice," he said, "is a dominant issue of our age [and is] both compelling and achievable." He pledged United States financial support for African states implementing the United Nations mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia and renewed efforts to get Congress to repeal the symbolically crucial Byrd amendment.<sup>2</sup> In accordance with African priorities and the piecemeal

<sup>1</sup> The text of the Lusaka Manifesto is printed in *Current History*, vol. 58, no. 343 (March, 1969).

<sup>2</sup> See p. 150, footnote 2.

strategy of concentrating efforts on one target at a time, his most far-reaching proposals were directed at Rhodesia because that country was believed to be the most vulnerable. Diplomatic commitments included support for majority rule with a precise timetable, multilateral cooperation to help refugees, international economic and technical assistance to Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) during a transition period, and the protection of minority rights. Kissinger also denied any support for the incumbent regime in Salisbury "at any stage of its conflict with African states or African liberation movements." Political commitments included a public warning that American citizens in Rhodesia cannot count on United States government assistance.

On the less urgent issue of Namibia, Kissinger promised economic aid during a transition period, and urged South Africa to announce a specific timetable for self-determination. Regarding South Africa, he called upon that country to help achieve majority rule in Rhodesia, and to provide equal opportunities and human rights for all. Finally, he announced that United States development aid in southern and central Africa would be tripled in the next three years.

At the end of September, it looked as though the immediate objectives of United States and African policies were close to being achieved. Pretoria had agreed to the principle of independence for Namibia, although the specifics of implementation were yet to be resolved. But most dramatic and far-reaching was Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's unexpected approval of a United States-British plan for yielding to majority rule. Under the plan, negotiations with black nationalists were to be followed in a few months by an interim government to prepare Zimbabwe for real independence.

The Rhodesian Cabinet's approval was conditional on an end to the international economic boycott and on the cessation of guerrilla activities in Rhodesia. The former, essentially a British device to bring about majority rule, may be easy to implement. But the second may be more difficult since Zimbabwe liberation and political forces are badly split, and since African host countries may not want or be able to control guerrillas operating in and from their countries. For liberation movements, there is also the precedent and contagion of the former Portuguese territories where armed force, both external and internal, determined the government. The agreement was, nevertheless, a major breakthrough that altered the very conditions against which the nationalists were fighting.

Diplomatic activities centered on pressures to bring about Pretoria's agreement for Namibian independence and majority rule in Rhodesia. Two external considerations added to American urgency. One was the expectation that better armed and trained guer-

rillas would soon mount a major offensive in Rhodesia. In September they were active in areas previously considered safe and were reportedly awaiting the cover of November rains. Such an offensive would strain Rhodesia's defenses and could accelerate and spread violence throughout the entire area, bringing to power one or more Marxist-oriented governments in league with the "socialist camp."

The other consideration concerned further Soviet and Cuban intervention that could have political and strategic repercussions far exceeding those in Angola. It could undermine the entire western position in southern Africa and deal it a serious blow in the third world.

Early in September, prior to Kissinger's trip to Africa and following a second meeting with South African Prime Minister Vorster in Zurich, it seemed that further progress on Namibia was the only issue that might be tackled successfully. Secretary Kissinger was ready to spend up to two weeks traveling about Africa for that purpose. Shortly after a subsequent Kissinger-Smith meeting in South Africa, the Rhodesian government announced its momentous decision. A combination of domestic and external pressures was no doubt responsible for the Smith regime's decision, which had been made palatable by the face-saving direct talks with the United States government. Salisbury was concerned with an accelerated white exodus; the withdrawal of South African police, soldiers, helicopter gunners and pilots; increasing white opposition; and the continued radicalization of blacks, with moderates now calling for a "righteous war."

#### **SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE**

The active role of South Africa, with United States prodding, was crucial in that decision. Pretoria moved cautiously, partly because of recalcitrant white opinion, and partly because it could not contemplate much sterner measures; Pretoria was fearful to employ a boycott because that weapon might later be turned against it. Also, for the first time, South Africa could not ignore other domestic pressures: the beginnings of forceful, large-scale political activity by blacks and coloreds inside the country. The immediate problem, aside from containing the turmoil, was to channel political protest into structures not beholden to sustained and externally supported guerrilla warfare. But the psychological impact on the government added urgency to pressure on Rhodesia, particularly since Pretoria's preference for "moderate" majority rule instead of an unrealistic white elite in Salisbury was well known.

United States cooperation with the British yielded an economic device to undercut Ian Smith's argument that a black government inevitably meant a system without viable guarantees for whites. At a

cost of nearly \$2 billion, the United States, with some British help, agreed to underwrite a kind of insurance policy aimed at fair compensation for land should whites elect to sell, pensions for civil servants, and resettlement of white emigrants. Whether the United States Congress will approve such a plan remains to be seen.

With the Rhodesian announcement, a combination of fortuitous events and pressures resulted in a further significant opening toward majority rule in southern Africa.

The other aspect of the new United States strategy in Africa concerns central and eastern Africa, where United States policy is directed at two limited objectives: to still growing fears by the leaders of Zaire, Kenya, and Ethiopia that military hostilities will be initiated by, or will spill over from, neighboring states, and to improve American prestige and convey an impression that friendly states will not be "abandoned" after the Angola debacle. The states that are the object of concern (Somalia, Uganda, and Angola) have been heavily armed by the Soviet Union, and their armed forces are considered superior to those in need of reassurance. Zaire shares a 1,600-mile border with Angola, whose government still employs several thousand former Katanga gendarmes hostile to the Kinshasa government. Kenya is concerned about territorial claims by both Uganda and Somalia. The unpredictability of Uganda President Idi Amin is particularly worrisome to Kenya since the 1976 Israeli raid at Entebbe airport and the deterioration of Uganda's ties with Kenya. Somali claims on Kenyan and Ethiopian territory, now buttressed by modern Soviet hardware, have long concerned Addis Ababa and Nairobi. There is an additional bone of contention between Ethiopia and Somalia: the French Territory of the Afar and Issas, whose port of Djibouti is the terminus of Ethiopia's only railroad to the coast. Both Somalia and Ethiopia consider Djibouti vital to their national interest for different reasons. The territory is scheduled for independence in 1977, and Ethiopia and Somalia might clash if one of them moved to annex it.

But the overall effectiveness of these countries' armed forces is not considered very high. United States policy toward the three client states is chiefly political: support for incumbent regimes as a psychological signal that Soviet-equipped armed forces need be no great cause for alarm. A major attack by Angola on Zaire, or Uganda on Kenya, or Somalia on either Kenya or Ethiopia is not likely. Somalia could take advantage of Ethiopia's costly, indecisive and clumsy civil war in Eritrea, and move before new

United States weapons arrive. But it is very difficult to envisage the United States as more than a supplier of assistance in an indigenous conflict.

The State Department plans a \$300-million military assistance program to implement its new policy: a \$175 million grant to Ethiopia, and sales of \$75 million to Kenya and \$50 million to Zaire. These large amounts have the earmarks of an emergency program. The grant to Ethiopia nearly equals the total aid extended between 1950 and 1975; the sale to Kenya is unprecedented; and that to Zaire compares favorably with the total credits of \$28 million extended between 1971 and 1975 and of \$19 million in 1976. Congressional critics have singled out the dangers of American "escalation" and hence of United States involvement in regional conflicts as well as the risk of indirect "confrontation" with the Soviet Union, the questionable effectiveness of the weapons in an African context, and the alleged lack of prior executive consultation. But the Congress seemed willing to approve the requests.

New United States military assistance should be evaluated against some background data. Zaire and Kenya still rely on their former colonial powers for most of their military aid. Total United States commitments for military equipment to Africa include four categories (percentages indicate the African share of the world total in fiscal year 1975): (a) grant assistance (2 percent), (b) training of personnel (4.7 percent), (c) credit sales (4 percent), and (d) commercial sales (1 percent). The first two reflect political criteria more directly, whereas sales follow business criteria. During 1975, 96 percent (\$12 million) of the regular assistance went to Ethiopia; lesser amounts went to Zaire, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal, and Kenya. Fifty-seven percent of the training funds for Africa were allocated to Ethiopia (\$775,000), 22 percent to Zaire, and smaller amounts to Liberia, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal. Of the total commercial sales of \$5.4 million to Africa, 40 percent went to Nigeria, 35 percent to Kenya, and smaller amounts to Uganda, Gambia, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zaire. Credit sales amounted to \$850,000, of which 70 percent went to Ethiopia, 15 percent to Kenya, nine percent to Zaire, and five percent to Liberia.<sup>3</sup>

(Continued on page 179)

---

Walter Skurnik is a frequent contributor to journals on African affairs and is the author of "The Military in Dahomey," in Claude E. Welch (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), *Foreign Policy of Senegal* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), and *International Relations: Sub Saharan Africa* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1976).

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts—November 1975* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense). For an earlier review, consult *Current History*, vol. 64, no. 379 (March, 1973).

---

*"... the United States decided in 1976 ... that if a peaceful negotiated settlement for majority rule [in Rhodesia] were not achieved soon, the Communist-trained Zimbabwe Liberation Army would win the hearts and minds of the people. ..." This author concludes that "... despite Kissinger's adroit diplomacy, the conflict seems likely to continue."*

## The Conflict in Rhodesia

By RICHARD W. HULL

*Associate Professor of History, New York University*

ARMED STRUGGLE in Rhodesia is not a new phenomenon. The country's original inhabitants, the Shona, fought against Portuguese incursions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and eventually repulsed them. Portuguese traders and missionaries sought control over the vast, mineral-rich Mutapa empire, which by 1480 stretched from the Zambesi River to the Limpopo valley and from the Kalahari desert to the Indian Ocean.

In the 1830's, the Shona were faced with invasions from Ndebele peoples who had been displaced from South Africa by Zulu and Boer imperialism. The militaristic Ndebele established an authoritarian nation, called Matabeleland, and gave the more egalitarian Shona tributary status. Ndebele hegemony was destroyed in 1893 after an armed struggle with Cecil Rhodes' white mercenaries, who had arrived in the country with a "pioneer column" of 200 settlers only three years earlier.

Between 1896 and 1897, after losing much of their land and cattle, Ndebele and Shona united in rebellion against the whites. Within months, Rhodes negotiated a peace with the Ndebele chiefs, who henceforth became loyal supporters of white rule. The Shona resisted longer, were brutally defeated, and became demoralized and apathetic. Built on conquest, Southern Rhodesia fell under the firm control of Rhodes and his British South Africa Company. After considerable white settler agitation, in 1923 Southern Rhodesia was transferred to the British Crown as an internally self-governing colony.

Ndebele and Shona nationalist feelings were never extinguished, and in the 1920's and 1930's they were expressed through the medium of independent Christian churches. Groundwork for a modern nationalist movement was laid in 1934 when young Western-educated Ndebele intellectuals established a Southern Rhodesian branch of the African National Congress (ANC). However, the organization lacked a mass following and was not seen as a threat to white supremacy. African nationalism assumed a wider,

more militant following in 1948 after a massive but unsuccessful general strike.

The Southern Rhodesian ANC was revived in 1957 under Joshua Nkomo, and it subsequently attempted to play a role in the Central African Federation, established by the British in 1953. The federation was heralded as a bold attempt to forge a multiracial nation out of the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the white-settler dominated colony of Southern Rhodesia.

Africans distrusted the federal constitution, which closely paralleled Southern Rhodesia's. It ensured white domination of the electoral rolls in all three territories. Southern Rhodesia's liberal, multiracialist Prime Minister, Garfield Todd, was forced out of office by his own Cabinet in February, 1958, out of fear that the colony was moving too close to majority rule. Racial polarization followed, and the influence of white moderates declined. By 1959, it was clear that the federation was doomed. Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland demanded independence for their own territories.

Earlier that same year, the ANC was banned in Southern Rhodesia. In December, 1961, Shona nationalists organized the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), named after the ancient Shona city of Great Zimbabwe. In September, 1962, this, too, was banned. National elections that year had brought to power the conservative white Rhodesian Front, which clung to Rhodes' dictum: "one man one vote for all civilized people." The Rhodesian Front considered nearly all Africans uncivilized until they possessed a high level of Western education, owned property, and paid a certain amount in income tax. Only a tiny minority found themselves eligible.

June, 1963, witnessed a split in the nationalist leadership when Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole broke with Joshua Nkomo and formed his own, more militant, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). After violent internal power struggles, Nkomo organized the People's Caretaker Council. By this time,

the federation was dead, and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were emerging as the independent African nations of Zambia and Malawi under the respective leadership of Kenneth Kaunda and Kamuzu Banda. African nationalism had become a potent force throughout southern Africa. Fearing a similar fate, Southern Rhodesia banned both the People's Caretaker Council and ZANU in August, 1964. A state of emergency was declared, and all major nationalist leaders were placed in preventive detention. The Rhodesian Front, anticipating British pressures for majority rule, secretly prepared for a unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.), which was proclaimed in November, 1965. U.D.I. found the nationalist movement severely divided and its leaders in detention.

In response to the declaration, the United Nations voted to boycott Rhodesian exports. Not a single nation ventured to extend diplomatic recognition to the breakaway regime. Refusing to recognize the independence of its former colony, Britain initiated an era of futile negotiations with the white leadership in an effort to force a new constitutional formula that would lead to majority rule. Neighboring Zambia also entered the picture when, in 1967, President Kaunda issued the Lusaka Manifesto. Kaunda offered Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith the option of a negotiated settlement on the basis of a peaceful transfer of power to majority rule or an armed struggle.

Smith's belated response came in 1969 with the passage of the "White Man's Charter," a new constitution that eliminated the possibility of majority rule and envisioned parliamentary parity in an unspecified future. Rhodesia's franchise, as in the past, was pegged to personal income.<sup>1</sup> The 1969 constitution also attempted to blunt African nationalism by admitting chiefs to parliamentary representation. Rhodesia's whites had always regarded the chiefs as authentic representatives of the rural population. Under the new constitution, all ten Africans in the Senate had to be chiefs and eight of the sixteen Africans in the Legislative Assembly were appointed by electoral councils under the chiefs' supervision.

Thus the government successfully forced a wedge between the traditional authorities and the nationalists at a time when divisions were deepening within

the ranks of the nationalists themselves. Tension was most apparent among the exiled nationalist groups in Zambia. Clashes became so violent in 1970 that Kaunda ordered 129 nationalists back to Rhodesia. He forced the remainder to join together into a unified movement, called the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). But splits within ZANU between Shonas and Ndebeles and ZAPU's antipathy toward ZANU prevented FROLIZI from becoming a viable unit. In December, 1971, the black Rhodesian Bishop, Abel Muzorewa, formed the African National Council (ANC) in a new effort at reconciliation. Unfortunately, most ardent nationalists greeted it with little enthusiasm.

Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations had been conducted intermittently since 1966. In 1971, tentative agreement was reached on a new constitution, which offered Africans a larger share of power although it did not provide for majority rule. If the African population approved the proposed constitution, Britain was prepared to lift sanctions, which in reality were having little effect on Rhodesia's economy. Indeed, Rhodesia had weathered international sanctions remarkably well, and even with Zambia and Zaire trade remained fairly brisk. Moreover, in 1971, the United States Congress passed the Byrd amendment, enabling Rhodesia to resume lucrative chrome exports.<sup>2</sup>

Yet economic growth could not buy African support; and when the British Pearce Commission visited Rhodesia to test African acceptability of the proposed agreement, it encountered vehement black opposition. Thus the constitution of 1971 was never implemented, and negotiations returned to square one. In the meantime, Muzorewa's ANC had mobilized the general African population, which demanded nothing less than majority rule.

The Rhodesian problem took on a more militant tone when, in December, 1972, ZANU exiles operating from Zambia launched a series of guerrilla attacks in northeastern Rhodesia. Smith responded by calling up the military reservists for 56-day periods. He also sealed the border with Zambia, in the hope that Kaunda would then restrain future forays. Kaunda increased his surveillance of ZANU activities but surprised Rhodesia by refusing to allow the frontier to reopen officially. Smith's tactic had partially backfired. Trade still flowed over the borders, although covertly and in lighter volume. Zambian and Zairean mines required Rhodesian coal and Rhodesia needed their hard currency.

South Africa viewed the deterioration of Rhodesian-Zambian relations as an impediment to her own policy of détente with independent black Africa. Prime Minister John Vorster seized this opportunity to offer his good offices and was able to open negotiations with Kaunda in March, 1974. Together with

<sup>1</sup> In 1969, Africans, comprising 95 percent of the population contributed only 1 percent of the nation's income tax revenue.

<sup>2</sup> The Byrd amendment, introduced by U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Ind., Va.) as part of the U.S. military procurement act of 1971, made it illegal to prevent the importation of strategic materials from a non-Communist country if such materials were being imported from a Communist country (the Soviet Union); this effectively bypassed the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia as far as chromite (chrome ore) was concerned. (See W. A. Skurnik, *Current History*, March, 1972, pp. 99-101.)

Botswana's President Seretse Khama, Vorster and Kaunda attempted to pressure Smith into releasing Sithole and Nkomo and to begin negotiations. Little headway was made. Then the whites of southern Africa were shaken by an unexpected event: the Portuguese military coup in Lisbon of April 25, 1974. This triggered the rapid independence and decolonization of Portugal's African possessions.

Vorster and many southern Africans then recognized the inevitability of African majority rule. It seemed unlikely that Rhodesia could defend her 800-mile frontier with Mozambique. Smith was deeply concerned and eventually acceded to the release of ZANU and ZAPU leaders on the condition that there would be a general guerrilla cease-fire. Subsequently, Vorster and Kaunda prodded Sithole and Nkomo into forming a new, united ANC under Muzorewa's leadership. In December, 1974, Vorster also coerced Smith into direct negotiations with the African nationalists.

Smith entered the negotiations feeling confident he enjoyed the broad mandate of the white electorate. In the July elections, 90 percent of the white voters went to the polls and gave the Rhodesian Front all 50 seats reserved for whites in the 66-seat legislature. The whites were clearly united and prepared to negotiate from a position of strength. Kaunda recognized the need for a similar display among the blacks and coerced the two nationalist factions (ZANU/ZAPU) and FROLIZI into signing a declaration of unity at Lusaka. With extreme reluctance, the parties recognized the ANC as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe, the name they intended to give Rhodesia after majority rule.

This fragile black unity was shattered in March, 1975, with the assassination in Zambia of Herbert Chitepo, national chairman of ZANU, by rivals within his own ruling circle. After Chitepo's death, the movement became increasingly tribalized. This became more apparent in June, 1975, when ZANU and ZAPU factions clashed in a Rhodesian African township, leaving 13 dead.

Convinced of the futility of talks with Smith's regime, Bishop Muzorewa recognized that Rhodesia's stalling tactics were contributing to frustrations and tensions among the nationalists. He therefore openly endorsed armed struggle as the only means of ending the impasse and achieving majority rule. Most of the nationalists in exile also began to gravitate toward a violent approach, while Joshua Nkomo persevered in his quixotic quest for a peaceful solution. A meeting was arranged in August, 1975, at Victoria Falls to establish a procedural basis for formal negotiations. But the conference ended in a deadlock over the question of immunity for exiled leaders wishing to attend future talks within Rhodesia.

Divisions between the two African nationalists over

tactics became sharper. As ANC leader, Muzorewa expelled Nkomo in September, 1975, on the grounds that Nkomo was cooperating with Smith. Ironically, Kaunda and Vorster seemed to be closer together on the Rhodesian issue than any of the Rhodesian Africans. In the same month, South Africa withdrew her 2,000-man security force from Rhodesia in return for a pledge from Kaunda that Zimbabwean guerrillas would no longer be permitted to operate from Zambia.

The removal of South African troops forced Rhodesia to rely more heavily on her own white population, which in turn put severe pressure on industry, which was already short of skilled manpower.

If Zambia and South Africa strove to return black and white Rhodesians to the negotiating table before the issues were further internationalized, they did not succeed. In October, 1975, the Liberation Committee of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) unilaterally established an 18-man military high command for Rhodesia, drawn equally from former ZANU and ZAPU members. The move was approved by the Presidents of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, who had become exasperated by the constant infighting of the ZAPU and ZANU leadership. Logistics would henceforth be supplied directly to the high command, bypassing the ANC leadership. This move was no surprise to many observers. Since 1971, the OAU had warned ZAPU/ZANU leaders to heal their rifts or risk losing OAU support.

Time was now running out for the forces of moderation. From December, 1975, to March, 1976, talks continued between Smith and Nkomo, with Kaunda continuing to use his good offices. They ended again with the failure to reach a constitutional agreement that would lead to majority rule.

The breakdown of these talks resulted in a defeat for the forces of moderation. Smith may have bought more time to pursue his war against the guerrillas, but Nkomo lost face with moderate black Rhodesians. Moreover, Nkomo had to contend with a further alienation of youthful black urbanites, who looked increasingly to the liberation army. As covert recruitment among urban Africans increased, the government responded by creating a police terrorism unit. Rhodesia's African townships had become dangerously overcrowded, especially those surrounding Salisbury, the national capital and the home of nearly 80 percent of the white population.

Equally serious, the collapse of negotiations turned Kaunda away from his long-held nonviolent approach and spelled doom to South Africa's efforts at détente. Kaunda had lost patience with Smith, and on March 18, 1976, he called for an armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. Once again, Kaunda would allow the liberation forces to operate from Zambia.

Land-locked Zambia has an enormous economic stake in the Rhodesian crisis. Her economy has seriously deteriorated under the combined pressure of transport blockades and falling world prices for copper, which earns nearly 90 percent of the nation's foreign exchange. The Angolan war and the closure of the railroad to Angola's seaports as well as the near impossibility of trade through the ports of Mozambique have taken their toll on the strained economy. Zambia must therefore rely on the less-economical, Chinese-built Tan-Zam railway to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

Rhodesia's response to the breakdown in talks was to accelerate her policy of separating peasants from guerrilla influences by expanding her "protective village" program, a scheme which had failed miserably years earlier in Algeria, Vietnam and Mozambique.

The need for peaceful negotiations became more urgent in the spring of 1976 after successful Cuban and Soviet aid to the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola. In February, the Soviet Ambassador to Zambia boldly pledged his nation's support for the liberation movements in southern Africa. The Cuban and Russian presence in Mozambique mushroomed, and by March Cubans and Russians had begun to overshadow the Chinese. Early that month, Mozambique's President Samora Machel closed his border with Rhodesia, following hot pursuit incursions into the country by Rhodesian forces. Radio Mozambique announced that a state of war existed between the two countries.

With the closure of this major rail link, Rhodesia lost one-sixth of her rolling stock and transportation routes for about half her foreign trade with nations outside southern Africa. Mozambique suffered also, for she depended on Rhodesia for food and foreign exchange from duties on trade. Closure of the border could cost Mozambique \$165 million a year and cripple her fragile economy. Rhodesia must have anticipated the cut-off when she completed a direct rail link to South Africa. Her only rail connections with vital South African ports are now this new line and the railway through black-ruled Botswana.

Rhodesia's external problems are compounded by some disturbing statistics on population and manpower. The country has one of the highest population growth rates (3.6 percent) on earth. Yet the weakening Rhodesian economy cannot expand fast enough to absorb the flood of 45,000 school leavers entering the labor market annually. Massive unemployment looms ominously. Moreover, in July, government figures indicated that, in the first six months of 1976, Rhodesia suffered a net loss of 2,280 whites compared to a net gain of 1,590 in the same period the previous year. Although not a mass exodus, this is the largest exodus in a decade; further, almost half

the emigrants were males in their twenties and thirties. Periodic government efforts to attract white immigrants had failed dismally since 1971. The collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique added some 12,000 refugees, swelling the white population to about 278,000. But the refugees have no real long-term stake in Rhodesia and are regarded as birds of passage.

Ian Smith must ask himself how many whites feel strongly enough about Rhodesia to risk their lives. Less than one-third are Rhodesian-born, many of South African origin. At least half of all whites hold non-Rhodesian passports. Three decades ago, there were only 65,000 whites in the entire country, and many of them left with the fall of the Central African Federation in 1963.

Rhodesia's greatest losses have been the skilled professional people and youths who have avoided conscription by attending schools in South Africa. By July, 1976, the white population had fallen to less than 265,000, and whites were outnumbered 22 to 1 by a nation of nearly six million Africans. Manpower shortages forced the military to turn to the Africans. Already, Africans comprise more than half the army and three-fourths of the paramilitary police force. The majority of Africans in the army are Karanga/Shona. Ominously, the Zimbabwe Liberation Army consists mainly of the same ethnic group, whose homeland is along Rhodesia's vulnerable eastern border with Mozambique. Would they really fight one another in the event of a full-scale racial war?

By spring, 1976, the Rhodesian security force consisted of about 5,000 regulars in the army and airforce, 8,000 paramilitary police, and 45,000 in the reserves of police and army. Concurrently, there were an estimated 1,000 guerrillas within Rhodesia and between 5,000 and 10,000 who were training in Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania under Chinese, Cuban and Russian supervision.

The security position of Rhodesia's whites had grown increasingly less tenable, and was compounded

*(Continued on page 185)*

---

**Richard W. Hull** has undertaken extensive research in Africa, under a Fullbright-Hays Fellowship and grants from the New York State Department of Education and New York University. Under a Ford Foundation grant he organized a series of lectures on African heritage at the Countee-Cullen Library in Harlem. In 1974, under a grant from the Tempelman Foundation, he sponsored the Mobutu Sese Seko Distinguished Lecture Series on Zaire, which won international acclaim. He is the author of *Munyakare: African Civilization before the Batuuuree* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972) and *African Cities and Towns before the European Conquest* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1976).

---

*"Beginning the wars with aims of freedom and moderate reforms, the nationalist movements that ultimately prevailed in Angola and Mozambique underwent a revolutionizing of goals and organization. Thus, by the war's end, they sought social as well as political revolution."*

## Angola and Mozambique: Intervention and Revolution

BY THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN

*Associate Professor of History, State University of New York, Plattsburgh*

PORTUGAL'S DEFEAT in Angola and Mozambique after more than a decade of guerrilla warfare has produced far-reaching changes in southern Africa. Since the Lisbon coup of April 25, 1974, which ended the wars, austral Africa has witnessed the discontinuance of Portugal's 500-year African presence, the independence of Angola and Mozambique (also Guinea-Bissau, formerly Guiné, a small wedge-shaped West African country) under Marxist-inspired governments, the military intervention of African and non-African states into Angola, and the increased nationalist encirclement of the white regimes in Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa.

Portugal's 13 years of stubborn resistance to decolonization contributed to these sweeping transformations. Supported by Western powers because of her membership in NATO and her strategic, mid-Atlantic Azores Islands, Portugal had attempted to tough it out against the aspirations of African nationalists who chose the gun after the olive branch had failed to achieve independence.<sup>1</sup> A relentless unwinnable war of attrition resulted in the military overthrow of the authoritarian Lisbon regime. Independence came to Portugal's colonies soon afterward.

The prolonged anti-Lisbon conflicts gave rise to a radicalization process in the nationalist leadership. Beginning the wars with aims of freedom and moderate reforms, the nationalist movements that ultimately prevailed in Angola and Mozambique underwent a revolutionizing of goals and organization. Thus, by war's end, they sought social as well as political

revolution. Denied significant Western assistance and cultivated by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the revolutionary nationalists developed a Marxist vision in an African context that has made them inimicable to capitalism and to the West. The long, smoldering wars offered China and the Soviet Union an unprecedented leverage in Africa, which became apparent in the Angolan civil war.

Fighting against Portuguese colonial rule first erupted in 1961 in Angola, where the war evolved from a widespread Bakongo revolt inspired but haphazardly prepared in Zaire (Congo) by the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA). This uprising and Portuguese retaliation claimed the lives of about 400 settlers and an estimated 50,000 Africans.<sup>2</sup> After the rebellion, warfare slowly developed in the northern countryside, sparked by a handful of rebels in the virtually inaccessible Dembos region or by raids across the Zairean border. Led by Holden Roberto, who spent much of his life outside Angola, the largely Bakongo-dominated UPA strove for the most part unsuccessfully to widen its appeal among other ethnolinguistic communities by forming the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). Despite its efforts, the FNLA remained centered among the Bakongo people, who span the Zairean-Angolan border and make up some 20 percent of the nearly 6 million Africans in Angola.

Unlike the contemporaneous wars in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, where single parties predominated, Angola was plagued at an early date by a three-way rivalry. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had roots in the mid-1950's and associations with Angolan and Portuguese Communists. Marxist-oriented and *mestiço* (mulatto) led, the MPLA drew its support from the intellectuals, the African slum dwellers around the

<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of guerrilla tactics in the wars, see Thomas H. Henriksen, "People's War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3 (September, 1976), pp. 376-405.

<sup>2</sup>A clear analysis of the Angolan war and much of the country's history can be found in Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

capital city of Luanda, and the Mbundu people, who constitute 25 percent of the population and inhabit the region east of the capital. After the failure of its assaults on military posts and civilian power centers in Luanda in early 1961, the MPLA suffered factionalism and setbacks.

By 1966, its leader, Agostinho Neto, a poet and medical doctor, had sufficiently consolidated the party to launch insurgency campaigns in northern and eastern Angola, where it established some liberated zones with rival administrations. But its operations in Cabinda, the oil-rich enclave surrounded by Zaire and the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), met with failure during the war with Portugal.

The third principal nationalist movement emerged from a personality and ethnic squabble within FNLA, when Jonas Savimbi, who had been Roberto's foreign minister, broke with FNLA. Two years later, in 1966, the Swiss-educated Savimbi formed the largely Ovimbundu-supported National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), within Angola's east central district of Moxico. Although UNITA was based among the Ovimbundu people, who are the largest ethno-linguistic group (40 percent of the Angolan population), it lacked unencumbered access to a neighboring sanctuary state for supplies and unrestricted training facilities. Political considerations within Zambia dictated a termination of UNITA's exile base. As a consequence, its military growth but not its popularity was stunted.

A chilling fact of the Angolan war was the fratricide among movements. In spite of repeated truces, fire-fights in the bush and political assassinations in the towns characterized relations. Internecine quarrels particularly threatened the existence of UNITA, the weakest of the three groups, and may have led it to collaborate occasionally with the Portuguese.

Another distinguishing feature of the Angolan struggle involved the significant intrusion of the foreign patrons of the various factions. During the war with Portugal, foreign involvement—albeit clandestine and exclusive of combat troops—exacerbated Angolan feuds but did not alone cause the splits. Personal ambition, ideological divisions, personality clashes, regional pulls and ethnic resentment—all form part of the movements' political history.<sup>3</sup> Most revolutions have been afflicted by factionalism. But the Angolan revolution differed from previous African revolts in the extent of fragmentation and in the role played by foreign forces.

When Portuguese officers, disgruntled with the seemingly endless colonial wars and with a myriad of professional grievances, toppled the Lisbon govern-

ment, no Angolan movement had achieved ascendancy. Indeed, the last year of the war saw a lull in the fighting that enabled the Portuguese to shift troops to the more pressing Mozambican theater. The cessation of hostilities in Angola, therefore, signaled a renewed round of political activity as each faction hustled for followers and jockeyed for power. Broadening efforts notwithstanding, each nationalist movement's main strength remained inside its ethnic constituency. But UNITA's progress was the most startling of the three.

Weakest of the movements during the war, UNITA emerged the unexpected front-runner with the peace. Savimbi dropped his Maoist rhetoric and called himself a socialist, a "realist." His undemagogic stance appealed to Portuguese settlers, who judged him as the best alternative against what they perceived as the Communist Neto and the tribalist Roberto. Peaceful transition to African rule benefited UNITA the most.

Realizing the potential for violence among competing groups, from the time of the coup to early 1975 Lisbon tried to steer Angolans toward orderly independence and lawful electoral competition. Some local military officials tended to favor the MPLA because it was in accord with their left-wing views. The infighting and distrust of the war years, however, were not to be undone quickly. There were increasing portents of impending trouble by mid-1974; and the Soviet Union and China, eager for influence in Africa, were stepping up support for opposing factions.

The Soviet Union had furnished limited assistance to the MPLA from the 1960's to 1973, when it concluded that the movement's internal squabbles barred its success. In the fall of 1974, however, Moscow resumed weapons shipments in ever-increasing amounts to the MPLA, preceded a few months earlier by the Chinese, who had rushed arms and instructors to FNLA bases in Zaire. To avert a full-scale civil war, Lisbon flew the contending leaders to Alvor in southern Portugal at the end of January, 1975, for a conference. The consequent Alvor Accord established a transition government comprised of the three movements, along with Portugal, and set an independence date of November 11, 1975. At the time of the Alvor meeting, the United States covertly gave the FNLA a small grant of \$300,000.

Hardly had the ink dried on the Alvor Accord than the clashes among factions gave way to sharpening combat. The FNLA moved southward into Angola to attack MPLA units in the north and in Luanda. On its home turf in Luanda, the MPLA counterreacted, destroying Roberto's tenuous hold in the seaside capital. At first, UNITA remained aloof from the FNLA-MPLA battles, but in early August, 1975, Savimbi's followers joined Roberto's against

<sup>3</sup> A definitive account of the early years of the Angolan struggle is found in John Marcum's *The Angolan Revolution*, vol. 1, *The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966).

the MPLA. This cooperation gave way to an uneasy UNITA-FNLA alliance, more for the sake of survival than out of any ideological or ethnic compatibility.

From the spring of 1975 to February, 1976, when the FNLA and UNITA main forces met defeat, the escalation of the civil war was as steady as it was bitter. In August, 1975, Soviet and Cuban instructors first appeared in Angola on the side of the MPLA. Cuban combat troops began arriving in late October, as the date of independence approached. At almost the same time, an armored column of South African troops, former Portuguese soldiers and a sprinkling of mercenaries spearheaded northwestward to head off a Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA victory. Under the protection of Panhard armored cars and Alouette helicopters, the South African-sponsored column drove the MPLA northward and back to its Mbundu base.

South Africa's assistance, however, boomeranged for its clients. Pretoria's support for the FNLA-UNITA coalition deflected continental censure of Soviet-Cuban intervention and brought African criticism of Roberto and Savimbi for their cooperation with the hated masters of apartheid. Alarmed by prospects of a "Soviet" Angola, the United States supplied over \$30 million in equipment to FNLA and UNITA, to little avail.<sup>4</sup>

Independence day witnessed enlarged supplies of Soviet weapons and Cuban soldiers and the MPLA's announcement of a People's Republic of Angola. Russian 122-mm rockets and the 13,500 Cuban regulars ferried to Angola by Soviet aircraft turned back the FNLA's siege of Luanda and the northward-moving South African force. The Moscow-Havana intrusion was decisive; the MPLA could not have defeated its rivals so quickly, if at all, without outside help. Without massive Soviet-Cuban intervention, some sort of partition would have been a more likely scenario.

By March, 1976, the heavy fighting was finished. The FNLA, followed by hordes of refugees, had been pushed across the Zairean border. In the south, UNITA's capital at Huambo (Nova Lisboa) fell to the MPLA and its non-African allies. Further south, on the Angolan-Namibian border, a South African force of 4,000 men held a slender swath of territory along the frontier, ostensibly to protect the South African-financed Cunene River Dam but more likely

to act as a buffer against possible nationalist-directed and Cuban-supported attacks on the white-held territory. A few months later, Pretoria abandoned Angola. Recognition of the MPLA government came from a majority of African states as the war wound down.

What fighting still exists is confined to regions distant from the capital. In the southeast, Savimbi and remnants of UNITA's army carry on a widening guerrilla struggle, reportedly financed by multinational corporations with interests in Angola. UNITA raiders attack the Benguela Railroad vital to Zambia's copper shipments and to Angola's economy. In the Cabinda enclave, a similar hit-and-run war is being waged. The Cabindans strove for independence in the wake of Portugal's collapse, but during the civil war the MPLA gained control. At this writing, encounters take place between the MPLA-Cuban forces and the Cabinda Liberation Movement (MOLICA), which is probably sustained by Zaire's President Joseph Mobutu. The Zairean leader also appears to support the FNLA's insurgency in the northeast, where coffee plantations have been burned.<sup>5</sup>

The continued fighting provides one explanation for the MPLA's much-publicized trial of white mercenaries in June and the prompt execution of four "dogs of war," one of whom was an American. The MPLA's actions were designed in part to serve as a warning to potential mercenaries. At this time, the ongoing conflicts in the countryside show little prospect of reversing the MPLA victory, but they could persist in absorbing its energies.

### THE COST

The cost of civil war and foreign intervention was great. An estimated 20,000 Angolans, most of them civilians, died in the fighting. Some 350,000 of the 400,000 Portuguese fled, taking with them badly needed skills and resources. Currently, the MPLA government is relying on outsiders, mostly Cubans but also Russians, Algerians and Yugoslavs, to replace Portuguese administrators and technicians in education, health and, notably, agriculture. Of all the problems related to war damage, transport probably looms the largest. The combatants destroyed many bridges. Fleeing Portuguese took their vehicles. Buses, trucks and taxis left behind lack spare parts and mechanics to repair them.

Political and economic problems abound. Shortages in food are held responsible for theft and lawlessness. Yet the new government regards criminals as "reactionary elements" who try to "undermine the socialist revolution." Labor unrest entailing shut-downs and strikes is a serious concern. President Neto, a somewhat moderating force, faces pro-Soviet and pro-Maoist factions in the MPLA. This friction is overlaid with and confused by racial feelings be-

<sup>4</sup> For a critical appraisal of Washington's policy during the Angolan civil war, see John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 54, no. 3 (April, 1976), pp. 407-25.

<sup>5</sup> Elaboration on some of these points can be found in Marvine Howe, "Rebels in Angola Report Advances," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1976, p. 9, and June Goodwin, "Angola: UNITA Guerrillas Step Up Fighting," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 9, 1976, p. 4.

tween Africans and Angolans of mixed ancestry. Black power advocates are pro-Moscow and against the predominance of the better educated *mestiços* in the MPLA hierarchy. For its own ends, the Soviet Union appears to be endorsing the black extremists against Neto, who subscribes to multiracialism. Some *mestiço* party members, in turn, are critical of what they view as Soviet imperialism in Angola.

Outsiders wonder about the cost of the Soviet-Cuban help. What price, if any, will Moscow demand? And what will the MPLA answer? African nationalism is a vibrant force, and the evidence to date suggests that Angolans will assert their independence from outside forces. But Moscow's intentions still trouble foreign nations as well as some Angolans. Justifying its stand on the continued presence of Cuban forces (now estimated at 20,000–25,000), the United States temporarily vetoed Angola's application for United Nations membership in late June, 1976.

Most of Angola's problems will probably decrease as the MPLA consolidates its position and normalcy returns to the war-ravaged country. The resiliency and durability of Neto and the MPLA core have been sorely tested in the past and not found wanting. Time will determine whether the past is a true indication of the future.

### THE MOZAMBICAN REVOLUTION

Across the southern end of the continent from Angola, Mozambique suffered none of the deep political divisions that plagued her former sister colony. But Mozambique has had troubles enough of her own. This southeast African country began its independence war in 1964 under the direction of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).<sup>6</sup> Although FRELIMO experienced some infighting within the party (the assassination in 1969 of the first President, Eduardo Mondlane, was one consequence), it never confronted a serious rival movement. Being almost the sole representative of Mozambican nationalism, FRELIMO dealt with ethnic rivalries by issuing a national appeal to all groups and by recruiting diverse peoples, even some Portuguese.

Building on its wartime program, since independence FRELIMO has launched a largely effective effort stressing Mozambican nationality rather than ethnicity. At the investiture of the transition government, Samora Machel, FRELIMO's second head and President of the country, said that it was his goal "to forge a Mozambican mentality from the Rovuma to the Maputo [rivers]." Mozambique's

problems stem from a colonial legacy, government policies and a location in southern Africa.

FRELIMO's takeover was disciplined and fairly smooth during the transition period from September 20, 1974, to independence on June 25, 1975, in spite of the fact that FRELIMO's control and active influence in the northern tier during the war extended to only two-fifths of a territory twice the size of California. The south and central regions had to be consolidated within a nine-month period. As one means to accomplish this and to involve the population in the governing process, FRELIMO set up *grupos dinamizadores* ("activating groups") to assist in the politicization of the population. Future plans include the transformation of the *grupos* into committees when they are politically advanced enough to insure participation at the lowest levels of society.

Before independence FRELIMO dealt handily with strikes and rural violence by appeals to national reconstruction. Working with the Portuguese, FRELIMO extinguished a race riot in the capital of Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques) early in the transition period and "nipped in the bud" two reactionary plots soon afterward. It also competently managed natural and man-made crises in the interim months before independence. Floods in the Limpopo Valley in the fall of 1974 left about 80,000 people homeless and caused near famine among another 250,000. About 150,000 returning war refugees from Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia added to the problems of resettling many thousands of *aldeamento* (fortified villages erected by the Portuguese in the war) inhabitants. The transition government rode out these storms, but FRELIMO faced serious challenges with the coming of independence.

Chief among the new government's priorities was the establishment of central economic planning to match the rising expectations of the mass of Mozambicans for improved social services and consumer goods. The privileges of a few had to be checked in order to divert scarce resources to broadening and developing the economy. To achieve self-sufficiency in food, FRELIMO has begun to set up communal farms although small individual plots are allowed to exist. By means of central control and collectivization, the government hopes to avoid neocolonial domination by the wealthy nations trying to develop Mozambique's natural resources of coal, iron, and hydroelectrical power (i.e., the giant Cabora Bassa Dam) and to emphasize agricultural production instead of industrialization. The government's plans, in fact, have initially disrupted the economy and have led to increased dependence on foreign assistance.

In FRELIMO's rush toward an egalitarian society, it eradicated most private enterprise, except the small business sector, and even nationalized the services of the few remaining doctors and missionary teachers.

<sup>6</sup> For a nationalist's account of the war, see Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), pp. 138–62, and for the Portuguese viewpoint, see F. X. Maier, *Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique* (New York: American African Affairs Association, 1974).

It also nationalized private dwellings in the Portuguese suburbs and seized homes vacated by fleeing whites. The FRELIMO government struck out against elitism in secondary schools and the university by sending the students into the fields to work. Prostitution was halted and the importation of luxury goods was curtailed. Private gain, profiteering and capitalism have been denounced. The purpose is to equalize the standard of living among Mozambique's 8 million Africans.

The new government's revolutionary economic program pressed most heavily on the Portuguese residents, formerly the most privileged group, and increased European feelings of being a persecuted minority. About half of the 225,000 Europeans had left the colony before independence. FRELIMO's moves toward an austere Marxist state reduced the remaining number to some 30,000, with the consequent loss of technicians, administrators, schoolteachers and doctors.

At the end of 1975, an equally zealous commitment to rid the party and army of "corruption, dishonesty, immorality and indiscipline" brought on a revolt involving 400 dissident soldiers in the capital. After the shooting stopped in Maputo, the Machel government was still in firm control. Resisters to the new economic order of revolutionary puritanism have been sent to "decolonization" camps for hard work and ideological training to rid them of a "capitalistic mentality."

Since the country is all but sealed off to Western journalists, most information about conditions in Mozambique comes from departing Portuguese, who have every reason to want to discredit the government's policies. They speak of ethnic disputes, resistance to communal farming, factionalism in the government and unrest in the army. Their flight has resulted in breakdowns in transportation, food production, health services and, most noticeably, port facilities.

Journalists and observers have worried about the loss of civil liberties because of the establishment of reeducation farms and the formation of a secret police known by its acronym, SNASP. They have been also perplexed by the economic dislocation of the FRELIMO program. Beneath the spartan Marxist flavor of the revolution, however, there is an easily overlooked flexibility and undogmatic practice. On the international level, the most frequently cited example of FRELIMO's "pragmatism" is Mozambique's continuing economic relations with South Africa. Mozambique's economy is buoyed by South Africa's use of her ports and by wages paid to Mozambican laborers in Transvaal mines.

On the local level, and often ignored, is the practice of something akin to Mao Tse-tung's "mass line" approach during the early days of Communist

power in China. By utilization of the mass line, the party eschews doctrinaire application of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories at the grass roots. Rather, it conducts on-the-spot investigations to determine social and political problems among the people of a locality or enterprise. Solutions and interpretations are sought in marxism but they are sought in order to build a mass movement and not to impose party dictates. Seen from this perspective, as it gropes toward its own brand of marxism the Mozambican revolution seems less chaotic. Such a blueprint underlines FRELIMO's struggle to preserve the indigenous quality of the revolution despite aid and instruction from China and from the East European bloc. It should also be borne in mind that the imposition of Marxist systems in Asia have all proved initially disruptive of the established social order and of the pre-revolutionary economy.

In the immediate future, Machel's leadership and the success of the revolution depend on his ability to check the formation of new elites and to develop able and committed cadres, while attaining a measure of economic well-being and maintaining support from potentially rebellious sectors of the society.

#### THE BORDER WAR

A dislocated economy, European departures, and the creation of a socialist economy are often overshadowed in newspaper reporting by Mozambique's stand against white-ruled Rhodesia (called Zimbabwe by nationalists). Even before the Salisbury regime lost its Mozambican dike against rising African nationalism, FRELIMO had cooperated with Zimbabwe guerrillas. Beginning in December, 1972, the Zimbabweans resumed strikes into Rhodesia using FRELIMO-dominated territory for a sanctuary from Rhodesian counterattacks.

Guerrilla attacks have been greatly stepped up since Mozambique's independence. Several Zimbabwe training camps dot the western Mozambique frontier zone, and guerrilla incursions take place along the length of the Mozambican-Rhodesian border. Officials in Salisbury have accused FRELIMO forces of firing rockets and mortars at their positions along the frontier. Rhodesian "hot pursuit" assaults, and air attacks have caused Mozambican casualties, and on March 3 Machel closed the border to Rhodesian traffic, declaring a "state of war" with the white regime.

The cost to Mozambique will be high. Her colonially shaped economy is reliant on traffic from  
(Continued on page 181)

---

Thomas H. Henriksen has written several articles on African nationalism and Portuguese colonialism. His book, *Mozambique: A History*, is to be published by Rex Collings, London, early in 1977.

---

"The future of [the] new alliance system between the Middle East and African nations is not clear."

## Africa and the Nations of the Middle East

BY RICHARD E. BISSELL

*Visiting Professor of Political Science, Temple University*

ON APRIL 8, 1976, an El Al airliner swept into the airport at Ben Gurion airport near Jerusalem carrying South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster and the most important members of his Cabinet. This was not a covert visit, like those undertaken by Vorster in recent years to amenable African states, but a full-blown state visit to Israel, with all the publicity and the communiqués that signal a high-level meeting.

In mid-April, 1976, an equally unprecedented meeting took place between African and Arab foreign ministers in Dakar, Senegal. Like the Israeli-South African talks, this meeting also altered history as Arabs and Africans pledged themselves to a summit meeting of Heads of State in early 1977. A draft program of cooperation between the two regions was created, to be ratified by the summit meeting and put into action by a constellation of new organizations servicing Arabs and black Africans.

These meetings were not held without controversy, but the fact that they were held at all demonstrates the revolution in African international relations in the past five years. In a region of episodic diplomacy, the continuing strength of the new alliance systems with the Middle East has baffled outside experts on Africa.

One benchmark date to consider is the year 1959. There were only a handful of independent black African states. South Africa, under pressure of a minimal sort from the international community, still participated fully in those areas where she chose to do so. Israel's position was as strong as it had ever been. As Arnold Rivkin noted in an issue of *Foreign Affairs* that year,

<sup>1</sup> Arnold Rivkin, "Israel and the Afro-Asian World," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 37 (April, 1959), p. 495.

<sup>2</sup> See I. M. Lewis, ed., *Islam in Tropical Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); and J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Influence of Islam upon Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1968).

<sup>3</sup> James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 90-91.

The friendly and mutually profitable relations which Israel has achieved with other young states have also been successful thus far in forestalling Egyptian efforts to turn the Afro-Asian bloc against Israel. The refusal of the African states and political organizations to take an anti-Israeli position at the respective Accra Conferences, already noted, is one instance of this important development.<sup>1</sup>

All across the Sahel, the border between Arab and black Africa, the Arabs were still regarded with fear and distrust because of their historical roles as slave-traders.<sup>2</sup>

South Africa showed little interest in the problems of the Middle East. At the time of the 1956 war, South Africa had taken a studiously neutral role. While South Africa tended to oppose Egypt on the basis of Egyptian rhetoric at the United Nations supporting liberation movements in southern Africa, strong forces precluded a diplomatic embrace with Israel: the strength of socialist parties in independent Israel, the ineptness of the Anglo-French-Israeli effort in 1956, and a residual anti-Semitism among some segments of the Nationalist party in South Africa.<sup>3</sup> In the late 1950's, then, South Africa had no stake in the Middle East conflict (except that the closing of the Suez Canal led to increased ship traffic around the Cape of Good Hope), and Israel saw little to gain from ties with South Africa.

The focus of interest in Africa in the early 1960's was the new states of black Africa. Nations competed to provide a model for the young states on the road to development and industrialization. Much publicity was given to the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union. But among the most effective was the small, technically capable aid corps of Israel.

The new states of Africa responded favorably to Israel's low-cost, highly effective programs. In part, such favoritism for Israel was negatively produced, because many African states were attempting to reduce the influence of the larger powers. Israel, too, offered new forms of societal organization that represented a middle road between capitalism and

socialism: trade unions, agricultural cooperatives, technical education, and scholarships to Israeli universities were topics of earnest discussion between newly arrived diplomats from Tel Aviv and the neophytes leading African countries in the early 1960's.

### ISRAEL AND GHANA

The Israeli diplomats were a remarkable lot, skillful in parlaying tiny aid programs into political influence. In Ghana, Ambassador Ehud Avriel was a legend in the early years of Kwame Nkrumah's reign. As a close confidante of Nkrumah, Avriel was the person who would intercede for the United States Ambassador for an appointment with Nkrumah. Such influence, however, was frequently dependent on one man's skill. Thus when Avriel was transferred from Accra in the early 1960's, the Israeli position declined, and Nkrumah, like many African leaders, began to improve Egyptian ties. Symbolic changes followed, like Nkrumah's decision to import the cement for the National Construction Company of Ghana from Egypt rather than continuing the trade with Israel.<sup>4</sup>

Black Africa also developed important ties with Israel in the most sensitive spheres of national survival. The granting of military assistance by Israel to many African states flowed naturally from the admiration of many new leaders for Israel's ability to survive in a world of giants. Israel posted technical training missions in many countries, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Kinshasa, to train elite corps that would ensure the survival of the weak African states. The Israelis also specialized in the production of light weapons within the price range of the new states. But admiration for Israeli light guns was not limited to the black African states. At the first opportunity, South Africa also asked the Israelis to establish a factory to produce Uzi machine guns in South Africa; that factory still exists, as the Israelis have apologetically explained, because once such a production establishment is sold with the technology, it is impossible to take it back.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Leopold Laufer, "Israel and the Third World," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 87 (December, 1972), p. 623.

<sup>5</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 135.

<sup>6</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-215; and C. W. deKiewiet, "The World and Pretoria," *South Africa International*, vol. 1 (July, 1970), p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> See Richard E. Bissell, "South Africa and International Ostracism," *World Affairs*, vol. 137 (winter, 1974-1975), pp. 179-185; and Richard E. Bissell, "The 'Fourth World' at the United Nations," *The World Today*, vol. 31 (September, 1975), pp. 376-382.

<sup>8</sup> See Leopold Laufer, *op. cit.*, and Susan Aurelia Gitelson, "Why Do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers? Lessons from the African Experience," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 18 (December, 1974), pp. 451-484.

What, then, were the African stakes in the Middle East in the early 1960's? The Arab states had little to offer either black or white Africans. Israel, on the other hand, could offer the black African states a development model and real economic and military aid. Nonetheless, the new African leaders did not take sides in the Middle East dispute on that basis. The spirit of "neutralism" was too strong. Black African leaders believed that both sides should be recognized, an attitude abandoned only in the Middle East war of 1973. South Africa had a more limited interest, which began to change after the 1967 Middle East war. As James Barber has pointed out:

By the late 1960's, and especially after the Israelis' dramatic victory in the Six Day War of 1967, the comparison was drawn in terms of two small states which had demonstrated their ability to survive by guts and determination. The Israeli experience confirmed the South African view that apparently overwhelming odds can be overcome by a combination of economic and technical strength, a dedicated citizen army, and a concerted national effort.<sup>6</sup>

In other words, as South Africa came under increasing pressure from the international community,<sup>7</sup> she became sensitive to analogous situations in other regions: Israel was a logical candidate for emulation.

### CONTINENTAL DRIFT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

At the same time, there was a parallel black African drift toward the Arabs. Those who study "politics by crisis" generally point to the 1973 Yom Kippur War as the moment when black Africa turned away from Israel; more discerning observers identified the trend earlier.<sup>8</sup>

To some degree, Israel suffered simply because her diplomats had been in Africa long enough to make enemies. Familiarity does not always breed friendship, and the assiduous efforts of the Israelis to become involved in the development of the young African states rubbed many groups the wrong way. Intellectuals, for instance, began to blame the Israelis for the growth of military regimes in Africa, charging that there was a relationship between the training of capable military leaders by the Israelis in Africa and their propensity to take over civilian governments. As the intellectuals became increasingly oppressed by military governments, they needed an external scapegoat. The Israelis served that role perfectly. African groups that were ideologically oriented also became enamored of the Palestinian cause in the Middle East as they lost patience with the Israeli development model. In many countries, the goal of socialism gave way to socialist slogans that created a new cycle of public discontent and a need for external scapegoats. Israel's "blood, sweat, and tears" approach to development faced a credibility gap as the terms of trade turned against the African states. The African states lost interest in

the "bootstraps" development approach and increasingly demanded a redistribution of global wealth.

The appeasement of radical groups in various African countries, including Niger, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville) and Ethiopia, led some African states to break diplomatic relations with Israel in the 1972-1973 period. It has been suggested that some African governments needed to make a symbolic break with the West, without offending the major aid donors in each case (France or the United States). With Israel increasingly identified with the West, expelling her diplomats satisfied radicals without disrupting the principal financial flows into Africa.<sup>9</sup> Such moves, however, were not yet a dominant theme in African international relations. They simply reflected domestic demands in specific countries for change, and different governments responded to that pressure in various ways.

The year 1973 marked a watershed in relations between Africa and the Middle East. For Africa, the major event of the year was not the Yom Kippur War—it was the quadrupling of oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in early October. But the war did have its impact. Many African military leaders saw Israel's lack of preparedness and Egypt's consequent gains as the failure of an army equipped with Western arms. Some drew parallels to the defeat of the Italians at Adowa, Ethiopia, in 1896 by a ragged Ethiopian army. Such an analogy fails any objective test, but the perceived mystique of Israeli invincibility was shattered.

The escalation of oil prices by OPEC also created an entirely new relationship between the Africans and the Arabs. It placed tremendous financial pressure on the black African states, it discredited the Israeli development model, and it gave the OPEC states the power that comes with money.

The black African states saw their balance of payments position destroyed overnight. Those with surpluses were reduced to marginal cases and the majority, already in trouble, were faced with imminent bankruptcy. When, in the wake of the oil price rise, the United Nations created a new category of nations euphemistically called "most-affected countries," African states comprised nearly 70 percent of the list. The limited sovereignty possessed by the African states was reduced even further as their credit ratings dropped out of sight. The ability of the African states to reduce petroleum consumption was far more limited than the ability of Western nations; most petroleum consumed in Africa was already being used for essential purposes.

<sup>9</sup> Gitelson, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas A. Johnson, "Black Africans at U.N. Question Extent and Motives of Arab Aid," *The New York Times*, October 23, 1975, p. 2.

The Africans saw a new model of development and wealth transfer in the OPEC action. And in this view they were encouraged by the Algerians and Venezuelans, who offered to use some of their new wealth to finance other commodity price support arrangements. The old Israeli method of plotting development progress arithmetically gave way to the OPEC method of increasing wealth geometrically.

Nearly all countries in Africa rely upon some particular export crop for their earnings—witness the cocoa of Ghana, the diamonds of the Central African Republic and Angola, and the copper of Zambia. The strategy of OPEC came through the fog of poverty like a beacon lighting the home port. No longer would the developing countries have to grope toward development on their hands and knees. African leaders came to believe that all commodity exports could be the objects of successful cartels, like OPEC.

If the Africans were thus reduced to poverty and grandiose dreams of the distant future, who was there to ensure their survival? The Israelis had no money to offer them. Israel's entire aid program had run in the region of \$10 million—a drop in the oil barrel. Israel's Western allies did little to stop the demise of Israeli influence in Africa. Cutbacks in foreign aid, particularly by the United States and France, at a time when energy and food costs were rising out of sight, forced many states to make unwanted political concessions to get aid. By the process of elimination, the Africans began to deal with the Arabs.

Chad, for instance, was struck by the severe Saharan drought and a cutback in French aid at the same time. When the mercurial Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya offered Chad \$92 million in aid, twice Chad's annual budget, with the only string being a break with Israel, Chad snapped up the offer. Such bilateral deals were not attractive to most African leaders, however, because the political *quid pro quo* demanded by the Arabs was humiliating to their pride. The Arab unwillingness to extend aid without strings created widespread resentment,<sup>10</sup> and gradually gave rise to demands from groups like the Organization of African Unity for more generous and more suitable arrangements for the transfer of funds from Arabs to Africans.

While the black Africans and Arabs were attempting—

(Continued on page 181)

---

**Richard E. Bissell**, author of many articles on the Organization of African Unity and southern Africa, holds a concurrent research appointment with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, where he serves as managing editor of *ORBIS*. His forthcoming book on southern Africa is entitled *Apartheid and International Organizations*.

---

*"Three component parts of southern Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland, illustrate some of the political problems involved in the southern African zone of tension and conflict."*

## Political Changes in Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland

BY RICHARD DALE

*Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale*

THE DOCTRINE of the self-determination of nations, an elegant phrase coined by United States President Woodrow Wilson during World War I, was more readily invoked than defined and has come to be a semantic battleground for those in southern Africa who have chosen to dismantle the structures and folkways of white power. In the region often defined as southern Africa, the white power structure is still intact in South Africa, Rhodesia, and South-West Africa (or Namibia, as it is termed in the United Nations and by the United States government, which accepts the United Nations terminology). English-speaking Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia), Malawi (once called Nyasaland), Botswana (known as Bechuanaland prior to independence), Lesotho (once termed Basutoland), and Swaziland, as well as Portuguese-speaking Angola and Mozambique are now sovereign states under African majority rule. Three component parts of southern Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland, illustrate some of the political problems involved in the southern African zone of tension and conflict.

The country known as South-West Africa to some and Namibia to many more (the name derives from the inhospitable coastal desert, which is known as the Namib Desert) was taken over by the Imperial German government (except for the deep water port at Walvis Bay midway between the borders of Portuguese Angola and the British Cape Colony) more than 90 years ago. Despite its designation as a protectorate of the German Empire, it could hardly be said to be based on the consent of the non-Germans, and even the German residents were not granted self-government until a few years before the outbreak of World

War I.<sup>1</sup> Although some African peoples may have initially welcomed the German intrusion as a device to check the territorial ambitions of other African peoples, the subsequent response to imperial rule was insurgency, especially among the Nama and Herero groups, followed by the efficient and deadly counter-insurgency of the German *Schutztruppen*.

The past is not forgotten by either victor or vanquished: the visitor to Windhoek, the capital city, and Swakopmund, the winter holiday resort for whites on the Atlantic, sees the statues of the past, commemorating the sacrifices of German soldiers and marines who perished in the colonial campaigns. Some of the churches in Windhoek still carry rolls of honor enumerating the German civilians who lost their lives in various African uprisings. Although they defeated the Germans on the field of battle in South-West Africa in 1914–1915, the South Africans allowed many Germans to remain in the territory and tried to reach a political accommodation with them in the 1920's, when the territory was governed by South Africa as a League of Nations mandated territory. The Permanent Mandates Commission, which sat in Geneva and was composed of private experts (rather than the government appointees who took charge under the United Nations Trusteeship Council), expressed far more concern for the status and well-being of the Africans in the territory than did the local whites or the political notables in the Union Buildings in Pretoria or the Parliament in Cape Town.

South African whites interpreted self-government and the principle of the consent of the governed to mean that the territory would, in due course, become a fifth province of South Africa. The Permanent Mandates Commission remonstrated politely with South Africa with regard to her policy of incremental incorporation; in the commission's view, the inhabitants of the territory were the Africans, more so than the whites, and the principal responsibility of the re-

<sup>1</sup> Those interested in the German phase of South-West African history should consult J. H. Esterhuyse, *South West Africa, 1880–1894: The Establishment of German Authority in South West Africa* (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1968) and Helmut Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule, 1894–1914* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).

gime in Pretoria was to elevate the socioeconomic and political status of the Africans. The commission, however, did not regard independence as a reasonable goal for the inhabitants of the territory and it had no coercive powers to ensure that South Africa administered the mandate in ways pleasing to the commission.

Wilsonian precepts about self-determination, which applied more to the continent of Europe than to Africa, were refurbished in the Atlantic Charter and in the Charter of the United Nations. General Jan C. Smuts, who attended both the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference and the 1945 San Francisco Conference that created the United Nations, not only assisted in helping to draft the mellifluous preamble to the Charter but also asked permission of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 to annex South-West Africa to South Africa. He regarded such an annexation as the correct application of the principle of self-determination and claimed that both the whites and the Africans in the territory had achieved consensus on this matter.

The General Assembly rejected his request and expressed its doubts about his interpretation of self-determination. Even before the advent of the Afro-Asian or third world bloc, the General Assembly construed the term to mean that the territory should be transformed into a United Nations Trust Territory which, in turn, would be an institutional mechanism for reaching nationhood and independence.

Thirty years later, the United Nations is still vitally interested in South-West Africa and its people, and the International Court of Justice has rendered four advisory opinions concerning the status of the territory as well as a judgment that may well have created more problems than it solved. In 1966, the General Assembly decided that South Africa should forfeit any rights to administer the territory and that its governance was the proper responsibility of the United Nations, which later adopted the name of Namibia for the territory.<sup>2</sup>

During these 30 years, the Pretoria regime steadfastly refused to acknowledge, by treaty or by other acts of statecraft and diplomacy, that it was responsible to the United Nations for its administration of the territory. Within the last two decades, the South African government drafted a blueprint for the mas-

sive economic improvement of the territory in terms of sorely needed communications and transport systems, but this blueprint carried with it the Pretoria-based proviso that such programs should be implemented within the grand design of separate development (or *apartheid*, as it was termed earlier). Thus ethnicity carried considerable geographic baggage, and each African ethnic group was granted its own exclusive territorial domain that was felicitously called its homeland. The whites, however, were not fragmented into Afrikaans-, English-, and German-speaking enclaves but were grouped together as one unit.<sup>3</sup>

Following the 1966 decision of the International Court at The Hague, which ruled that neither Liberia nor Ethiopia had any legal standing to bring a case against South Africa and which also avoided any evaluation of the propriety or legality of the application of *apartheid* to the territory, sporadic insurgency broke out, primarily at the northern frontier. Force invited counterforce, and a low-intensity guerrilla warfare has been waged on the Angolan-Zambian border between South African armed forces and police units, on the one hand, and small units of SWAPO (the South-West African Peoples' Organization of Namibia) guerrillas, on the other hand. Counterinsurgency operations have involved the use of African policemen armed for border service—a remarkable *volte-face* for a nation whose rulers have followed a consistent policy of withholding arms from Africans—and the declaration of a type of free-fire zone running parallel to the northern border.

SWAPO units have access to base camps or forward areas over the border in Angola and Zambia, but so far they have not penetrated into the white-controlled heartland of the territory to establish bases. The war is still fought in the bush, although visitors to Windhoek are aware of the presence of police and military units. Off-duty soldiers in combat dress stroll through the city streets on shopping errands and some wait at the Windhoek airport for their furlough flights back to Johannesburg or other South African metropolitan areas.

In Windhoek itself, the quest for consensus has continued at a refurbished old German gymnasium, known as the *Turnhalle*, located off the main street, *Kaiserstrasse*, which is heavily guarded by the police. An attempt has been made to gather together the principal ethnic units of the territory and to forge an agreement on a constitutional framework for the territory. The *Turnhalle* talks, however, mean different things for different groups: for the ultra-conservative whites (*verkrampptes*), they signify the end of the psychic and creature comforts of white paramouncy. Their view, however, did not prevail in a recent and critical by-election in Windhoek, which pitted the Reconstituted National party (HNP) of Jan Hertzog against the reigning National

<sup>2</sup> For a thorough account, which stresses the international legal aspects of recent South-West African history, consult Solomon Slonim, *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). A more recent account, which is congenial to the official South African view, is Gail-Maryse Cockram, *South West African Mandate* (Cape Town: Juta and Company Limited, 1976).

<sup>3</sup> The geographical aspects of South-West Africa, especially those relating to the Odendaal Plan of separate development, are carefully examined in John H. Wellington, *South West Africa and Its Human Issues* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967).

party of Prime Minister John Vorster. Other whites, like Dirk Mudge, the presiding officer of the *Turnhalle* talks, who met with United States Senator Charles Percy (R., Ill.) earlier this year, saw the talks as a manifestation of the new identity among white South Westers (as they term themselves). They draw a distinction between themselves and the South Africans in the Republic of South Africa and wish to assert their peculiar identity. To them, the demise of white paramouncy holds no psychic perils.<sup>4</sup>

The principal drawback of the *Turnhalle* talks, however, is that SWAPO has chosen not to participate in them; to that extent they are not a replication of the spectrum of African attitudes. Yet more than any other group, SWAPO was responsible for the organization of the insurgency campaign. SWAPO is regarded with considerable loathing by Prime Minister Vorster and with esteem and diplomatic recognition by other African leaders on the continent. Just how and when the level of insurgency in the North will subside will depend on what sort of *modus vivendi* can be worked out between SWAPO and its protagonists in Pretoria and Windhoek. One eminent South African political scientist has been expelled from the National party for suggesting the inclusion of SWAPO in the talks, and at least two other members of the South African academic and media elite have made known their desire for reconciliation. Senator Percy himself has suggested that the United States could make a positive contribution in terms of facilitating talks of this nature.<sup>5</sup> The latest accounts suggest that Pretoria is willing to grant independence to Namibia by the end of 1978, but the timetable and details of South African disengagement have yet to be announced.

Namibia's eastern neighbor, Botswana, was also a product of the great scramble for Africa in the last

<sup>4</sup> For an insightful analysis of the *Turnhalle* talks by one of the best journalists in Windhoek, see Clive Cowley, "War or Peace? Decision at Turnhalle," *The Star* (Johannesburg), June 16, 1976, late final ed., p. 35, cols. 1-10. See also Charles H. Percy, *The United States and Southern Africa: A Report . . . on His Study Mission to Southern Africa Conducted between April 13 and April 25, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., June, 1976), pp. 11-13 on Namibia. On the by-election, see "Nats Retain Windhoek in Low Poll," *The Star*, May 27, 1976, stop press ed., p. 3, cols. 8-9.

<sup>5</sup> The political scientist was Dr. Gerhard Tötemeyer of the University of Stellenbosch, who had served as Prime Minister Vorster's adviser on South-West Africa for a brief period. See Fleur de Villiers, "Cape Town: Top NP Men Are Divided on the SWAPO Issue," *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), June 6, 1976, p. 4, cols. 1-5. Also consult J. D. van der Vyver, John Dugard, and J. H. P. Serfontein, *South West Africa/Namibia: A Symposium* (Braamfontein, Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1976), especially pp. 7-23, as well as Senator Percy's report, pp. 11-13.

<sup>6</sup> For an exposition of this point of view, consult W. A. Godlonton, "Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. . .," *The New Rhodesia* (Salisbury), vol. 18, nos. 976 and 977 (April 6 and 13, 1951, respectively), pp. 10-11 and 10-12, respectively.

quarter of the nineteenth century. The British were interested in the territory known as Bechuanaland primarily as a buffer against German expansion from the west and Boer *Lebensraum* from the Transvaal, or the South African Republic as it was then called. Having little visible wealth, Bechuanaland was a stepping stone to the mineral treasures of Southern Rhodesia and thus served as a northern-bound conduit for the colonization of Southern Rhodesia by the so-called Pioneer Column of 1890. However, the greatest threat to the Africans of the Bechuanaland Protectorate came neither from the Germans nor the Afrikaners from the Transvaal but rather from the British South Africa Company, the British imperialist Cecil Rhodes' engine of expansion. Indeed, three African chiefs (with a white missionary as friend and translator) journeyed to London to petition Queen Victoria to protect them from one of her own subjects, Rhodes himself. The British South Africa Company maintained that it had certain residual rights to rule at least contiguous portions of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.<sup>6</sup> However, after the conclusion of the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War and the formation of the Union of South Africa through the amalgamation of two British and two Afrikaner colonies and republics, the imperial British government understood that the newly formed Union would lay claim to three territories within, or adjacent to, South Africa, namely, Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. The anticipatory phraseology regarding the incorporation of these three territories (collectively designated the High Commission Territories) was retained in the South African constitution even after the British granted independence to all three territories in 1966 (for Botswana and Lesotho) and 1968 (for Swaziland). In terms of possible annexation, Pretoria was a far greater threat than Salisbury.

The anticipation by both the British and the South African whites that Bechuanaland had no political future except as a province or glorified "native reserve" of South Africa explained much of the policy of cordial apathy and irresolution pursued by British officials in Bechuanaland. Indeed, the administrative headquarters of the Protectorate were inside South Africa (at Mafeking), in the region sometimes called British Bechuanaland, which was annexed to the Cape Colony in 1895. It was not until 1965 that the headquarters were moved north along the line of rail to Gaborone, now the capital city of Botswana. The new capital was built to coincide with the granting of self-government to the Protectorate in early 1965, followed by the granting of independence on September 30, 1966.

As Botswana approaches the end of her first decade of independence, the grandsons of two of the three chiefs who visited Queen Victoria are held in esteem,

although they represent the government and the opposition in a multiparty democracy. The better known grandson is Sir Seretse Khama, the President of Botswana, who served as the model for Nicholas Monsarrat's novel, *The Tribe That Lost Its Head* and whose marriage to an Englishwoman in the late 1940's ran counter to the norms of white Rhodesia, white South Africa, the British Labor party, and even some of his own kinsmen among the Bamangwato. For a number of years Khama was declared a prohibited immigrant in South Africa, a status that lasted until the mid-1960's, when it became obvious to the government in Pretoria that Khama and his Democratic party were to be taken seriously as the future rulers of an independent, neighboring republic.

### A STRATEGIC LOCATION

The Republic of Botswana is strategically located in southern Africa and is wedged in on three sides by white minority regimes: Namibia on the west, Rhodesia on the east, and South Africa on the south. Its sole geographical contact with black-ruled Africa is at Kazungula, where the Chobe and the Zambesi Rivers flow together. Two modern ferries owned by the Zambian government transport automobiles, trucks, and passengers from the Zambian to the Botswana side of the confluence of the two rivers. The road is tarred on the Zambian side all the way to Livingstone, but it is yet to be tarred south of the ferry at Kazungula. The so-called Botzam (that is, Botswana-Zambia) road will run southeast to join the railway at Francistown; thus trade between the two nations will be handled by means of the railway (which traverses the eastern perimeter of Botswana and is owned by Rhodesia at present) and truck haulage.

Because the border between Rhodesia and Zambia is currently closed, such goods will have to be placed on the freight train at Livingstone for their journey through Zambia. There is no air traffic between Botswana and either Namibia or Rhodesia, but there are scheduled runs between Botswana and South Africa, on the one hand, and Botswana and Zambia, on the other. The Khama government does not yet own the line of rail that runs through Botswana; thus it cannot afford to press sanctions against the government of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith unless it receives compensatory aid from the West. The Smith government has recently closed the rail gap between the southern border of Rhodesia and the northern border of the Transvaal Province of South Africa; hitherto all its trade with South Africa passed through Botswana, owing to a quirk of imperial history.

President Khama's government does not recognize the Smith government but it does deal with the Rhodesia Railways (which has an office in Gaborone)

out of sheer necessity. Despite recent mineral strikes and mining operations, the economic impoverishment of the nation precludes the implementation of economic warfare against the Rhodesian minority government; nor can Botswana afford a large standing army to patrol her borders. The government does have a paramilitary group called the PMU (Police Mobile Unit), but this elite nucleus of the police force is not strong enough to act as a deterrent to Rhodesian hot pursuit of African guerrillas who cross the Botswana-Rhodesian border in search of political sanctuary. Indeed, there has been an exchange of fire and there are charges that refugees have been kidnapped at Botswana's borders that fall within Rhodesian military operational areas. President Khama and the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique have played a political brokerage role in attempting to resolve the armed conflict in Rhodesia. In addition, Khama has tried to lessen his nation's dependence on South Africa, the economic giant of southern Africa. Thus in late August, 1976, Botswana issued her own currency in lieu of the South African *rand*. Botswana exchanges no ambassadors with Pretoria although the two nations have a treaty that permits Botswana to post a labor representative in the Witwatersrand area to help Botswana nationals who are working as contract laborers in South Africa.

The President enjoys wide esteem throughout the region, the Commonwealth, and the West; in 1976 he was awarded an honorary doctorate by Princeton University and addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and the Canadian Parliament. His stature can be traced in part to his chiefly heritage and university training in South Africa and in England (combining traditional and modern elements in an African setting) and in part to the power of example (with his British-born wife and Dutch son-in-law). His influence stems also from the strategic location of Botswana at the eye of the racial storm. Modern Gaborone can hardly be said to have the charm or old-world beauty of Windhoek; its attractiveness lies more in the tolerance and friendliness of its citizens, both black and white, and its self-conscious yet successful pursuit of a non-racial way of life. Its wealth is not material but philosophical. There are many American Peace Corps volunteers in Gaborone, Scandinavian young people who are doing their part in economic development, and even a

(Continued on page 183)

---

**Richard Dale** is the coeditor (with Christian Pottholm) of *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1972). He visited South-West Africa, Botswana and South Africa in 1970 and, more recently, traveled in South Africa, South-West Africa and Zambia in the summer of 1976.

---

*"Whether or not democracy is sustained . . . the crucial question is whether the military government can successfully weld the different sections of Nigeria into a unified nation."*

## Nigeria's Uncertain Future

BY LEVI A. NWACHUKU

*Assistant Professor of History, The University of Michigan, Flint*

WITH A population of 82 million<sup>1</sup> and an annual growth rate of 2.7 percent, Nigeria is the most populous black nation in Africa. She achieved her independence in an orderly and peaceful manner, and observers, therefore, saw a promising potential for progress and stability. Oil initially discovered in 1958 has made her the wealthiest black African nation. Of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) nations, Nigeria ranks fifth in terms of oil exports. By 1980, she expects to produce three million barrels of oil per day.<sup>2</sup>

Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, an analysis of socioeconomic and political conditions in Nigeria reveals a paradox. Although rich as a result of oil, Nigeria has not yet achieved social modernization, economic viability, or political stability. Since the fall of the civilian regime of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in January, 1966, the country has been undergoing a transition to a politically more viable state capable of assuming a leadership role in Africa.

When the military took over the government on January 15, 1966, many Nigerians felt that the army would correct the abuses of the civilian government. The young army officers who executed the coup d'état stated that it was their mission to clean up the country.<sup>3</sup> However, the army has been in power for ten years and the socioeconomic and political viability

that the Nigerians have sought since their country's independence has not yet been attained.

An underlying reason for perennial social malaise in Nigeria is the deep-rooted and widespread corruption that plagued the civilian regime and continues to undermine the efforts of the military regimes to create a society in which all Nigerians can enjoy the wealth of their nation. An editorial by one of the national papers commenting on the corruption that has engulfed Nigeria said: "Of all the ills that have so long befallen this country, lack of fair play, godfatherism, unequal opportunities, barefaced cheating in high places remain the most malignant."<sup>4</sup> And a high official commented: "I would not go to the extent of saying that everybody is corrupt in Nigeria, but most of our leaders—military and civil—are readily corrupt."<sup>5</sup> It was not, therefore, a surprise that General Yakubu Gowon, who ruled Nigeria from July 29, 1966, to July 29, 1975, was purported to have saved between \$112 million and \$320 million in foreign bank accounts.<sup>6</sup> The proclivity toward corruption is not limited to those in authority but extends to many other Nigerians, especially to those who regard the practice as a means of sharing the nation's wealth. Thus a Nigerian lawyer described this social evil as "democratic corruption," seeing it as "a way of redistributing wealth" in the country.<sup>7</sup> Beyond this, the get-rich-quick syndrome has gripped the psyche of many Nigerians, and Brigadier Emmanuel Abisoye, the Adjutant-General of the Nigerian army, reflected this thinking when he said, "The present [Nigerian] society encourages the belief that each man is entitled to acquire as much as he can through whatever means."<sup>8</sup>

It is, nonetheless, encouraging that the regimes of the late General Murtala Mohammed and Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo took measures to rescue the country from this social debility. In October, 1975, General Mohammed established a Permanent Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and Special Tribunal to handle all cases of corruption in all sectors of the nation's economy.<sup>9</sup> It is difficult

<sup>1</sup> Nigeria takes as her official population the census result of 1963 which is 555,558,163. However, the U.N. estimated the Nigerian population in 1975 at 82 million.

<sup>2</sup> *West Africa*, August 5, 1973, p. 965.

<sup>3</sup> Nzeogwu's statement in A. H. Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria*, vol. 1 (New York: 1971), pp. 125-126.

<sup>4</sup> *The Renaissance*, August 30, 1975, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *West Africa*, August 26, 1974.

<sup>6</sup> *Newbreed*, March, 1976, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Africa Confidential*, vol. 15, no. 20 (October 4, 1974), p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> *The New York Times*, March 6, 1975, p. E15.

<sup>9</sup> Full text of the 15th Independence Anniversary Broadcast by the Head of State, His Excellency Brigadier Murtala Mohammed. Special Press Release (Washington, D.C., Embassy of Nigeria: Information Division, October, 1975).

to say if this mechanism can eradicate bribery and corruption. However, there are hopeful signs that the problem is easing. Those in power now realize that public office is not a passport to the unscrupulous acquisition of wealth.

### SOCIAL SERVICES NEEDED

Besides corruption, Nigerian leaders are beset with problems created by increasing urbanization. Lagos, the lame duck capital of Nigeria, will have a population of 4 million by 1985, growing at a rate of 186 percent annually, second only to Bandung in growth rate.<sup>10</sup> Other Nigerian cities, like Aba, Port Harcourt, Owerri, Calabar, Enugu, Umuahia, Oyo, Ibadan, Benin, Onitsha, Jos, Kano and Kaduna, are increasingly inundated with immigrants from rural areas. Urbanization creates a need for social services and in Nigeria, the most crucial needs are for housing, sanitation, and intra-city transportation.

To many Nigerian workers in the cities, housing has always been an agonizing issue. Not only are rents high beyond the financial capability of most tenants, but there is also a severe shortage of housing. To ease the problem of high rent, the federal military government passed a rent control decree in 1968 and another in 1973. These decrees, described as "workers' charters," were designed to control rents. Unfortunately, the measure fell short of the desired objective. Realizing that as long as there are insufficient housing units, rents will be high, the federal government has embarked upon a massive housing program to build up to 200,000 housing units for all income groups in its third development plan in 1975-1980. To facilitate individual home ownership,<sup>11</sup> it plans to set up a \$240-million mortgage bank. It has also encouraged finance houses throughout the country to extend loans with reasonable interest rates to more Nigerians to build houses.

Nevertheless, it is not enough to provide adequate housing units for the urban dwellers. It is equally important to create a healthy urban sanitary environment. Nigerian cities suffer from poor sanitation. In his address to the opening session of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the National Council of Health, Dan Suleiman, a former Commissioner of

Health, lamented that "heaps of rubbish are dumped anywhere, gutters overflow with rubbish, industrial waste accumulates, food for sale is exposed to dirt and filth, and many homes are overcrowded." "All told," Suleiman continued, "Nigeria is a dirty country and may remain so despite our periodic and sporadic but expensive clean-up campaigns." To crown it all, in this "Environmental Health Year" (1976), the United Nations declared Lagos "the most unhygienic city in the world."<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, the plans of the military government to sanitize the cities have been unclear.

Along with sanitation problems, the federal government has recognized the need to improve health standards. Thus, it has earmarked \$2.72 billion for the health sector during the third development plan. Included in the health program is a proposal to provide 1,500 mobile clinics for rural settlements and a commitment to train 3,000 doctors yearly by 1980.<sup>13</sup>

### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

An observer commented that Nigeria "is literally floating in money."<sup>14</sup> Still, the country's economic viability depends largely on how well she can channel that wealth into constructive development programs. Nigeria's wealth results primarily from the financial yields of her crude petroleum; she derives 85 percent of her revenue from oil export. Nigeria should use this oil revenue to build a sound economic foundation that could continue well after the oil boom. The third development plan, 1975-1980, which General Yakubu Gowon inaugurated in March, 1975, reflects a commitment to modernize Nigeria, with emphasis on education, industrial development, agriculture and investment in the infrastructure of communication.

It is appalling for a country of 82 million with a gross domestic product of \$25 billion to have only a 25 percent literacy rate.<sup>15</sup> Partly to raise the literacy rate, the government introduced universal free primary education in September, 1976. Primary school enrollment, which stood at 5 million in 1975, is expected to reach 11.5 million by 1980. Primary education will be under the control of the federal government. The government will also encourage an increase in university enrollment to meet the manpower needs of the country. In 1975, university enrollment was 23,000, but the government estimates that the figure will reach 53,000 by 1980.<sup>16</sup> The federal government hopes eventually to make all levels of education free for all Nigerians.

Although Nigeria is primarily an agrarian country, she has a high industrial growth rate.<sup>17</sup> In 1972, the government began to make plans to build car assembly plants. Peugeot was the first to be built, at Kaduna. Production started in 1974, with an annual output of 10,000 vehicles. Volkswagen opened an assembly plant at Lagos in 1974 and in 1975 the British Ley-

<sup>10</sup> *West Africa*, April 15, 1974, p. 431.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, November 17, 1975, p. 1391.

<sup>12</sup> See Obi Okudo, "Nigeria and Filth, Any Way Out?" *Weekly Star*, May 2, 1976. See also "Filth May Suffocate Nigeria," *ibid.*, June 20, 1976.

<sup>13</sup> See address by General Yakubu Gowon on the occasion of formal launching of the Third Development Plan.

<sup>14</sup> *Washington Post*, June 6, 1976.

<sup>15</sup> *To, The Point International*, May 17, 1976, p. 25.

<sup>16</sup> General Yakubu Gowon, "Third Development Plan," *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> *U.N. World Economic Survey, 1974*, part 1 (New York, 1975), p. 68.

land Company contracted with the Nigerian government to set up a joint manufacturing facility in Ibadan. The plant is expected to produce 9,000 vehicles (buses, trucks, tractors and land rovers) a year. In this deal, the Nigerian government holds 40 percent of the equity, while the Leyland Company holds 35 percent, and the Nigerian public will bid for the remaining 25 percent. From 1971 to 1974, Nigeria imported 125,000 cars;<sup>18</sup> thus it seems appropriate that an investment in the car industry should be made. However, Nigeria has only assembly plants and will have to import parts. She should manufacture cars and not simply assemble cars manufactured in foreign countries.

### INDUSTRIALIZATION

The government is also developing other aspects of industrialization. Two more oil refineries are planned for the next four years, bringing the total to three. Also in the plan is the establishment of a petrochemical complex and a nitrogenous fertilizer plant. In November, 1970, the government signed agreements with the Soviet Union for a detailed design of a steel complex. A steel and iron ore mill is located at Ajaokuta in Kwara State, Northern Nigeria. Nigeria has also begun to improve and increase her transportation system. For the plan period, the government is committed to constructing more roads of a combined length of about 1,600 miles; six airports, one each at Kano, Lagos, Jos, Ilorin, Calabar and Enugu, are undergoing modernization. The 2,100-mile railroad system is also being improved; \$640 million has been earmarked for this.<sup>19</sup> A network of well-constructed roads will facilitate interstate communication and will reduce the incidence of deaths resulting from the traffic accidents on narrow and badly built highways; 5,552 Nigerians lost their lives in 1975 in traffic accidents.

Nigeria has not neglected agriculture. On April 1, 1976, Lieutenant-General Obasanjo, the Head of State, announced the inauguration of "Operation Feed the Nation." A National Council consisting of military personnel and federal commissioners for trade, information, cooperatives and supply, education and finance was appointed to take charge of the campaign, which involves encouraging schools, colleges, universities and individuals to grow all types of food crops. Essentially, this is a mass mobilization program for food production. To realize this goal,

the government has pledged its assistance to farmers to provide them with improved seeds, seedlings, and fertilizer.

Although it is important to embark on a major campaign for food production (especially when it is realized that Nigeria spent about \$8 billion on the importation of food and manufactured products during the 1975-1976 fiscal year),<sup>20</sup> it is even more important that the local farmers should be taught efficient and less expensive means of food production. Agriculture should be mechanized, and local food industries should be increased and subsidized by the government.

### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Political instability contributed to the demise of the civilian regime in 1966. Nigeria is heterogeneous, with strong ethnic affinities. The Yoruba, the Ibo and, to a larger extent, the Hausa-Fulani dominated the political scene in the civilian regime. Ethnic groups in a political minority felt frustrated. The army was concerned that political power should not be concentrated in a few ethnic groups and believed that the creation of more states would enable minority ethnic groups to share in the political process. In 1976, General Yakubu Gowon created twelve states and General Mohammed, who succeeded him, added seven more in 1976, bringing the total number to nineteen.

The creation of states based on ethnicity is seen as a preliminary step toward achieving political satisfaction for Nigeria's diverse peoples. Theoretically, no ethnic group will feel dominated by another.<sup>21</sup> The military government has set a date for the second time to return political life to the civilians. Gowon's government established a nine-point program to usher in civilian rule for Nigeria in 1976. In 1974, he rescinded his promise, charging that the country was ill prepared to assume the responsibility of a civilian government.<sup>22</sup> General Murtala Mohammed, who overthrew Gowon on July 29, 1975, stated that the army would transfer power to civilians on October 1, 1979. He was assassinated on February 13, 1976. His successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo, has so far given no indication that he will alter this date.

In October, 1975, as a preliminary to restoring civilian government, General Mohammed's regime appointed a committee of 50 under the chairmanship of Rotimi Williams, a veteran lawyer, to draw up a constitution. Mohammed stated that a major objective of the constitution would be "providing a sound basis for the continuing existence of a united Nigeria." Mohammed advised the committee to establish a federal system of government guaranteeing fundamental human rights; to create viable political institutions that would insure consensus political power; to eliminate cut-throat political competition

<sup>18</sup> *Africa*, February, 1976, p. 39.

<sup>19</sup> *West Africa*, December 1, 1974, p. 1451.

<sup>20</sup> *The Nigerian Chronicle*, March 11, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> General Mohammed reflected on this view in his address at the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee, October 18, 1975. See also *Report of the Panel on Creation of States* (Lagos, 1976).

<sup>22</sup> Levi A. Nwachuku, "Why Gowon Fell," *Africa Report*, September-October, 1975.

and electoral malpractices and to discourage institutionalized opposition to the government.<sup>23</sup> The committee is expected to submit the draft constitution in September, 1976.\*

If Nigeria is to attain civilian rule in 1979, many problems need to be resolved. The viability of civilian rule will depend largely on how successfully Nigeria works out the delicate ethnic balance that characterizes her polity. So far, the military governments have not made meaningful efforts to democratize participation in the political power process at the federal level. Appointments of federal commissioners and military governors have seemed to favor particular ethnic groups.<sup>24</sup>

### FOREIGN POLICY

At a special interview on a Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation television program, Colonel Joseph Garba, Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, outlined Nigeria's foreign policy objectives: Nigeria intends to aid less fortunate countries through recognized agencies; she endorses the economic objectives of the United Nations; she will emphasize the paramountcy of Nigeria's national interest.<sup>25</sup>

In pursuance of her policy of aiding less fortunate countries through recognized agencies, in February, 1976, Nigeria and the African Development Bank recently contracted an agreement to create a "Nigeria Trust Fund"; the Nigerian government has subsequently made \$80 million available for loans to needy African countries. Nigeria has also been uncompromising in her support of liberation struggles on the continent, stating that: "As far as the federal military government is concerned, the battle for Southern African has begun and there will be no turning back. The struggle may be long and bitter, but history has assured us that victory is certain."<sup>26</sup>

Although she is concerned with the interest of Africa and is a respected and leading member of the Organization of African Unity, Nigeria has equivocated in matters dealing with the political unification of the African continent. Because of the difficulty she has historically experienced in uniting the

disparate ethnic groups within her territorial confines, she is skeptical of the practicability of a supranational state in Africa and she regards pan-Africanism more as a political utopia than a realistic goal. Nevertheless, Nigeria has encouraged regional functional cooperation and regional interstate cooperation. Led by Nigeria; in May, 1975, 15 West African states formed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is similar in some ways to the nineteenth century German Zollverein. Member states see ECOWAS as "an area of concerted development," and as a "link of unity."<sup>27</sup>

In her relations with the different ideological power blocs, Nigeria has argued for a nonaligned posture. Nigeria's reaction to the Angolan crisis led observers to conclude that she had been converted to the Soviet Union's political ideology. Nigeria's relationship with the United States was strained. She was bitter against South Africa's intervention and took measures to counter that intervention. Nor did she support Soviet intervention, for she accused the Soviets of indulging in gross interference in Angola's domestic affairs. It would be misleading to place Nigeria in either the Western or Eastern camp.

In keeping with her policy of nonalignment, Nigeria does business with the various power blocs. In 1975, she bought supersonic MiG-21 fighters from the Soviet Union. During the same year, a party of 22 experts from China came to Nigeria under a technical cooperation agreement to help the country develop small-scale industries in metal working, leather goods and automobile engineering. United States businessmen have at least \$1 billion invested in the country and Nigeria is the second major supplier of crude oil to the United States. During the first half of 1975, Nigeria was France's major oil supplier, and plans are under way to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries.

The military regime has maintained that it would not embrace a specific ideology. Brigadier Shehu Yar 'Adua, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Military Headquarters, has made it clear that the federal military government will not impose a particular political philosophy on Nigeria. This statement was probably made in reaction to demands by some Nigerians to declare the country a socialist state.

In foreign relations, there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies. Recently, strains have developed in relations between Nigeria and the United States and Britain, two countries that have generally been regarded as Nigeria's traditional friends. United States support for the factions in Angola supported by the South African government angered the Nigerian government, which saw the United States as an ally of a racist regime. Nigeria was also dismayed by the possibilities of Central Intelligence Agency infiltration, and when General

<sup>23</sup> Address by the head of federal military government at the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee on Saturday, October 18, 1975.

\* This paper was written in August, 1976; thus it was not possible to include the highlights of the draft constitution.

<sup>24</sup> See, for instance, the federal Cabinet of Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo described in *Africa Research Bulletin*, April 15, 1976, p. 3957.

<sup>25</sup> See Nigeria's "Foreign Policy Under Review," *The Nigerian Chronicle*, October 28, 1975, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> See "Statement of the Federal Military Government on the Closure of the Border between Mozambique and Rhodesia," March 6, 1976 (N.Y.: Nigerian Consulate General).

<sup>27</sup> See *West Africa Finds a New Future*, speeches by Heads of States during the ECOWAS Summit Meeting in Lagos, May 27-28, 1975.

Murtala Mohammed was assassinated, some Nigerian students carried placards implying a link between the incident and the CIA.<sup>28</sup> In January, anti-American demonstrations were commonplace among Nigerian university students, who burned American flags and urged that the American Gulf Oil firm should be nationalized. United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's proposed visit to Nigeria in May was called off by Nigeria. Ironically, it was Nigeria that had negotiated Kissinger's African tour when Joseph Garba, Nigeria's Commissioner of External Affairs, visited the United States in 1975.

The assassination of General Mohammed triggered diplomatic tensions between Nigeria and Britain. During investigations of the assassination, it was alleged that General Gowon, who was overthrown by Mohammed and who now lives in London, was involved in the assassination plot. When Nigeria requested that Yakubu Gowon be repatriated to answer charges of his involvement, London refused the request. It is alleged that Nigeria responded by selling £70 million of her sterling reserves, a move that started the slide of the British pound.<sup>29</sup>

#### PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Because Nigeria has an abundance of petroleum, observers have emphasized her wealth and neglected the problems that the apparent wealth has engendered. In his 1976–1977 budget speech, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, the Head of the military government, warned that the country's economy was "overheated"; although Nigeria is supposed to be wealthy, it is in some respects poor. He noted that while revenue for the first nine months of 1975–1976 totaled \$6.24 billion, recurrent and capital expenditure stood at \$7.52 billion, leaving a deficit of \$1.28 billion. External reserves fell from \$6.56 billion at the end of the 1974–1975 fiscal year to \$4.96 billion at the end of fiscal year 1975–1976.<sup>30</sup> Nigeria's external trade has shown an unfavorable balance: while exports in 1975 declined by 15.1 percent compared with 1974, imports of assorted goods rose by 101.8 percent, of machinery and equipment by 155.3 percent. Food imports increased by 92.4 percent

and beverages registered a 433.3 percent increase.<sup>31</sup> On the whole, Nigeria's trade deficit amounted to \$200 million over the 1974–1975 fiscal year. Beyond this, inflation gripped Nigeria. It now runs at 43 percent per year, while the per capita income is barely \$320.

In order to stabilize the nation's economy, Obasanjo pruned the country's 1976–1977 budget by 20 percent. The country's 250,000-man army has been a source of undesirable expenditure; more than 35 percent of capital for 1970–1974 development went to the military, and 90 percent of that was for salary. The maintenance of such a huge army could be defended only if the country were at war or were threatened by war. The money used to maintain the huge but unnecessary army could be better used to train the manpower that is sorely needed for carrying out the country's development programs. Currently, the Nigerian government structure needs more than 6,000 senior-level and more than 1,300 middle-level employees. There is also a crucial shortage of teachers for compulsory, universal free primary education. Worse still, the respective state governments have indulged in prestige or vanity projects. Lagos State has planned a state house that will cost \$1.2 million. The mansion of the Kano State governor is projected to cost \$800,000. The Rivers State governor's house is to be built at a price of \$3.2 million. The federal military government has proposed a \$28 million OAU village and conference center in Lagos.

In addition, rural Nigeria is still far removed from the fruits of oil wealth. Nigeria has misplaced her priorities and has managed her resources poorly. For instance, in 1974, Nigeria contracted with various overseas companies to buy 20 million tons of cement, although only 4 million tons were needed. The influx of ships carrying the cement led to port congestion, and consequently to a delay in unloading the ships. The government was forced to pay as much as \$4,100 for demurrage per day per ship.<sup>32</sup> This has caused a major drain on the country's economy.

Above and beyond the port congestion crisis, Nigerian businessmen are experiencing difficulties with foreign exporters who refuse to honor letters of credit issued by Nigerian national banks.<sup>33</sup> Overseas firms have little confidence in Nigerian-owned banks and, by projection, in the Nigerian economy.

*(Continued on page 180)*

<sup>28</sup> "CIA Runs 3,000 Local Agents," *Sunday Times* (Nigeria); *West Africa*, February 12, 1976, p. 253; Colin Legum, "Nigeria Is no Longer an Automatic Friend to U.S.," *The New York Times*, January 11, 1976, section 4, p. E3.

<sup>29</sup> *Africa Confidential*, vol. 17, no. 6 (March 19, 1976), p. 8. See also *Dimka: The End of the Road* (Benin: 1976).

<sup>30</sup> 1976/77 Budget Speech by His Excellency Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, May 31, 1976.

<sup>31</sup> Statement on the 1976/77 budget by A. E. Ekuinam, Federal Commissioner for Finance, April 1, 1976.

<sup>32</sup> "Firms Feeling Weight of Nigeria's Cement Scandal," *Washington Post*, June 6, 1976.

<sup>33</sup> *Business Times* (Nigeria), vol. 1, no. 29 (April 13, 1976).

Levi Nwachuku is the director of the African-American Studies Program at the University of Michigan-Flint. His articles on Nigeria and Africa in general have appeared in *Africa Report* and the *Black World*, together with reviews in scholarly journals. At present, he is working on a book, *Nigeria: The Agony and Triumph of Unity*.

---

"... Ethiopia's problems can be viewed with some perspective, although the patterns of decision making are not yet fully discernible."

## Military Rule in Ethiopia

BY JOHN G. MERRIAM

*Associate Professor of Political Science, Bowling Green State University*

SEPTEMBER 12, 1976, marked the second anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution. Ethiopia has long interested the United States, because her strategic coastline overlooks the southern gateway to the Red Sea, the Bab el Mandeb, through which ships ply from the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The 1974 deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie I followed by his humiliating dethronement—easily achieved despite the reverence with which he was regarded—came in the wake of problems that tested the effectiveness and ultimately the political legitimacy of the old regime.

For the new rulers, the Provisional Military Administrative Council or "Dergue" (the Amharic word for council), Ethiopia's problems can be viewed with some perspective, although patterns of decision making are not yet fully discernible. The problem areas are land reform, domestic dissidence, the Eritrean rebellion, impending independence in the adjoining Territory of the Afars and Issas, Somali irredentism, and the consolidation of the revolution.

Initially shrouded in secrecy, the Dergue's first apparent leader was Lieutenant General Aman Michael Andom, a military hero in the 1963–1964 Somali border conflict who stood up to the Emperor and was a moderate on the Dergue's most pressing issue at the time—the protracted rebellion in the province of Eritrea. But on September 14, only two days after his supposed assumption of power, an announcement indicated that he was "only the committee's spokesman"—a measure of the deep-seated tensions within the largely unknown military junta. His refusal to commit 5,000 reinforcements to Eritrea at a time when the secessionist Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was thought to be preparing a major offensive no doubt contributed to his death in a shoot-out at his residence in the capital city of Addis Ababa on November 23.

Andom's successor, General Teferi Bente, became President of the Provisional Military Council on

November 28, but observers soon realized that real power rested with Major Mengistu Haile Mariam and Lieutenant-Colonel Atnafu Abate, the Council's First and Second Vice Presidents, respectively. A pattern of decision making began to emerge. The hawkish position of the three leaders on Eritrea seemed to rule out political compromise. Their execution of 29 civilians and 30 military officers in what came to be known as "Bloody Saturday" immediately after the removal of General Andom caused worldwide reverberations.<sup>1</sup> Those executed included two former Prime Ministers: the forced resignation of Aklilu Habte-Wold on February 27 had marked the beginning of the end of the monarchy, and his successor, Endalkatchew Makonnen, although he was a descendant of King Sahle Selassie's, was considered a progressive who would acknowledge the army's assertion of power. Significantly, both men had served as governors of Wollo province, where more than 100,000 persons died from the drought and the attending famine and disease. The attempted cover-up of this disaster was a contributing factor in the Emperor's downfall. Rear Admiral Eskinder Destu, the Emperor's grandson, was also executed. The Eritrean conflict went on, and so for that matter did the drought, while pleas poured in to stay further executions and to spare the life of the Emperor (he died of natural causes on August 26, 1975).

Much of the alleged unrest, however, was precipitated by the Dergue's alleged centralist tendencies and by the March, 1975, Land Reform Act. The need for land reform was undeniable. Ninety percent of the land was owned by the royal family, the aristocracy, the Church, and other feudal landowners. Outside the northern provinces, Ethiopia had a feudal system of land tenure under which the typical tenant farmer surrendered three-fourths of his crops in exchange for rent and taxes. On the large estates of southern Ethiopia, particularly in Shoa and northern Sidamo, reform was popular with the 53 percent of the rural population who actually worked the soil. Since the Land Reform Act affects small landholders

<sup>1</sup> Colin Legum, ed., "Ethiopia," *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1974–1975*, vol. 7 (London: Rex Collings, 1975), p. B185.

—some of whom are soldiers—as well as large ones, it may do more to challenge the regime than the Eritrean rebellion or other border tensions. In the past, retired soldiers were given grants of land by the Emperor. Many officers and soldiers want private landownership continued.

The initial land reform decree deceptively states that all land will henceforth belong to the Ethiopian people. In fact, land was nationalized with the primary purpose of asserting political control. The control mechanism lies in 21,000 peasant associations, cooperative service associations and producer cooperative units that are coordinated in turn by a central committee headed by the Minister of the Interior. Control is further tightened through the revolutionary administrative development committees that include police officials. Resistance to the regime's reform efforts have been exacerbated in the east and south by drought and famine; and some military are reportedly exempting themselves from the reform provisions. The land reform program, which subsequently included urban land and non-owner occupied houses, is much more ambitious than the program implemented in Egypt after the 1952 revolution; it is also far more difficult to apply.

## DISSIDENCE

Resistance to land reform and Dergue centralism has come both from the right and from the left. Reports of the capture of "reactionary elements," former landlords and their followers, and in some cases their deaths "while resisting arrest" continue. The most effective rightist force consists of some 5,000 Afars in eastern Wollo province, followers of Sultan Ali Mirreh Hanfere, led by his son, Prince Hanfere Ali Mirreh. The sultan, now in exile in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, apparently wants to restore the virtual autonomy he enjoyed under the Emperor rather than to overthrow the new regime. The Ethiopian Democratic Union is led by the former chief of staff, General Iyasso Mengasha, the former Tigre province governor, Ras Mengasha Seyoum, and a former Begemder province governor and divisional commander, Major General Nega Tegegne (Ras Mengasha's brother-in-law). Another group is led by Dej Berhane Meskel, former governor of Wollo province. The left-wing Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) leader, Osman Saleh Sabbe, met in Jiddah in September, 1975, with Sultan Ali Mirreh and many leaders of rightist revolts in the provinces of Tigre, Wollo, Gojjam and Begemder, in an effort to coordinate operations.

Left-wing opposition has generally come from students, teachers and the Confederation of Ethiopian

Labor Unions (CELU). On the left also is the Marxist-Leninist Ethiopian People's Revolutionary party. The original CELU leaders were placed in detention. Nevertheless, in September, 1975, the provisional executive committee chairman formally demanded the restoration of democratic liberties, the release of political prisoners and the inclusion of civilians in the government, and threatened a general strike—the weapon that helped overthrow Haile Selassie. CELU sought a truly proletarian revolutionary party based on Marxist-Leninist principles, and wanted several other parties to be grouped with CELU in a "democratic front." The government's response was the declaration of a state of emergency on September 30 and the prohibition of strikes and any incitement to stop work. When strikes occurred in protest against the state of emergency, the government announced the dissolution of CELU and the formation of a new trade union composed of "loyal" elements. The state of emergency was subsequently lifted, and trade union officials, among them former CELU President Ato Beyene Solomon, were released.

Students have been particularly vocal in their criticism of the military and have demanded democratic rule. Persuading the students to accept Dergue leadership and to work for the revolution has been a primary goal of Dergue decision makers. The National University was closed in March, 1974, and the reluctant students were sent to the countryside by September, thus serving the twin goals of dispersal and social consciousness-raising. About 60,000 students were assigned to teach the peasants the Amharic language, modern sanitation methods, agricultural technology, and "the philosophy of the revolution."

However, many drifted back to the capital; some 1,000 striking National University students were arrested in Addis Ababa in August, 1975. Those considered guilty of subverting government reforms were jailed or executed. Recent accounts indicate that this *Zemecha* or Chinese-style national work campaign has come to an end and that "the torch bearers of 'Ethiopia Tikdem'" are going home.<sup>2</sup>

Results of the *Zemecha* were undoubtedly mixed, but in coffee-rich Kaffa province, student implementation of Dergue goals came off reasonably well. Contributing factors may have been a good crop and an unusually favorable world market. Credit was quickly given to land reform.

## ERITREA

The Dergue inherited the problem of the Eritrean rebellion. The province of Eritrea completely encompasses Ethiopia's only coastline and includes the ports of Assab and Massawa. Until recently, American technicians operated the Kagnaw communications facility near Asmara, but abductions and the murder of some Americans by the ELF and the Peo-

<sup>2</sup> "Campaigners Begin Coming Home: The Effect Is Worth the Effort," *The Ethiopian Herald*, June 10, 1976, pp. 1, 4.

ple's Liberation Forces (PLF) point to the continued instability generated by the rebellion, not only for Americans but for the operation of the ports.

An element in the Dergue once unsuccessfully suggested giving Eritrea its independence so that, like Lenin, the Dergue could pursue its revolution in the heartland. However, Dergue policy, like Emperor Haile Selassie's before it, is irrevocably committed to unity. One of the five fundamental principles is that "above all, the unity of Ethiopia will be the sacred faith of our people." Without its ports of Massawa and Assab, the country would be landlocked and the loss of Eritrea would foster demands for autonomy or independence elsewhere.

Eritrea's history, however, has established a separatist tradition. Indeed, in his May 16 speech, General Teferi Bente specifically blamed Eritrea's feudal and imperialist legacy for current problems. Subject to Italian occupation and facing the Arab-peopled Red Sea, Eritreans speak Arabic and Italian, in contrast to the Amhara-dominated heartland. According to a December, 1950, United Nations General Assembly resolution, Eritrea was to constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia in recognition of its distinctive culture and higher literacy rate. But Haile Selassie integrated Eritrea as Ethiopia's fourteenth province and thereby spurred formation of the Marxist-oriented, Christian-led PLF, which is in uneasy alliance with the ELF; a common front was formed on January 16, 1975.

The downfall of the Emperor seemed to offer an excellent opportunity to end the conflict. But the consequent truce between the Eritrean guerrillas and the new regime lasted only a few months. The desire to negotiate is expressed by both sides, but the ELF demand for independence and the Dergue offer of a measure of autonomy appear irreconcilable. Nonetheless, a compromise may be preferable to the existing stalemate. Both sides are more or less evenly matched with modern arms. Basically, Ethiopia is supplied by the United States, and the Eritreans are supplied by militant Arab supporters and by Saudi Arabia. Support for Eritrea also comes from China, Cuba and the Soviet Union.

It is true that the Ethiopian government controls the air, but the ELF possesses highly effective surface-to-air rockets. On the ground, there appears to be a draw as supplier states' restraint prevents either side from gaining a decisive advantage. The Arabs are preoccupied with Israeli-held territory and realize that strong action on their part will prejudice the rights already extended by the military junta to the 8 million-10 million Muslims living in Ethiopia outside Eritrea.

While individual Arab states are clearly sympathetic to the Muslim half of Eritrea's population, the Arab League recognizes the Organization of African Unity

commitment to the territorial integrity of Ethiopia; further, it needs OAU endorsement of its struggle against Israel. Such is the complexity of regional politics.

General Andom's short-lived leadership gave promise of an Eritrean political settlement because of his Eritrean birth, his moderate stance and his popularity in Eritrea, although he had never sanctioned Eritrean independence. In any case, in their desire to push for a military solution the hardliners triumphed. Virtual stalemate prompted several Dergue policies. In a desperate effort to end the costly and politically embarrassing conflict, a peasant crusade, "Operation Raza," advanced on Eritrea. Peasant cooperation was induced where necessary by a barrage of anti-Muslim propaganda and by outright coercion. The northern province of Tigre and the traditionally recalcitrant provinces of Gojjam and Begemder were less fertile recruiting areas than Wollo. On May 21, an attack by 5,000 peasants was easily repulsed by Eritrean guerrillas, and a large amount of Ethiopian equipment was captured.

Why did the Dergue send peasants against the well-equipped ELF? Were they having disciplinary problems with their own troops? Perhaps there were memories of Emperor Menelik's similar but more successful stratagem against the Italians at the Battle of Adowa. Whatever the reason, the lack of success plus diplomatic pressures soon prompted a pullback of the peasants. The Dergue has waved the carrot as well as the stick. On May 16, in a key speech, General Teferi Bente again offered autonomy and decentralization to Eritrea, emphasizing clemency and pardons for those imprisoned because of the rebellion. He promised government aid for those who had lost property or jobs and for exiles who wanted to return home. Although United States concern over a peasant "holy war" probably prompted the speech, the Dergue may want to end the military stalemate. Is there room for a negotiated compromise? The Front's Secretary, General Osman Saleh Sabbe, wants independence, not a federal arrangement. In view of these intractable positions, the conflict may well get worse before it gets better.

## THE AFARS AND ISSAS

Djibouti, the capital of the Territory of the Afars and Issas (TFAI), is Ethiopia's only reliable port, because the roads from her own ports of Massawa and Assab to Addis Ababa have been subject to guerrilla harassment. The territory's future is of central concern to the Dergue; Djibouti connects with the Ethiopian capital by 488 miles of railroad.

France talks about independence for her last African territory. Where do the interested parties stand? The Afars, about half the population, are an Ethiopian people, but the Issas are a Somali clan. The

Ethiopian government has renounced any claim to the territory and is on record as favoring independence. Nonetheless, a continued French presence, while repugnant because of the stigma of colonialism, would preclude the feared Somali takeover.

The Dergue finds itself in a curious position; it tacitly supports the policy of the late Emperor. Significantly, Ethiopia cast the lone vote against the United Nations Trusteeship Committee's resolution on December 5, 1976, calling on France to provide immediate independence for TFAI and to withdraw her 6,000 troops. Ethiopia maintains she took this action because the resolution contained no requirement that Somalia renounce her claim to the territory.

Djibouti's Ali Aref Bourhan, President of the territory's government and sometime friend of France, endorsed a continued French military presence despite the political costs in order to guarantee independence, but he faced opposition from the legal Issas-supported LPAI (*Ligue populaire pour l'indépendance*) and two illegal opposition groups, the FLCS (*Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis*) with headquarters in Somalia and the MLD (*Mouvement pour la libération de Djibouti*) whose secretary-general was Ahmed Bourhan Omar. Ali Aref's power was probably eroded, not only by his association with France and his rather reluctant push for independence, but also by the fact that:

Many of his fellow-Afars suspect he has done a deal with Ethiopia, which has trouble with its own Afars—no cross-border infiltration to help Ethiopia's Afars, in return for Ethiopian support for himself.<sup>3</sup>

On July 17, Ali Aref resigned under pressure and Abdallah Mohamed Kamil succeeded him on July 30.

### SOMALIAN IRREDENTISM

Somalia's pursuit of a Greater Somaliland poses a problem for the Dergue. Somalia lays claim to the French-held Afars and Issas, Kenya's Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District and Ethiopia's Ogaden province, all of which border Somalia. The Ogaden, with its million Somali tribesmen, was handed to Ethiopia by the British in 1948. This forbidding desert may be valuable; it shows promise of oil and natural gas. In 1973, Tenneco, associated with Texaco and Chevron, completed the gas discovery of Calub I, but efforts were subsequently

suspended as much because of the modest findings and formidable logistics as because of political instability.<sup>4</sup>

Observers feared the assertion of Somalia's claims after Somali President Siad Barre relinquished the OAU chairmanship to Uganda's President Idi Amin in July, 1975. But Somalia's stated position with regard to the Afars and Issas is to settle the future of the territory nonviolently by means of a referendum held under international control; it is confident that a majority would vote for independence. No foreign military base would be allowed in the TFAI, which would rule out French plans, and Ethiopia would have free access to Djibouti's port and railroad terminal under international guarantee.

The government of Ethiopia is not reassured; the territory and the Ethiopian-Somalian border have been troubled. Is an all-out military effort contemplated? Those who argue against Somalia's staging more than a few incidents in the TFAI or the Ogaden point to problems created by the devastating drought, domestic unrest (although nothing like what confronts the Dergue) and "Russian pressure on President Barre to avoid a military conflict which would affect the course of the Ethiopian revolution and increase America's influence as the main arms supplier to Ethiopia."<sup>5</sup> Another factor is the OAU's support, at least with regard to Ethiopia proper, of the TFAI's right to unity and territorial integrity. Finally, there is the recent commitment of Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to the spirit of détente, after United States pressure in the wake of the victory of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola.

There are also compelling arguments for the view that Somalia will mount a major military effort. Ethiopia's forces are tied down by dissidents across the country and, specifically, in Eritrea. The French withdrawal from the Afars and Issas might trigger an all-out effort. However, at this writing, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing appears committed to retaining the status quo with a military presence.

Nevertheless, the Ethiopians were sufficiently  
(Continued on page 183)

---

John G. Merriam returned to Africa to spend the 1974-1975 academic year on a leave of absence. He is interested in African political development. Relevant publications are: "The Political and Social Thought of Sékou Touré of Guinea" in Maina Kagombe, ed., *African Political and Social Thought* (forthcoming) and "Ethiopia: Energy Prospects and Political Problems" in *The Pan-African Journal*, volume 9, June, 1976.

<sup>3</sup> "Afar and Asunder: Djibouti," *The Economist* (London), January 3, 1976, p. 31.

<sup>4</sup> *The American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin*, October, 1974, pp. 2055, 2057, and October, 1975, pp. 1906, 1916, 1931; *World Oil*, August 15, 1974, p. 138 and August 15, 1975, p. 156.

<sup>5</sup> *Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa*, no. 7, 1975, p. 253.

---

---

*"In the future, as in the past, the intrusion of the Great Powers into South African politics is either a hope or a nightmare, depending on one's point of view."*

## South Africa: White Laager under Pressure

BY CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM

*Chairman of the Department of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College*

THE PAST 12 months have not gone well for white South Africa. In fact, the government and the white population face 1977 with deeper concern for the future than at any time since the early 1960's, when African activities and the Sharpsville massacre focused the world's attention on South Africa.

Early in 1975, Prime Minister John Vorster embarked on a major effort to work with the governments of Zambia and Tanzania to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian situation and to increase South African credibility in black Africa.

Early efforts failed, in large part because of the intransigence of the regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith in Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup> Constitutional talks were begun on the heels of the joint initiatives and the withdrawal of South African troops from combat operations in Rhodesia against those Africans seeking to force Smith to accept African majority rule.

By mid-1976, these talks had failed utterly. Moreover, Eschel M. Rhoades, the Secretary for Information, stated flatly that "military intervention by South Africa to uphold the Rhodesian Government is absolutely out of the question."<sup>2</sup> When it failed to reach an accommodation with the moderate supporters of Joshua Nkomo, who led a portion of the African National Council (ANC) in Rhodesia, the Smith regime irritated the South African government.

Ironically enough, the South African government was under international pressure to leave the white Rhodesians to their fate but it faced domestic pressure to stand by them; at the same time Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, convinced of the futility

of trying to reach a peaceful settlement with the Smith regime, became more hostile toward South Africa as well.

In the summer of 1976, responding to United States pressure, South Africa increased her pressure on Rhodesia to transfer power to the black majority in the near future. Subsequently, Vorster gave his support to U.S.-British proposals for financial subsidies to white Rhodesians and induced Ian Smith to present concrete proposals for majority rule to the Rhodesian Parliament.\*

### ANGOLA

The abortive South African effort to influence the situation in Angola cast further doubt on the government's ability to determine the course of events in southern Africa. When the Portuguese abruptly left Angola in 1975, three warring factions contested to determine who would rule the country.\*\*

Supporting the forces of Joseph Savimbi and his National Movement for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), South Africa sent men and matériel into the battle. Spearheaded by South African forces, UNITA came within 25 miles of Luanda, the capital of Angola, and nearly won the day. But a massive intrusion of Cuban troops with Soviet equipment turned the tide and the South Africans and forces of UNITA were ignominiously driven from Angola.

To many South Africans—black as well as white—the defeat of the South African forces in Angola called into question their ability to retain the rest of the subsystem, including Namibia. Namibia (or South-West Africa, as the South Africans refer to it) has long been a source of international irritation. A small-scale insurgency led by the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) had simmered for a number of years.

In fact, the South African decision to intervene in Angola was due in part to a desire to drive SWAPO

\* See "The Conflict in Rhodesia," by Richard W. Hull, pages 149ff., particularly page 185, in this issue.

\*\* See "Angola and Mozambique," by Thomas Henriksen, pp. 153ff. of this issue.

<sup>1</sup> Larry Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, May 14, 1976.

from its bases in southern Angola. With the evacuation victory of the Soviet-supported faction in Angola, of course, SWAPO could once again mount attacks within Namibia. Once again, the efforts of the South Africans to stabilize a situation in southern Africa had backfired.

The coming to power of a Marxist-oriented revolutionary regime in Mozambique also increased pressure on South Africa. Mozambique is poor and is dependent on revenues from the South African railroad that terminates in Maputo (formerly Lourenço, Marques). But Mozambique is dedicated to the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia. In short, recent events in the contiguous territories have clearly placed South Africa on the defensive.<sup>3</sup>

### MILITARY SUPERIORITY

South Africa remains militarily supreme in the region. South African forces were withdrawn from Angola not so much because of a military defeat as because of an unwillingness to make that battle the all-or-nothing test of the future of South Africa.

The 1976 South African defense budget was over \$1.5 billion, a figure that was almost double the already high 1975 budget. South Africa has a standing army, navy and air force of over 50,000, with an additional 225,000 in the active reserve and home guard. She is well armed and is virtually self-sufficient in a wide variety of weapons, including jet aircraft, small arms and ammunition and armor.

For the first time, South Africa has also armed African and Eur-African troops to augment her white manpower. To date, these troops have been closely supervised by white officers and have always been deployed with regular white units in attendance. If a sizable number of Africans are willing to serve, particularly in Namibia, this would strengthen the South African military capability.

On the other hand, South Africa's claim that her Africans at least passively support apartheid was ripped to shreds by the bloody riots in June, 1976, which took hundreds of lives and injured several thousand people. Once again, the world saw South African police killing Africans who were protesting the social order. The subsequent meeting between United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Prime Minister Vorster in West Germany did not alter the United States belief that southern Africa must accept African majority rule.

In fact, after a brief period of quiet, severe rioting broke out with renewed vigor in August. Despite government efforts to stamp out urban unrest, violence erupted in a number of South African cities,

including Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. As was true in the ghetto riots in the United States during the late 1960's, most of the damage was confined to nonwhite areas. Still, there were instances of interracial violence as demonstrators attempted to attack factories, stores and transportation facilities.

Despite the government's claims, there was little evidence that the riots were coordinated and planned. Instead, it appeared that poor living conditions in many of the black townships and the crushing indignities of apartheid had led to resentment that quickly and spontaneously spilled over into violence. Given the segregated living patterns and the size of some of the townships (for example, Soweto, near Johannesburg, has over one million persons), it was the system of apartheid itself that made the suppression of the violence so difficult. And after the initial riots were publicized, the demonstrator effect stimulated other Africans to seek redress of their grievances by violent means.

By the end of August, the riots seemed to be entering a new phase. Despite the shooting of dozens of Africans, resistance continued. But the efforts of many young militants to turn the riots into a strike by preventing Africans from going to work in white areas ran into considerable reaction. Although much of the press characterized the reaction in tribal terms, i.e., the Zulus pitted against other African groups like the Sotho or Xhosa or Pedi, a good deal of the reaction was socioeconomic. Many of those urging a boycott of European factories and homes were unemployed, while many of those who resisted the attempt to prevent them from going to work into white areas in fact were anxious to keep their jobs.

Both the tribal and the class differences that split the African population into often antagonistic groups underscore the difficulties of mobilizing African resentment into political organization and action that could topple the white regime. In 1976, the Europeans in South Africa have been able to capitalize on African disunity to maintain themselves in power. But, however the situation is resolved, the claims of the South African government that its population is basically "happy" with apartheid has been shattered; the longer the violence drags on, the more probing the questions of the international community about apartheid.

### THE BANTUSTAN PROGRAM

How stable can South Africa be in the face of the mounting pressures from within and without?

A good deal depends on domestic developments, first of all, the continuing development of the bantustan program. Designed to separate the African population into reserves by tribal affiliation (or "micronation"), the bantustan program seems to

<sup>3</sup> Christian P. Potholm, "The Effects on South Africa of Change in Contiguous Territories," in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler, eds., *Change in Contemporary South Africa* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975).

offer the white regime political insulation from the winds of change.<sup>4</sup>

If the African population can be divided and each tribe given citizenship only in its tribal reserves, then—South African whites argue—Africans can have no claim on political power in the European areas (even though as many as 60 percent of the African population will continue to live and work there).

With a population of four million and an area larger than that of Switzerland or Denmark, the Transkei would seem to have many of the qualifications for independence. Self-governing since 1963, it was scheduled to become an independent state under Kaiser Matanzima in October.<sup>†</sup> What happens thereafter depends in large part on how the Transkei and its leaders are treated by the rest of Africa. The Transkei will seek admission to the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU); and while it may have some champions, such as the governments of nearby Lesotho and Swaziland, many African nations are opposed to any recognition of what they see as the fragmentation of South Africa.

Internal critics also abound. The most outspoken of these is Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and leader of the Inkatha movement. KwaZulu is supposed to be given its independence as well, but Buthelezi has categorically rejected such a course of action, saying:

We disdain the political role into which the white minority has relegated [us]. The white minority has foisted on us political circumstances which make a mockery of our dignity and our responsibility.<sup>5</sup>

If other homeland leaders follow Buthelezi, then the South African case will be severely weakened. If, on the other hand, the majority of African leaders go along with the independence formula (like Chief Mangope of Bophuthatswana), then there is at least a chance the independence of all the bantustans will be recognized by some black African states.

In fact, some observers suggest that the bantustan proposals offer a way out of the current dilemma, because they may serve as the basis for a subsequent black-white federation.<sup>6</sup> Under certain circumstances (like OAU recognition), a federation of the bantustans

and already independent countries like Botswana and Mozambique might also be possible. In any event, the future development of the bantustans may determine the extent to which whites will be able to maintain their dominant economic and political positions in South Africa.

A second major change within South Africa is taking place within the white electorate. Since 1948, the National party, dominated by the Afrikaners, has ruled the country, basing its program on apartheid, or separate development. For most of the intervening period, the opposition United party has stood for "white supremacy at all costs," a position often difficult to distinguish from apartheid. Since the early 1970's, however, there has been a shift in voter sentiment toward the Progressive/Reform party, which has advocated a sharing of power with Africans and other non-Europeans on a nonracial basis.

Growing from a single member in Parliament to twelve, the Progressives have breathed new life into the controversy about the African and European shares in their common future. But much of this change has come at the expense of the United party, which is now at its lowest point in 42 years. The National party of John Vorster remains in control of Parliament, with 123 seats to 36 for the United party and 12 for the Progressives. If change is to come from within South Africa, then the Progressives will have to continue to make substantial gains at the polls, not just at the expense of the United party but at the expense of the Nationalists as well.

A third area of change has come at the economic and social level. The significance of these changes is a matter of some debate.<sup>7</sup> Some of the most irritating aspects of petty apartheid have been reduced. Blacks and whites may now jointly attend some cultural and sports events, and multiracial sports teams have become a regular feature of South African life. While unheard of a decade ago, these changes do not in any way affect the political fact: Africans and other non-Europeans like Asians and Eur-Africans do not share meaningful power.

How much these gradual—some would say "token"—changes alter the nature of non-European grievances is open to question, although some observers argue that the process, once begun, will lead in time to significant change in all aspects of South African life. Certainly, many jobs previously reserved for

(Continued on page 182)

<sup>†</sup> As of this writing, the Transkei was scheduled to achieve independence on October 26.

<sup>4</sup> G. Carter, T. Karis and N. Stultz, *South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

<sup>5</sup> *Africa Report*, May-June, 1976, pp. 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> Leo Marquard, *A Federation of Southern Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), and Paul Malherbe, *Multistan: A Way out of the South African Dilemma* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1974).

<sup>7</sup> Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973).

Christian P. Potholm is the author of a number of books on Africa, the most recent of which is *Liberation and Exploitation: The Struggle for Ethiopia* (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1976). He recently returned from an extensive research tour of southern Africa.

---

---

## BOOK REVIEWS

---

---

### On Africa

**SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE ESCALATION OF A CONFLICT.** BY SIGNE LANDGREN-BÄCKSTRÖM. (New York: Praeger Publishers, and Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1976. 235 pages, appendix, selected bibliography, and index, \$20.00.)

Although Angola has become independent since this book was completed, those seeking a concise and accurate assessment of the political and military situation in Southern Africa will find this a useful work. Produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it devotes considerable attention to the historical background of the former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verde islands, Angola and Mozambique, and to the situation in Rhodesia.

A number of chapters deal with South Africa and the military prospects and capabilities of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

### THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA.

BY CHRISTOPHER STEVENS. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1976. 236 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$24.00.)

The Soviet courtship of black Africa during the 1954 to 1973 period brought Moscow few tangible advantages. Nonetheless, it laid the groundwork for closer ties with such key countries as Somalia, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania. This assessment of Soviet trade, aid, and diplomacy is written with analytical persuasiveness. A.Z.R.

**CONFLICT IN AFRICA: CONCEPTS AND REALITIES.** BY ADDA B. BOZEMAN. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. 429 pages, bibliography and notes, \$27.50, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

It is Adda Bozeman's contention that the "African experience of dissension, hostility, and strife cannot be integrated readily in our conceptual schemes because it offers different, perhaps entirely new, perspectives on these perennial human concerns." Bozeman concludes that in the African states south of the Sahara, European cultures introduced "revolutionary changes in the ancient orders of the societies they ruled" with a consequently continuous interplay between the two cultures. Now the "indigenous cultural traditions are

resurgent everywhere, whereas European influences are in eclipse." O.E.S.

**GHANA OBSERVED: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF A WEST AFRICAN REPUBLIC.** BY DENNIS AUSTIN. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1976. 199 pages, notes and index, \$16.00.)

These essays cover 25 years (after 1947) of the history of Ghana as seen by Dennis Austin, who taught at the University of Ghana for 12 years during that period. Extensive notes add to the value of this book. O.E.S.

**BY KENYA POSSESSED: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF NORMAN LEYS AND J. H. OLDHAM: 1918-1926.** EDITED BY JOHN W. CELL. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. 382 pages, appendix, notes and index, \$20.00.)

John Cell has edited an interesting work, dealing with the intellectual history of the colonial period in Africa. Norman Leys spent 15 years as a medical officer in East Africa, and his socialist conscience had been bothered by his experiences. J. H. Oldham was secretary of the International Missionary Council and an important influence on British African policy. Most of the letters between the two men deal with Kenya. O.E.S.

**MY LIFE AND ETHIOPIA'S PROGRESS: 1892-1937.** BY EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I, translated and edited by Edward Ullendorf. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 336 pages, notes, maps and index, \$13.75.)

Edward Ullendorf has prepared a literal translation of the Amharic original of Haile Sellassie's work in an attempt to mirror "the flavor of the original" for students and scholars. This is a fascinating book by a strong ruler of an African nation; Haile Sellassie was a figure in world politics for a long time and was deposed as king only recently. O.E.S.

**POLITICS IN THE SUDAN: PARLIAMENTARY AND MILITARY RULE IN AN EMERGING AFRICAN NATION.** BY PETER K. BECHTOLD. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976. 359 pages, appendix and index, \$23.50.)

Bechtold has written a well-documented and lengthy study of contemporary Sudanese politics based on five trips to the Sudan. O.E.S. ■

---

## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

---

# Toward Majority Rule in Rhodesia

*On September 21, 1976, after a series of meetings with United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and South African Prime Minister John Vorster, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith yielded to international pressure and accepted a plan for the transfer of power in Rhodesia to the black majority in the course of a two-year transition period. Excerpts from Smith's November 24 address to the nation explaining his government's action and the terms for the transition follow:*

### IAN SMITH'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION

As you are all aware, I have recently had a series of meetings in Pretoria, firstly with the South African Prime Minister, then with Dr. Kissinger and finally with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster together.

At these meetings the position of Rhodesia in relation to the rest of southern Africa, and indeed to the Western nations, was discussed in great detail. It was made abundantly clear to me, and to my colleagues who accompanied me, that as long as the present circumstances in Rhodesia prevailed, we could expect no help or support of any kind from the free world. On the contrary, the pressures on us from the free world would continue to mount.

Since our return the Cabinet have examined in great detail and in all its aspects the choice which faces us and we have done this in full knowledge of the heavy responsibility which we carry for the welfare and the safety of all Rhodesians, white and black. In the light of this assessment, the Cabinet have decided to accept the proposals put to us in Pretoria and the parliamentary caucus of my party, which met all day yesterday, has endorsed our decision.

I shall now read the actual terms of the proposals put to me by Dr. Kissinger. Paragraph six relating to economic aid is an agreed summary of a longer paper.

1. Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.
2. Representatives of the Rhodesian government will meet immediately at a mutually agreed place with African leaders to organize an interim government to function until majority rule is implemented.
3. The interim government should consist of a council of state, half of whose members will be black and half white with a white chairman without a special vote. The European and African sides would nominate their representatives. Its function will include:

Legislation—general supervisory responsibilities—and supervising the process of drafting the constitution.

The interim government should also have a council of ministers with a majority of Africans and an African first minister. For the period of the interim government the ministers of defense and of law and order would be white. Decisions of the council of ministers to be taken by two-thirds majority.

4. The United Kingdom will enact enabling legislation for the process to majority rule. Upon enactment of that legislation Rhodesia will also enact such legislation as may be necessary to the process.

5. Upon the establishment of the interim government

sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war, including guerrilla warfare, will cease.

6. Substantial economic support will be made available by the international community to provide assurance to Rhodesians about the economic future of the country. A trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia which will organize and finance a major international effort to respond to the economic opportunities of this country and to the effects of the changes taking place.

### STATEMENT OF AFRICAN PRESIDENTS

*On September 26, the Presidents of Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania issued a statement in effect rejecting the Smith proposals. Excerpts from their statement follow:*

The struggle of the people of Zimbabwe [Rhodesia], the African and international solidarity in the implementation of sanctions and coordinated action of all anticolonialist forces and states have together brought the isolation and collapse of the illegal racist minority regime in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia.

Now that the pressures of armed struggle have forced the enemy to accept majority rule as a condition for immediate independence, the five Presidents call upon the colonial authority, the British Government, to convene at once a conference outside Zimbabwe with the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people:

(A) To discuss the structure and functions of the transitional government.

(B) To establish the transitional government.

(C) To discuss the modalities for convening a full constitutional conference to work out the independence constitution.

(D) To establish the basis upon which peace and normalcy can be restored in the territory.

To achieve these goals two phases are envisaged. The first phase will deal with the establishment of an African majority transitional government. The second phase will be concerned with working out the details of the Zimbabwe independence constitution.

The Presidents have carefully studied the proposals as outlined by the illegal and racist regime which, if accepted, would be tantamount to legalizing the colonialist and racist structures of power. Any details relating to the structure and functions of the transitional government should be left to the conference.

## AFRICA AND THE SUPERPOWERS

(Continued from page 148)

### COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

Any discussion of the foreign policy of the Communist states presents serious difficulties. Information is restricted to what incumbent leaders want publicized. The distinctiveness of Communist theory and ideological objectives may suggest greater unanimity than is warranted.

Leaving aside the question of ideology, salient elements of policy need to be taken into account. These include the bitter hostilities between Moscow and Peking and their consequent competition for influence, the funds they are expending in Africa, the desire to weaken and ultimately to replace Western influence, their ability and desire to expand their relative power position in the world. The Soviet Union is a superpower that can afford to take global political, strategic, economic and other initiatives while running only small risks. China remains a developing country and sees African nations more as equals, whereas the Soviet Union views Africa from a position of strength. Both countries have sought to undercut each other in Africa for some time, and the Soviet Union seeks opportunities in Africa partly to make up for recent setbacks there and elsewhere.

Available public reports on Soviet policy in Angola may help to reconstruct Moscow's policy objectives, both domestic and external.

Without diminishing the importance of domestic factors, external motivations seem to have been more decisive. Soviet prestige in Africa certainly soared after Angola, and the Soviet Union achieved a new image as a dependable supporter of liberation in southern Africa. But Soviet policy was hardly low profile and offended the policy preferences of many African leaders. Whether Soviet leaders succeeded in brightening their overall image in Africa remains to be seen.

Another external factor was competition with the People's Republic of China. China's influence in Africa was growing, whereas that of the Soviet Union was decreasing. Although African leaders understandably resent such competition, Angola provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to demonstrate to the third world that Moscow, not Peking, could be counted upon to help in revolutionary conflict; simultaneously the Soviet Union could take the sting out of China's continuous verbal attacks. Another external factor was the impact of current American public opinion on United States foreign policy. Moscow seems to have gauged the American mood correctly. The American public seeks retrenchment from international affairs, symbolized by the debate on Vietnam. There are basic conflicts between the legislature and

the executive, a new liberal wing in Congress is influential, preparations for a presidential election campaign are distracting, and a cloud has settled on intelligence agencies after public revelations of illegal activities.

Another factor was the nature of the situation in Angola. Of the three groups vying for control, the MPLA seemed tailor-made for further Soviet support. Bitter factional struggle for control of national political rewards and the imposition of minority rule are nothing new to post-independence Africa. What set Angola apart was the fact that the struggle, normally carried out by political means, began as an armed struggle and followed a long history of interfactional armed fighting. In contrast to the situation in Mozambique where Portugal succeeded in helping one faction win military control, the situation in Angola was so tense and volatile that Portugal called for a negotiated settlement and withdrew. Since the MPLA leadership was ideologically closest to the Soviet Union, Moscow decided to give that movement enough support to make possible a military victory. This decision followed a prior decision by Lisbon to grant independence to Angola, so that the struggle was not for independence but for military control of the country and for eventual political control.

The use of a large Cuban expeditionary force in Angola was not only a vital part of the MPLA's military success but was also a bold and skillful political move. Fidel Castro's Cuba is no newcomer to Africa. In the ex-Belgian Congo in 1965, Cuban military personnel fought briefly against the incumbent government supported by the United States. There are more than 300 Cubans as advisers in Guinea, about 100 in Tanzania, and 50 in Somalia; they are also present in Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome, Mozambique, and the Congo (Brazzaville). For the Angolan adventure, Cuban soldiers had important advantages which made them an obvious choice for implementing Soviet policy. They were familiar with physical surroundings similar to those in Angola, with Soviet weapons, including heavy armament that is standard equipment in Cuba, and with Soviet military doctrine, which enabled them to work closely with Soviet military advisers in the field.

But it would be a mistake to think of the Cubans as completely subservient to Moscow's dictates. Havana's intervention in Angola was also the result of a fortunate coincidence of Castro's objectives with those of the Soviet Union. These objectives include international prestige and are grounded in an ideological commitment to help third world countries in their fight against colonialism and foreign domination. Cuba, more than the Soviet Union, is motivated by ideological considerations in her foreign policy. Her recent support for Algeria and the Sahraoui Republic (the self-proclaimed Saharan Democratic Republic)

against Morocco and Mauritania is based on ideological preference, not on the principle of self-determination that the OAU chose in this case to overlook.

The question which remains after Angola is: was the Cuban intervention an aberration, or was it a harbinger of things to come? This kind of ideological commitment is gaining ground in developing countries and the Cuban intervention was a warning of third world hostility toward Western and other big powers. Pent-up frustrations among the elites of third world states are profound and cannot be overlooked or brushed aside. But to the extent that the Cuban intervention depended upon Soviet material aid, significant future military intervention may well be a function of Soviet policy rather than of Cuban preference. For the moment, concern that Castro's troops would march eastward and southward from Angola seems to have evaporated, presumably as a result of limited Soviet goals and of Western pressure.

The magnitude of the Soviet commitment in Angola—some \$300 million—may be appreciated against the backdrop of the total assistance of the socialist states to Africa. Economic aid (chiefly loans) by the socialist states to all developing states totaled \$1.3 billion in 1974; about 2 percent (\$300 million) was allocated to Africa. Of that total, the Soviet Union contributed one percent (\$5 million), Eastern Europe, 26 percent, and the People's Republic of China, some 70 percent. The largest single amount went to Guinea (\$80 million from Romania for bauxite development); China allotted \$75 million to Tanzania, \$50 million each to Zambia and Nigeria, and \$40 million to Mauritania. The remainder went chiefly to Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, and Upper Volta. African states which benefited most since the inception of such programs include Guinea (\$380 million), Tanzania (\$360 million), Zambia (\$330 million), the Sudan (\$300 million), Ghana (\$240 million), Somalia (\$230 million), and Ethiopia (\$200 million).

In the African context, Soviet security expenditures in Angola were huge and unprecedented. They amounted to slightly less than the total military aid extended as well as the arms deliveries made to sub-Saharan Africa since such programs began. In 1974, socialist countries extended as much military as economic aid to all developing states. The bulk of such aid came from the Soviet Union, which spent twice as much for military aid as for economic assistance. Africa's share of Soviet military aid was nonetheless only \$170 million (1.4 percent) for the 20-year period prior to 1975, indicating the relatively low security priority of Africa for the Soviet Union until then. The largest beneficiaries included Somalia (65 percent of the total for Africa), the Sudan, Guinea, and Uganda. In addition, arms deliveries to Africa by socialist states totaled about \$300 million between 1964 and 1973, most (\$210 million) from the Soviet

Union. This type of assistance was also highly concentrated: the Soviet Union allocated \$70 million to Somalia, \$60 million to the Sudan, \$30 million to Nigeria, and \$20 million to Guinea, whereas the bulk of Chinese arms deliveries—\$60 million of an African total of \$80 million—went to Tanzania.

Because of the complex nature of African politics, to establish a cause and effect relationship between the socialist states' assistance and African collaboration would be hazardous. But the coincidence between Soviet strategic interests and close relations with recipient states is nevertheless noteworthy. Soviet interests center on the Red Sea/Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean areas, as part of a larger naval buildup. Soviet strategic interests in the first area are served by access to facilities in Somalia and by recent growing influence in Mozambique, reputed to have the best ports in eastern Africa. In west Africa, the Soviet Navy and Air Force has long been active in Guinea, which, along with Mali, provided facilities for transporting arms to Angola. The Soviets have discovered the political advantages of naval power and are beginning to make use of it.

Little need be said at this time about Chinese influence in Africa. China's massive help for the Tanzania/Zambia railroad is well known, as is her support for African liberation movements in southern Africa. Perhaps because Angola was not worth the price of competing with the Soviet Union, Peking de-

*(Continued on page 184)*

## NIGERIA

*(Continued from page 169)*

Politically, Nigeria is not walking a smooth path. There is still a ban on political activity and the press has been struggling for freedom of expression from the government.<sup>34</sup> Whether or not democracy is sustained in Nigeria, the crucial question is whether the military government can successfully weld the different sections of Nigeria into a unified nation. The number of states now established may not have satisfied all the ethnic groups in the country. Colonel George Inih, governor of the former Midwest State, has noted that "no matter the number of states created . . . some groups . . . will still consider themselves minorities and clamour for separate states of their own."<sup>35</sup> If this prophetic comment becomes a reality, then Nigeria's political future in terms of unity is bleak, and what Jean Herskovits has called "Africa's new power"<sup>36</sup> may become Africa's disintegrated power. ■

<sup>34</sup> "Nigerian Decree Curbing Press Under Fire," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1976; also *Africa Confidential*, vol. 15, no. 20 (October 4, 1974).

<sup>35</sup> See "Is There One Nigeria?" *West Africa*, May 3, 1976, p. 594.

<sup>36</sup> Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria, Africa's New Power," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 53, no. 2 (January, 1975).

## ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

(Continued from page 157)

Rhodesia and South Africa. Already, the curtailing of transit and port fees have adversely affected the faltering Mozambican financial situation. Some 30,000 Mozambican transport-related workers have joined the ranks of unemployed. According to a United Nations report, Machel's sanctions will cost Mozambique \$165 million this year. Pledges of assistance from Western nations make up less than half the needed sum. The aid from Communist nations is as yet unknown.

Some observers have speculated that Machel's duel with Rhodesia is an African implementation of the time-honored device of distracting domestic concerns to foreign policy issues. Specifically, they argue that by deploying the Makonde soldiers along the border a potentially troublesome element has been removed from urban centers. But FRELIMO's commitment to the African liberation of Zimbabwe seems too genuine and the cost too high for Mozambique to give this speculation much credence.

Nor can the possible costs be counted merely in financial terms, for there have been widely circulated reports (denied by FRELIMO) of Soviet military hardware and Chinese advisers arriving in Mozambique. Should the Rhodesian crisis escalate à la Angola, then Mozambique could find herself in the center of an ideological and strategic conflict between the superpowers in southern Africa. ■

## AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 160)

ing to find a *modus vivendi*, the Israelis and South Africans were facing threats to their survival. By the 1974 session of the United Nations General Assembly, South Africa had been removed from essentially all specialized agencies, and the black Africans and their allies had mustered enough votes in a Security Council meeting to demand the expulsion of South Africa. South Africa survived only because the United States, France, and Britain vetoed the measure. The coup in Portugal in April, 1974, and the subsequent decolonization of Portugal's African colonies meant that South Africa was rapidly losing her white-controlled buffer zone to the north. The loss of her Portuguese ally required a replacement; the immediate targets of South African diplomacy were Brazil, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Israel, and Iran, among others.

Israel, too, was driven into a diplomatic corner during 1974. The pressure of the Arabs on several fronts, particularly at the United Nations and in its

specialized agencies, threw Israeli diplomacy into a tailspin. In November, 1974, the UNESCO General Conference voted to exclude Israel from the European regional group; there were no African votes in Israel's favor. At the United Nations General Assembly, the majority voted to give a royal reception to the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Efforts to equate Zionism with racism were clearly a propaganda exercise, but the majorities that could be mobilized, particularly among the financially prostrated African states, suggested the impact of OPEC as a political force. Many observers began to identify a "siege mentality" in Israel.

## HOW ENEMIES OF MY ENEMIES BECOME FRIENDS

The newly prominent *détentes* between black and Arab, and Israeli and South African, are not dramatic surprises; but they represent a development that few would have predicted ten years earlier. Each is fraught with peril for the parties involved.

Israel traditionally maintained rather distant diplomatic ties with South Africa, because of a large Jewish community in South Africa, and despite Israeli opposition to apartheid. With the Yom Kippur War and the loss of nearly all African ties, Israel saw no reason to discourage ties with the industrial power to the south. Prime Minister Vorster's visit to Israel, however, was clearly initiated by the South Africans. The South Africans had good reasons to expand ties. Their desire to obtain more Israeli weapons technology (possibly missile boats and the STOL air transport Arava produced by Israel Aircraft Industries)<sup>11</sup> was a strong motivation. South Africa also wanted to sell more raw materials to Israel. Trade between the two countries has been accelerating in recent years, from \$3.45 million in 1968 to \$116 million today; and it can be expected to grow.

The result of the Vorster visit, however, was more far-reaching than facilitation of trade. The agreement signed by Vorster and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin covered scientific and industrial cooperation as well as trade. In addition, a standing ministerial joint committee comprising Cabinet ministers from both countries is to meet at least annually to "discuss ways and means of expanding economic cooperation and trade between the two countries, such as encouragement of investments, development of trade, scientific and industrial cooperation, and joint use of South African raw materials and Israeli manpower." South Africa and Israel are clearly interested in more than financial cooperation. Both are victims of international ostracism and recognize that specialized technologies exist or can be developed to enable them to survive. These technologies include military weaponry, new forms of energy production, the attainment of self-sufficiency on a smaller scale than is traditional, and the stockpiling of critical ma-

<sup>11</sup> SIPRI, *op. cit.*, pp. 133 and 141.

materials in case of boycotts or embargoes. The Israeli-South African partnership is, to a remarkable degree, a partnership of equals.

### THE WARY ARABS

The ties between black Africans and Arabs are far more unequal. Their willingness to share is more tenuous, based on a long history of antagonism and on the difficulty of creating a working relationship. The Africans must persuade the Arabs that there is some reward for helping them. In the past, the Arabs have been satisfied with buying the votes of the Africans in international forums. But that cost is going up, and the value of the votes in achieving a satisfactory settlement in the Middle East is becoming transparently small. With one of the greatest beneficiaries of Arab wealth, President Idi Amin of Uganda, an object of ridicule in the African diplomatic community, the Arabs are wary of committing themselves financially to the unstable African political climate. Much will hinge on the outcome of the Afro-Arab Heads of State conference in early 1977.

The future of this new alliance system between the Middle East and African nations is not clear. The historical pattern of African international relations would seem to indicate that rigid lines of diplomatic communication will not long survive. The African bloc's support of the Arab states is largely a product of the debilitating poverty of black Africa caused by high oil prices. But that situation will not last forever.

## SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 176)

Europeans have been taken over by non-Europeans. How much this is due to a scarcity of European workers and how much is the result of genuine upward mobility of non-Europeans remains to be seen.

In addition to the pressures from contiguous territories and the ferment within, South Africa is also affected by changing international politics. For example, the recent session of the United Nations that condemned Zionism as racism was the result of a diplomatic alliance between the Arab and African representatives at the United Nations. In exchange for unity on the question of Israel, the Arab group joined many African states in condemning South Africa.

This alliance has driven Israel and South Africa closer together. Prime Minister Vorster visited Israel in 1976 and concluded a number of trade and arms agreements. The South Africans may hope that the United States, which currently guarantees the existence of Israel, will also guarantee the existence of South Africa (in a truncated version, minus the bantustans). But the refusal of the United States to side openly with South Africa in Angola seemed to weaken these hopes.

In the future, as in the past, the intrusion of the Great Powers into South African politics is either a hope or a nightmare, depending on one's point of view.

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of August 12, 1970: Section 3685, Title 39, United States Code). 1. Title of Publication: CURRENT HISTORY. 2. Date of filing: September 29, 1976. 3. Frequency of issue: Monthly (combined issues-July/August). 3A. Number of issues published annually: 11. 3B. Annual subscription price: \$13.50. 4. Location of known office of publication (Street, city, county, state and ZIP Code) (not printers): 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127. 5. Location of the headquarters or general business offices of the publishers (not printers): 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127. 6. Names and addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Publisher, Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 4225 Main Street, Phila., Pa. 19127; Editor, Carol L. Thompson, 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127; Managing Editor, None. 7. Owner (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given.): Current History Inc., 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127; Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127; Shelby Cullom Davis, 116 John St., N.Y., N.Y. 8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities (If there are none, so state): None. 9. For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at special rates (Section 132.122, PSM): (Not Applicable). 10. Extent and nature of circulation: A. Total No. copies printed (Net press Run): (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 29,409; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 29,000. B. Paid circulation: 1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 307; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 160. 2. Mail subscriptions: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 27,329; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 25,905. C. Total paid circulation (Sum of 10B1 and 10B2): (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 27,636; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 26,065. D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means samples, complimentary, and other free copies: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 390; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 135. E. Total distribution (Sum of C and D): (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 28,026; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 26,200. F. Copies not distributed: 1. Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 1,383; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 2,800. 2. Returns from news agents: (Not Applicable). G. Total (sum of E, F1 and 2—should equal net press run shown in A): (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 29,409; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 29,000. 11. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. Signature and title of editor, publisher, business manager, or owner: D. G. Redmond, Jr., Publisher. 12. For completion by publishers mailing at the regular rates (Section 132.121, Postal Service Manual). 39 U. S. C. 3626 provides in pertinent part: "No person who would have been entitled to mail matter under former section 4359 of this title shall mail such matter at the rates provided under this subsection unless he files annually with the Postal Service a written request for permission to mail matter at such rates." In accordance with the provisions of this statute, I hereby request permission to mail the publication named in Item 1 at the phased postage rates presently authorized by 39 U. S. C. 3626. Signature and title of Editor, publisher, business manager, or owner: D. G. Redmond, Jr., Publisher.

## NAMIBIA, BOTSWANA AND SWAZILAND

(Continued from page 164)

member of the embassy of the People's Republic of China.<sup>7</sup>

### ALL THE KING'S MEN: THE CASE OF SWAZILAND

Like Botswana, the Kingdom of Swaziland is a landlocked state and shares borders with South Africa. It has access to black Africa and to the sea through Mozambique and the port of Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques). Swaziland's history is markedly different from that of Botswana; it has been endowed with more natural resources and thus with a more balanced economy, which involves a larger percentage of resident whites. At one time Swaziland was administered by the Transvaal, but after the Anglo-Boer War it became one of the High Commission Territories, destined, it was thought, for incorporation into South Africa. Its political history was similar in many respects to that of Botswana, for both had dual legislative advisory councils beginning in the 1920's, with one council representing the Africans and the other, the resident whites, who owned a considerable amount of land in Swaziland.

Among the Africans, there was a paramount chief whose writ ran to all Swazis resident in the territory. There was no one chief in Botswana; rather, there were eight tribes, each with its separate chiefs and with its demarcated territorial areas. The Swazis, however, had fewer consolidated blocs of land than their Botswana counterparts, and the whites in Swaziland did not cluster in enclaves in quite the same way as did their counterparts in Botswana.

Both nations are linked to one another and to South Africa and Lesotho as well by means of a revised customs agreement, and both Botswana and Swaziland cooperate in the governance of the remainder of what was once the tripartite University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, the Lesotho portion of which was recently nationalized by the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. In

addition, both Botswana and Swaziland use their own currencies, although the Swaziland currency has par value with the South African *rand*.

Although King Sobhuza II, the monarch of Swaziland, has recently made it clear that in his view the Westminster model of democracy is not what Swaziland needs, Swaziland's most pressing problem will be the establishment of mutually beneficial and supportive relations with President Samora Machel's FRELIMO\* government in neighboring Mozambique. She has little diplomatic maneuverability relative to South Africa, but her officials make no secret of their dislike of apartheid and the notion of African "homelands" in South Africa. Swaziland has not exchanged ambassadors with South Africa but does have a high commissioner accredited to Gaborone. Like Botswana, she has served as a haven for refugees from South Africa, but she is also hospitable to South African tourists who are anxious to visit the casino in one of the two Holiday Inns just outside the capital city of Mbabane.

Swaziland has yet to turn into a caricature of Las Vegas, and her relaxed way of life and the relative absence of racial tension and animosity contrast very favorably with the climate of Botswana and suggest alternatives to what is ingenuously termed the South African way of life.<sup>8</sup> ■

## MILITARY RULE IN ETHIOPIA

(Continued from page 173)

alarmed about the prospects of a "full-scale war" to send several African governments a 39-page memorandum, entitled "War Clouds in the Horn of Africa," in January, 1976. Turning from the intentions of the parties involved to their military capability, it is not clear who would win a conflict between Soviet-supplied Somalia and United States-supplied Ethiopia. Both are well armed by third world standards.<sup>6</sup> Somalia's armed forces total 23,050. Her navy is small but the air force, with 60 MiG's, is highly effective. Also significant are some 250 tanks and 400 armored personnel carriers. Unlike much of Ethiopia, the Ogaden would be favorable terrain for their employment.

The Ethiopian armed forces number an impressive 44,570, half of which are tied up in Eritrea. Although many air force pilots were Eritrean and therefore hostile to the government, the Eritreans tended to be concentrated in the civilian Ethiopian Air Lines. At last count, the air force of 2,250 men had 40 combat aircraft. The figures are no doubt higher now. Significantly, for 1975 (the last figures available), defense expenditures were running \$15

\* Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.

<sup>7</sup> For a fuller, more detailed treatment of Botswana's foreign policy, consult Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry, "Expanding Botswana's Policy Options," in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard, eds., *Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a Regional Subsystem* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1976), pp. 312-338.

<sup>8</sup> Swaziland politics are discussed in greater detail in Christian P. Potholm, *Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political Modernization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) and in the same author's "Swaziland under Sobhuza II: The Future of an African Monarchy," *The Round Table* (London), no. 254 (April, 1974), pp. 219-227.

<sup>6</sup> See *The Military Balance, 1974-1975* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), pp. 42-44.

million for Somalia as opposed to an impressive \$80 million for Ethiopia.

United States military aid was temporarily suspended after the 60 deaths on "Bloody Saturday" and has since run well below the level requested by the Ethiopian government. When Ethiopia appealed in early 1975 for an emergency airlift of \$30-million worth of ammunition, the United States provided only \$7 million in arms on a cash basis, and expressed the hope that the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean secessionists would move toward negotiations.

Under a loan agreement signed in Washington on April 25, 1975, the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture was to receive \$15 million. Total United States economic aid to Ethiopia for the financial year was thus increased to \$31 million. Knowledgeable sources indicate that Ethiopia is having some difficulty absorbing nonmilitary aid even at this modest level. With a foreign exchange surplus and no cash flow problem, Ethiopia can acquire arms from non-American sources.

These facts suggest that arms expenditures are substantially higher than the last available figures indicate. One unconfirmed source indicates that the Ethiopian army now stands at 66,000. Despite training and morale problems, both Ethiopia and Somalia are equipped to carry on a conflict. There are parallels with the Arab-Israeli conflict and with the internecine Lebanese civil war. With each side supplied with weapons and an appropriate ideology, the conflict could continue for some time. The danger is that little effort will be made to resolve Somali-Ethiopian differences, protestations to the contrary.

Decisions need to be made on many fronts at a time when the Dergue seeks a transformation of the people of Ethiopia. Priority is given to the dissemination of the Dergue's socialist philosophy—withstanding the initially high political, social and economic costs—within the framework of a popular democratic republic. At some point, a choice may have to be made between equity and development. If the experience of other countries attempting to effect a transformation is a guide, Ethiopia will probably not be able to have equity and development.

It is not clear whether the Dergue can cope with these seemingly insurmountable challenges that call for contradictory policies. The key question is whether land reform can be achieved by the military rulers without the brokerage function of a political party. Domestic dissidence from the left and the right, with conflicting demands for the return of feudal privileges on the one hand and democratic rule on the other, calls for pragmatic responses. An 18-person civilian Politburo that concerns itself with the political conscience of the country, though not with policy making, may defuse left-wing pressures.

Several developments favor the hard-pressed

Dergue. Land reform has been welcomed and implemented in some areas. There is now a ready market for coffee, Ethiopia's principal export. The dissidents are in prison, in exile, or dead. Many of the remaining dissidents want strictly local grievances resolved and, because of their Christian heritage, may have second thoughts about siding with the Muslim-dominated Eritrean secessionist movement. Then, too, the ELF's Arab suppliers seem unwilling to provide all-out support for Eritrea. Somalia also faces internal and external constraints.

Despite staggering problems Ethiopia's economy shows signs of health, and social transformation is taking place. Perhaps most important of all, the Dergue has survived its second birthday. ■

---

## AFRICA AND THE SUPERPOWERS

*(Continued from page 180)*

cided in the fall of 1975 to sever its ties with the rival National Liberation Front of Angola (FLNA) through the cooperation of Zaire. China is well known also for low-key economic and technical assistance that has gained her widespread African respect and occasional influence and for her shrewdness in projecting an image of a developing country opposed to the superpowers.

Only a provisional balance sheet of big power involvement in Africa could be drawn in mid-1976. Portugal's decolonization reinforced African determination to liberate the rest of the continent. Internationalization of the issue brought with it greater American and Soviet involvement. Moscow elected a military settlement in one country, basked in the subsequent emotional approval, and was able to reinforce its strategic goals. China quietly withdrew from Angola, but continued to aid African liberation movements elsewhere and to compete with the Soviet Union. Washington, by contrast, quickly recovered from a major blow and launched a new multinational program for a political settlement.

In a larger sense, the internationalization of domestic issues and the permeability of sovereign (especially small and weak) states created opportunities for big power involvement in Africa on a scale and of a scope unknown even during the cold war. The Angola crisis illustrated also the expansionist mood of the Soviet Union and the timidity of the United States. It would be the height of irony if independence and non-alignment signaled more, rather than less, big power intrusion. Finally, among the imponderables of African politics, the African commitment to black majority rule in southern Africa has become urgent and irreversible, and this issue will continue as a major irritant in international relations until an acceptable resolution is found. ■

## THE CONFLICT IN RHODESIA

(Continued from page 152)

by high inflation and a drop of 1.5 percent in the gross domestic product—the first since independence. Surrounded on all sides but one and faced with growing internal unrest, there was little solace for whites except for the continuing disunity in the ranks of the liberationists. Indeed, by late spring, 1976, splits in the ANC between Nkomo and Muzorewa had begun to have a rippling effect on the Zimbabwe Liberation Army, the so-called “third force.” In June, some 50 guerrillas died fighting each other in their own camps. Moreover, there were conflicts between the ANC and the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana as well as between the ANC and the OAU Liberation Committee under Tanzania’s chairmanship. Muzorewa accused the Liberation Committee of isolating the ANC political leadership from the liberation army. The nationalists had begun to feel that their leadership would be eclipsed; even within the liberation army, some cadres were fearful of Karanga/Shona domination. The Shona, Rhodesia’s original inhabitants and the largest ethnic group, regard themselves as the logical and legitimate rulers of an independent Zimbabwe. The ZANU faction of the 18-man high command in the army has denounced Muzorewa for his accusations of tribalism; it claims that power will be shared in the future state. By July, 1976, the army’s 18-man high command was firmly under the direction of Samora Machel and his FRELIMO army, which had for years fought a guerrilla war against the Portuguese in Mozambique.

At best, the Rhodesian policy of the United States has suffered from benign neglect. The United States preferred Great Britain to take the diplomatic initiatives, and it looked the other way when American tourists and businessmen patronized the breakaway régime. However, with the debacle in Angola, the growing Communist presence in southern Africa, and British failure to resolve the question, the United States decided in 1976 that time was fast running out, that if a peaceful negotiated settlement for majority rule were not achieved soon, the Communist-trained Zimbabwe Liberation Army would win the hearts and minds of the people and lead them into a bloody race war. This the United States wished desperately to avoid. Rhodesia holds 86 percent of the non-Communist world’s known reserves of high-quality chromite. The United States, on the other hand, has almost no commercially exploitable chromite, a metal essential in the manufacture of stainless

steel. A hostile African government in an independent Zimbabwe would not augur well. Moreover, a violent liberation struggle might spill over into South Africa where over 350 United States subsidiaries have invested more than \$1.46 billion.

Thus, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, after neglecting southern Africa for years, suddenly took a new and nervous look at the boiling cauldron. He quickly undertook an official African tour (his first), and in April in Zambia he reaffirmed United States support for the 1967 Lusaka Manifesto and for the cause of majority rule.

Rhodesia’s survival depends almost entirely on South Africa, her only lifeline to the outside world. Because South Africa was in the best position to force Smith back to the negotiating table, the United States chose to use South Africa as the bargaining wedge. In late June, 1976, Kissinger and Vorster met in Germany to explore new ways of pressuring Smith to reopen talks.<sup>3</sup> Among other proposals, they discussed a plan aimed at undercutting the Rhodesian Prime Minister’s support and forcing him to reenter negotiations. The plan would compensate whites who chose to leave Rhodesia before majority rule and would strengthen the security of those choosing to remain by providing financial and property guarantees. Highly professional whites would be encouraged to remain; those whose skills compete with Africans would receive financial and resettlement incentives to leave.

As Rhodesia rejected the plan as “out of the question,” the political chief of the Liberation Army, Robert Mugabe, prepared for a massive infiltration of Rhodesia, to commence in November with the onset of the rainy season. If a settlement were not reached soon, future negotiators might have to contend with a victorious pro-Marxist guerrilla army. The initiative for change was passing rapidly from the moderates under Nkomo to the Liberation Army.

After talks with Vorster in Zurich in early September, Kissinger engaged in frenetic shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa and extracted from Smith a public commitment to black majority rule within 2 years in return for international financial guarantees for white Rhodesians. An interim government would be established to devise a new constitution.

But peace may not yet be at hand. Nyerere has argued that a white-dominated interim government would never grant authentic majority rule; Nkomo and Muzorewa remain locked in a bitter struggle for control of the ANC; and Mugabe and his Liberation Army, excluded from Kissinger’s negotiations, feel outflanked and are convinced, along with the Russians and the Chinese, that true liberation will never be achieved without armed struggle. Thus, despite Kissinger’s adroit diplomacy, the conflict seems likely to continue. ■

<sup>3</sup> This came at a time when the Soviet Union was obtaining an agreement with Mozambique to construct a jet runway on an island off the Mozambique coast.

---

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

---

*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of September, 1976, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### African Crisis

- Sept. 4—In Zurich, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger meets South African Prime Minister John Vorster for 3 days of talks on the future of Namibia (South-West Africa) and on the implementation of majority rule in Rhodesia.
- Sept. 6—In Dar Es Salaam, the Presidents of Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania meet to determine a unified policy on the end of minority rule in southern Africa.
- Sept. 7—The Presidents attending the 2-day conference in Dar Es Salaam are reportedly unable to reconcile the 2 feuding black nationalist factions in Rhodesia; the 5 Presidents agree "to intensify the armed struggle in Rhodesia."
- Sept. 8—In London, it is announced that Prime Minister Vorster has agreed to a U.S.-British plan to provide \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion to subsidize white Rhodesians during the transfer of power to black rule in Rhodesia.
- Sept. 14—In Pretoria, Prime Minister Vorster meets with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith to discuss the proposals on Rhodesia made by Kissinger to Vorster earlier in September.
- Sept. 15—In Dar Es Salaam, Secretary of State Kissinger meets with Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere.
- Sept. 16—In Lusaka, Kissinger meets with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.
- Sept. 17—In Pretoria, Secretary Kissinger meets again with South African Prime Minister Vorster. Kissinger is the highest ranking American official ever to visit South Africa.
- Sept. 19—In Pretoria, Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith meets with Kissinger. In a press conference after the talks, Kissinger says he believes that Smith will recommend a plan for the transition of power to the black majority to the Rhodesian Parliament.
- Sept. 21—After a meeting with U.S. Secretary Kissinger in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzanian President Nyerere says that Smith has accepted the concept of black majority rule for Rhodesia.
- Sept. 22—In Nairobi, Kissinger announces plans to meet in the U.S. with Sam Nujoma, head of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to discuss a conference on the future of Namibia. SWAPO is refusing to attend the conference.
- Sept. 23—Kissinger ends his 10-day visit in Africa and flies to London to talk to British Prime Minister James Callaghan.
- Sept. 24—Kissinger returns to Washington, D.C.  
Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith's government agrees to the terms of the Kissinger/Vorster proposal. (See *Rhodesia*.)
- Sept. 25—In Lusaka, the Presidents of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania meet to discuss the proposals outlined by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to his Cabinet for the transfer of power to the black majority.
- Sept. 26—In Lusaka, the 5 African Presidents reject the plan for majority rule outlined by Prime Minister Smith.

They ask Britain to convene a constitutional conference outside Rhodesia to work out an alternate plan. The leaders charge that the plan "if accepted, would be tantamount to legalizing the colonialist and racist structures of power" in Rhodesia.

In London, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland says that Britain will help organize a constitutional congress to establish an acceptable transitional government in Rhodesia.

Sept. 27—In Washington, D.C., William Rogers, an aide to Kissinger, says that the 5 Presidents of black African nations have sent messages to clarify their position on the Rhodesian proposals. According to Rogers, the African leaders have accepted the overall U.S.-British plan for a 2-year transition to majority rule, although they do not approve of the procedures outlined by Prime Minister Smith for the formation of the interim government.

British Minister of State for African Affairs Edward Rolands and his Under Secretary of State, Sir Antony Durr, fly to Botswana to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with regard to proposals for an interim government in Rhodesia.

In Lusaka, the leaders of 2 Rhodesian nationalist groups, Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe Reformed African National Council and Joshua Nkomo of the African National Council, meet to discuss the formation of a black alliance in Rhodesia.

Sept. 29—In London, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland says that he has informed Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith that Britain will hold a biracial conference in southern Africa in about 2 weeks to work out the terms for an interim government in Rhodesia.

At the United Nations, Kissinger confers with SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma on the future of Namibia.

### Central Africa Economic and Customs Union

Sept. 4—The Presidents of Congo, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Gabon meet in Brazzaville, Congo, to discuss a projected Central Africa Development Bank.

### Council of Europe

Sept. 22—Meeting in Strasbourg, France, the Council of Europe's consultative assembly formally accepts Portugal as its 19th member.

### International Terrorism

(See also *Middle East*)

Sept. 5—A Dutch airliner, hijacked over France yesterday by 3 Palestinians demanding the release of 8 prisoners of the Israelis, is released with its 80 passengers and crew at Larnac, Cyprus, airport; the hijackers receive safe conduct from Cyprus.

Sept. 10—A Trans World Airways 727 jet is hijacked on a flight from New York to Chicago with 86 passengers and a crew of 7 by Croatian terrorists demanding Croatian independence from Yugoslavia.

Sept. 11—A bomb left by the terrorists in a subway locker in Grand Central Terminal, removed yesterday by New

York police, explodes, killing one bomb expert who was attempting to deactivate it.

The hijacked plane lands at Gander, Newfoundland; 35 passengers are released. Propaganda pamphlets are transferred from the 727 to another plane, which is to guide the 727 to the Keflavik Air Base in Iceland. Both planes circle London while pamphlets are dropped on the city. More pamphlets are dropped over Paris and the planes land at Charles de Gaulle Airport.

Sept. 12—The remaining passengers and crew of the TWA 727 jet are freed by the Croatian terrorists.

The Croatian terrorists surrender to French authorities, and are flown to New York on a French government plane; the 4 men and 1 woman are arrested by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on charges of air piracy.

## Middle East

(See also *Lebanon*)

Sept. 2—*The New York Times* reports that Israel has reinforced her troops along the northern border she shares with Lebanon.

Sept. 4—Meeting in Cairo, members of the 20-nation Arab League arrange an Arab leader conference on the Lebanese crisis.

Sept. 5—In Beirut, Abu Hassan Salamah, head of the security branch of Al Fatah (the military wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization), meets separately with Lebanese President-elect Elias Sarkis, leader of the Christian Phalangist party Pierre Gemayel, and spiritual leader of the Lebanese Maronite Christians Patriarch Antonius Khoreish.

Sept. 6—In Cairo, the Arab League admits the Palestine Liberation Organization as its 21st member.

Sept. 11—In Beirut, heavy fighting continues between Christian forces and Muslim and Palestinian leftists; 123 people are reported killed and 150 are wounded.

Sept. 26—In Damascus, 4 Palestinian terrorists opposed to Syria's role in Lebanon take over a Damascus hotel and seize 90 hostages. The terrorist leader and 4 hostages are killed by Syrian troops.

Damascus radio reports that the terrorists belonged to Al Fatah.

Sept. 27—In Damascus, the 3 terrorists who were captured after they took over a hotel yesterday are hanged in public view.

Sept. 28—In the mountains east of Beirut, Syrian and Christian forces begin a major offensive against Palestinian and Muslim troops.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat asks all Arab leaders to intervene to stop the Syrians from "liquidating the Palestinian resistance movement. . . ."

Sept. 29—The Syrian press agency reports the defeat of Palestinian forces in the mountain area east of Beirut and the capture of Ain Tura and 7 other villages.

Sept. 30—Sporadic fighting continues as PLO forces refuse to withdraw.

## United Nations

(See also *African Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 2—In his annual report to the U.N. General Assembly, soon to convene, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim states that the problems of southern Africa "create a serious potential threat to international peace and security."

Sept. 14—The U.N. Security Council postpones consideration of the membership of reunified Vietnam in the U.N. until after the U.S. presidential elections in November,

to try to avoid a U.S. veto.

Sept. 17—The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference closes its 7-week session. The 150 participating countries are deadlocked over the regulation of the exploitation of seabed mineral wealth. The next session is scheduled for May, 1977.

Sept. 21—The U.N. General Assembly convenes; Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka is President.

The Indian Ocean island republic of the Seychelles is admitted to the U.N. as its 145th member.

## ANGOLA

(See *Intl. African Crisis*)

## ARGENTINA

Sept. 10—In order to end the automobile workers' strike, the government threatens to imprison the labor leaders for up to 10 years if they do not return to work.

Sept. 12—Carlos M. Baldovinos, chief inspector of the federal police bureau in Bahia Blanca, is killed by guerrilla rebels.

Sept. 16—The daughter of an American Mennonite missionary, Patricia Erb, is kidnapped from her home in a Buenos Aires suburb.

## BANGLADESH

Sept. 25—Major General Ziaur Rahman, head of the military government, charges India with aiding and training Bangladesh terrorists.

## BARBADOS

Sept. 3—Barbados Labor party leader J. M. G. Adams is sworn in as Prime Minister. He succeeds Erroll W. Barrow, whose Democratic Labor party has been in power since Barbados became independent in 1961.

## BOTSWANA

(See *Intl. African Crisis*)

## CAMBODIA

Sept. 27—The People's Assembly temporarily suspends Prime Minister Tol Saut from all his responsibilities for health reasons.

## CANADA

Sept. 12—President of the Privy Council Mitchell Sharp resigns from his Cabinet post; he says that he will not seek reelection to the House of Commons in 1978.

Sept. 14—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announces the formation of a new Cabinet; 7 new members are named and 8 ministers are reassigned.

## CHILE

Sept. 11—On the 3rd anniversary of the takeover by the military government, President August Pinochet releases 205 political prisoners.

Sept. 21—In Washington, D.C., Orlando Letelier, Foreign Minister in the government of Salvador Allende Gossens, and his assistant are killed when a bomb explodes in their car.

## CHINA

Sept. 1—In Peking, Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng addresses earthquake relief workers in the Great Hall of the People.

Sept. 6—In Peking, former U.S. Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger arrives for a private 2-week visit. He is expected to meet with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Prime Minister Hua.

Sept. 9—In Peking, *Hsinhua*, the Chinese press agency, announces the death of 82-year-old Chairman Mao Tse-tung; he was the founder of the Chinese Communist party and the People's Republic of China; as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party he was the ruler of mainland China for 27 years.

Sept. 10—A list of the officials on the committee for Chairman Mao's funeral indicates that 3 high government officials have lost their positions: the Minister of Education, the Minister of Railways and the director of *Hsinhua*.

Sept. 11—Chairman Mao's body is taken to the Great Hall of the People where it will lie in state for 8 days of official mourning. Foreign leaders are not invited to attend the ceremonies.

Sept. 18—In Peking, nearly 1 million people attend the memorial service for Chairman Mao; Prime Minister Hua delivers the eulogy. 3 minutes of silence are observed throughout the country.

Sept. 20—In New Delhi, Chinese Ambassador to India Chen Chao-yuan presents his portfolio to the Indian government; he is the first Chinese ambassador to India since 1962.

Sept. 26—*Hsinhua* announces the successful explosion of a nuclear device; the test is seen as a diversion to turn the mourning country's "grief into strength."

### CYPRUS

Sept. 6—In the 1st parliamentary elections since July, 1974, an alliance of the Democratic Front, the Socialist Edek party and the Communist Akel party, all of whom support President Makarios, win 34 of the 35 seats in the Greek Cypriote House of Representatives, defeating the right-wing Democratic Rally led by former Speaker of the House Glafkos Clerides.

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Sept. 15—The Agriculture Minister and 2 Deputy Prime Ministers are dismissed from the Cabinet. Josef Nagr is named Agriculture Minister.

### EGYPT

Sept. 30—In Cairo, the U.S. agrees to provide Egypt with \$100 million worth of loans and grants; this brings the total amount of project aid to Egypt to \$795 million for fiscal year 1977.

### FINLAND

Sept. 17—Prime Minister Artti Miettunen submits his resignation when his 5-party coalition disagrees over government economic policies.

Sept. 27—President Urho Kekkonen asks Prime Minister Miettunen to head a minority government.

### FRANCE

Sept. 22—Prime Minister Raymond Barre submits an anti-inflation program to Parliament; he calls for tax increases on personal and corporate incomes, cars, gasoline and alcohol, and a 3-month freeze on prices.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See *The Netherlands*)

### INDIA

(See also *Bangladesh; China*)

Sept. 1—The government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proposes constitutional amendments that would permit Parliament to ban "antinational activities and associations,"

permit the President to amend the constitution and limit the right of the judiciary to review legislation.

Sept. 18—The government lifts the "censorship guidelines" it imposed on the foreign press 15 months ago.

Sept. 25—The government formally approves a 5th 5 year plan totaling \$75 billion.

### IRELAND

Sept. 1—By a vote of 70 to 65, Parliament declares a formal state of emergency to deal with the Irish Republican Army.

Sept. 19—President Cearbhall Ó Dálaigh receives recently approved legislation giving the police greater power over suspected terrorists; he refuses to sign the legislation and calls instead for a special session of the Council of State to advise him on the constitutionality of the bill.

### ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Sept. 9—A confidential 1975 report by Minister of the Interior Israel Koenig is made public by the left-wing newspaper *Al Hamishmar*. The report discussed ways of curbing the population and influence of Israeli Arabs in the Galilee area.

Sept. 15—Israel and Syria open their mutual border along the Golan Heights to permit Arab Druse villagers from the Israeli-occupied sector to meet with relatives living in the U.N. buffer zone in Syria.

Sept. 16—In a U.S. publication, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon proposes that Israel withdraw her troops from the Arab territory taken in the 1967 war and suggests the creation of Jordanian-Palestinian zones in the demilitarized areas of the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip.

Sept. 17—In Tel Aviv, the Likud party demands that Parliament debate Foreign Minister Allon's peace proposals.

### JAPAN

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 15—Prime Minister Takeo Miki dismisses 13 ministers and appoints 13 new members to his Cabinet; he also appoints 3 new party officials to his ruling Liberal Democratic party.

Sept. 16—Parliament meets in extraordinary session to debate proposals for fiscal reform.

### LAOS

Sept. 9—*The New York Times* reports that in an effort to build up the country's population, the government has outlawed the sale and use of all contraceptive devices.

### LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Sept. 15—In Beirut, Lebanese President Suleiman Franjeh, a Christian, whose term expires in 8 days, realigns his Cabinet; the effect of the shuffle is to reduce the powers of Prime Minister Rashid Karami, a Muslim.

Sept. 19—In Chtaura, Lebanon, leaders of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian factions are unable to agree on a cease-fire in Beirut in order to permit the peaceful swearing in of President-elect Elias Sarkis, a Christian, on September 23.

Sept. 23—In the Syrian-controlled sector of eastern Lebanon, President-elect Elias Sarkis is sworn in as President of Lebanon. Elected in May, he is the first President to be inaugurated outside the capital city of Beirut.

## MALTA

- Sept. 18—General elections are held for the 65 seats in the House of Representatives.
- Sept. 20—The Labor party of Prime Minister Don Mintoff wins the election against the opposition Nationalist party headed by former Prime Minister Giorgio Borg Olivier.
- Sept. 22—Mintoff is sworn in for his 2d 5-year term as Prime Minister. He promises that there will be no foreign military bases on the island after 1979, when the current agreements with Britain and NATO run out.

## MEXICO

- Sept. 24—Labor union leaders call off a proposed strike and settle for an emergency wage increase of 23 percent to compensate for a 25 percent rise in the cost of living since the peso was devalued last month.

## MOZAMBIQUE

(See also *Intl, African Crisis*)

- Sept. 4—The official press agency reports that the U.N. High Commission for Refugees has granted the government \$75,000 to assist the victims of a Rhodesian army attack last month.

## NEPAL

- Sept. 4—King Birendra dismisses 2 members of his Cabinet and appoints 2 new ministers; he also names 4 junior ministers to serve in the Cabinet.

## NETHERLANDS

- Sept. 2—The Ministry of Information reveals that Prince Bernhard requested the then West German Defense Minister and now Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt to buy Northrop Aircraft Corporation planes in 1971.

## PANAMA

- Sept. 17—Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd formally accuses U.S. armed forces of intervening in recent student demonstrations against the rising cost of living. He accuses the U.S. government of attempting to "destabilize" the country. 2 U.S. Defense Department employees and an American serviceman have been arrested for participating in the demonstrations.

## PERU

- Sept. 23—The military government of General Morales Bermudez agrees to compensate an American-based mining company \$37 million in cash for its Marcona iron ore properties that the government nationalized in 1975.

## POLAND

- Sept. 10—The Roman Catholic Church urges its members to support the government's efforts to deal with the current economic crisis.
- Sept. 17—*Polityka*, the official newspaper of the Communist party, reports the government's decision to forego all scheduled price increases for food until 1978.

## PORTUGAL

(See *Intl, Council of Europe*)

## RHODESIA

(See also *Intl, African Crisis; Mozambique*)

- Sept. 9—In Dar Es Salaam, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole withdraws his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) from the umbrella organization of the African National Council (ANC).

Sept. 14—Prime Minister Ian D. Smith meets with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Pretoria.

Sept. 16—Meeting in Umtali, members of the white Rhodesian Front party give Prime Minister Smith a mandate to "negotiate on its behalf for the future of all the peoples of Rhodesia."

Sept. 21—Prime Minister Smith submits to his Cabinet proposals made to him by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in South Africa on September 19. The proposals concern the transfer of power to the black majority.

Sept. 24—In a televised address, Prime Minister Smith tells the country that his government has agreed to the terms of the proposal for a transition to black majority rule submitted to him by Secretary Kissinger. The government agrees to details of a transition to majority rule in a 2-year period and to the immediate establishment of a biracial temporary government made up of a council of state and a council of ministers; in exchange, there is to be an end to all economic sanctions against Rhodesia and an end to the guerrilla warfare of nationalist factions; the country is also to benefit from a billion dollar international trust fund for development and investment programs in the country and to aid white Rhodesians who emigrate.

## SAUDI ARABIA

(See *U.S., Legislation*)

## SEYCHELLES

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

## SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, African Crisis; Rhodesia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 2—In a white area of Cape Town, 3,000 nonwhite demonstrators clash with police.

Sept. 3—Fighting continues between nonwhites and police in Cape Town.

Prime Minister John Vorster leaves for Zurich for talks with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Sept. 7—In a white section of Cape Town, police open fire on demonstrators.

Sept. 9—Fighting between police and coloreds (people of mixed racial origin) flares in a number of nonwhite townships surrounding Cape Town; 15 people are reported killed, bringing the unofficial total to 21 in the last 3 days.

Sept. 10—The government offers concessions to the coloreds, who are demanding equal status with whites.

Sept. 11—In the last 10 days, 5 well-known black journalists have been arrested and detained by security police.

Sept. 13—In Soweto, a 3-day protest strike begins; tens of thousands of black workers stay away from their jobs in Johannesburg.

Sept. 17—In Johannesburg, Prime Minister Vorster begins talks with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

## SPAIN

Sept. 10—In an address over radio and television, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez announces that the government has approved a reform bill that calls for elections for a 2-house Parliament by June, 1977.

Sept. 22—Lieutenant General Fernández de Santiago resigns as First Deputy Prime Minister; he is replaced by Lieutenant General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, Chief of the General Staff.

Sept. 27—In Bilbao, thousands of workers go on strike to protest the government's treatment of Basque political prisoners.

**SRI LANKA**(See *Intl, U.N.*)**SWEDEN**

Sept. 19—General elections are held for the 349 seats in Parliament.

Sept. 20—The Center party of Thorbjorn Falldin wins 180 seats and the Social Democrats under the leadership of Prime Minister Olof Palme and their Communist allies win 169 seats in the parliamentary elections.

Palme submits his resignation to the Speaker of the Parliament, Henry Allard; the Social Democrats have ruled the country for 44 years.

**SYRIA**(See *Intl, Middle East; Israel*)**TANZANIA**(See *Intl, African Crisis*)**THAILAND**

Sept. 19—Despite a government request that he remain in exile, former head of the military government Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn returns to the country.

Sept. 23—Under criticism by his own Democratic party for allowing Field Marshal Thanom to remain in Thailand, Prime Minister Seni Pramroj resigns his post.

Sept. 25—King Phumiphol Aduldet reappoints Seni Pramroj as Prime Minister.

**U.S.S.R.**

Sept. 2—Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai A. Tikhonov is appointed First Deputy Prime Minister. Tikhonov has been a long-time associate of Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Sept. 6—A Soviet pilot lands a MiG-25 jet fighter in Hokkaido, Japan, and asks for asylum in the U.S.

Sept. 9—The U.S. Agriculture Department forecasts a 46 percent increase over 1975 for Soviet grain production. This year's crop is expected to yield 205 million metric tons.

The defecting pilot of the Soviet MiG-25 jet fighter leaves Japan for the U.S. aboard a U.S. commercial airliner.

Sept. 14—In the 1st public statement since the defecting Soviet pilot landed in Japan September 6, the government charges the Japanese government with preventing the pilot from returning to the U.S.S.R.

**UNITED KINGDOM****Great Britain**(See also *Intl, African Crisis*)

Sept. 10—Prime Minister James Callaghan announces major changes in his Cabinet. Among the changes, Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, becomes Home Secretary, succeeding Roy Jenkins; Defense Secretary Roy Mason will succeed Rees as envoy to Northern Ireland.

The Bank of England raises its minimum lending rate 1.5 percent, to 13 percent.

Sept. 22—A royal commission on environmental pollution strongly advises that the further expansion of nuclear energy "be postponed as long as possible."

The executive committee of the National Seamen's Union votes to accept the proposals of the management and to call off a threatened strike.

Sept. 29—The pound sterling falls to an all-time low of \$1.63 to the U.S. dollar.

A Treasury Ministry spokesman announces that the government will apply to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan of \$3.9 billion, the limit of its credit.

**UNITED STATES****Administration**

Sept. 1—According to White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen, President Gerald Ford has asked the Justice Department for a full report on its findings concerning the alleged misuse of federal services and property by Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Clarence Kelley.

Speaking to the National Guard Association's annual conference, President Ford warns against unilateral arms reduction by the U.S.; he says: "We cannot lay down our arms in the simple hope that others will follow our lead."

Sept. 4—The White House press office issues a statement noting that after reading the Justice Department report on FBI Director Kelley, President Ford intends to allow Kelley to remain as director.

Sept. 21—In a report to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, a federal task force recommends the phasing out within 5 years of the Cuban Refugee Program, which for the last 15 years has helped Cubans who are refugees from the Fidel Castro government to resettle in the U.S.

Sept. 22—FBI Director Clarence Kelley reports a 97 percent decline over the last 3 years in the number of U.S. citizens and organizations investigated because of their political ideologies—from 21,414 to 626.

Sept. 25—The Bureau of the Census makes public figures that show that the number of persons living in poverty in the U.S. increased by 2.5 million in 1974, the largest rise in any year since the government started to keep statistics in 1959. The statistics show that the median family income rose to \$13,729 in 1975.

**Civil Rights**

Sept. 1—Some 94,883 students in the public schools of Louisville, Kentucky, return to school without incident at the start of a 2d year of a busing desegregation plan that produced violence and protest last year.

Sept. 15—The House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church votes 95 to 61 to permit the ordination of women as priests and bishops.

Sept. 16—The House of Deputies of the Episcopal Church concurs with the resolution of the House of Bishops and authorizes the ordination of women as priest and bishops.

Sept. 24—Racial violence erupts at Boston's Hyde Park High School; at least 11 persons are hurt.

**Economy**

Sept. 3—The Labor Department reports a rise in the unemployment rate to 7.9 percent for August.

Sept. 21—Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York and First National Bank of Chicago reduce their prime lending rates 0.25 percent to 6.75 percent.

The Labor Department reports a rise in consumer prices of 0.5 percent for August; the annual rate of inflation remains at 6.2 percent.

The Dow-Jones industrial average rises to 1,014.79, its highest point since January 23, 1973.

Sept. 27—The Commerce Department reports that the monthly trade deficit in August was \$757.7 million, the 3d largest deficit in the nation's history. The largest monthly deficit was \$887.8 million, in August, 1974.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, African Crisis; Panama; U.S.S.R.*)

- Sept. 4—In Zurich, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger meets South African Prime Minister John Vorster for 3 days of talks aimed at resolving key southern African issues.
- Sept. 6—After 3 days of talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster, Secretary of State Kissinger arrives in London to discuss his African negotiations with British officials.
- The U.S.-led U.N. Command and North Korea agree on a new set of security arrangements, designed to prevent clashes between the two forces in the demilitarized zone.
- On August 18, 2 Americans were killed in such a clash.
- Sept. 10—The White House announces that Secretary Kissinger will leave Washington, D.C., on September 13 for talks with white and black leaders in southern Africa.
- Sept. 13—President Ford directs U.S. Representative to the U.N. William Scranton to veto Vietnam's application for membership in the United Nations when the application comes before the Security Council. (See *Intl, U.N.*)
- Sept. 21—In Geneva, American and Soviet negotiators resume their talks on strategic arms limitations.
- Sept. 30—Secretary Kissinger addresses the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly.

## Labor and Industry

- Sept. 7—New York State's Department of Environmental Conservation announces a negotiated settlement with the General Electric Company; the company agrees to pay \$3 million toward clearing the Hudson River of toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) that the company has been dumping into the river.
- Sept. 14—The United Automobile Workers call a strike against the Ford Motor Company to begin at midnight after negotiations to avert the strike fail.
- Sept. 18—The International Brotherhood of Teamsters announces the removal of 2 trustees of its principal pension fund, William Presser and Frank Ranney.
- Sept. 19—A 1-day strike by mechanics and ground crews of Trans World Airways is settled.
- Sept. 20—Ford Motor Company negotiators and United Auto Workers officials resume talks to end the strike against the company.

## Legislation

- Sept. 1—The House votes approval 384 to 0 and the Senate approves by voice vote the "Government in Sunshine Act," which requires more than 50 federal agencies to conduct most of their business in public. The act, which would become effective March 13, 1977, goes to the White House.
- Sept. 6—President Gerald Ford signs a bill extending income tax cuts until September 15.
- Sept. 7—The President signs a compromise day-care center bill providing \$24 million in interim funds.
- Sept. 13—The Senate votes 58 to 19 to approve the Automotive Transport Research and Development Act that authorizes a 5-year program to develop a fuel-saving and non-polluting automobile. The act authorizes the spending of \$100 million in the first 2 years of the program. The House passed the bill August 31.

The President signs the "Government in Sunshine Act."

The President signs a bill guaranteeing that packers who purchase at least \$500,000 worth of livestock annually must post "reasonable" bonds to insure that farmers are paid for their livestock.

The President vetoes a bill that would have provided

\$160 million to develop an electric motor for automobiles. This is his 56th veto since assuming office.

- Sept. 14—The President signs an act ending 4 states of emergency declared in 1933, 1950, 1970 and 1971.
- Sept. 16—The House votes 242 to 138 to approve an anti-trust bill to protect consumers against corporate price fixing. The bill authorizes state attorneys general to sue for triple damages on behalf of consumers who allege price fixing; it gives the Justice Department's anti-trust division subpoena-like powers to force companies and individuals to provide information in civil antitrust proceedings; it expands the program in accord with which large corporations notify the government of plans for mergers. The Senate has already approved the bill, which goes to the White House.

The House approves a budget for fiscal 1977 (beginning October, 1976) with a ceiling of \$413.1 billion and a deficit of \$50.6 billion. The Senate approved the budget resolution yesterday.

The House and Senate pass and send to the White House a final version of the tax revision bill, some 1,000 pages long; the bill extends individual anti-recession tax cuts through 1977, makes child-care deductions a tax credit, eliminates a sick-pay deduction, liberalizes alimony deductions, tightens the rules on deductions for business use of the home, changes the regulations on capital gains taxes, and reforms estate and gift taxes, among other provisions.

- Sept. 17—By a 47-21 vote, the Senate gives final congressional approval to legislation that would forbid the use of federal Medicaid funds (funds for the indigent) to pay for abortions unless the life of the mother is in danger. A \$56.6-billion appropriation for the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare is part of the bill.

The Senate overrides the President's veto of funds for the development of an electric automobile. The House overrode the veto yesterday.

- Sept. 22—By a voice vote, the Senate gives final congressional approval to a bill that would extend through fiscal 1977 260,000 federally funded public service jobs in state and local governments, with the possibility that there might be an increase to 500,000 jobs in that fiscal year.

By voice vote, the Senate completes congressional action on a \$3.7-billion appropriation for public works construction projects, federal aid to state and local budgets, and water treatment plants. The bill aims at the creation of 300,000 additional jobs. The House voted 263 to 53 to approve the bill on September 17.

The House Ethics Committee refuses to attempt to cite CBS news correspondent Daniel Schorr for contempt or to punish him by any other means for his unauthorized disclosure to a New York newspaper, *The Village Voice*, of a House intelligence committee report.

- Sept. 24—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves a resolution by an 8-6 vote to block the sale of 650 Maverick air-to-surface missiles to Saudi Arabia.
- Sept. 28—The Senate votes 56 to 24 to approve a foreign (including military) aid appropriation of \$5.1 billion for fiscal 1977, over half of which is earmarked for Middle East nations. The House approved the bill yesterday, voting 215 to 155.

The Senate votes 73 to 6 and the House votes 360 to 35 to approve a bill giving the Environmental Protection Agency more authority over dangerous chemicals and forbidding the production of polychlorinated biphenyls—PCB's—in 3 years.

President Ford signs a bill authorizing increased federal funds for water conservation and the preservation of historic landmarks.

Reversing its decision of September 24, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee takes no action on a resolution banning the sale of 650 air-to-ground Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia. The committee's approval of the resolution was strongly criticized by Secretary of State Kissinger.

CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr resigns from the CBS network; he was suspended February 23 because of a controversy about his role in giving a secret congressional committee report to *The Village Voice*.

Sept. 29—President Ford vetoes the \$56.6 billion appropriation bill for manpower programs and health, education and welfare programs.

Congress completes action on a 3-year, \$4.9-billion public works authorization bill and sends it to the President.

The Senate fails to override President Ford's Sept. 24 veto of the \$100-million authorization bill to develop and test efficient automobile engines. Earlier today, the House voted 293 to 102 to override the veto.

Sept. 30—The House votes 312 to 93 and the Senate votes 67 to 15 to override President Ford's veto of the \$56.6-billion appropriations bill for manpower programs and health, education and welfare programs. This is the 11th time Congress has overridden President Ford's veto. 59 bills have been vetoed by the President.

The House votes 292 to 111 and the Senate votes 77 to 4 to pass and send the White House a \$25.6-billion appropriation for revenue-sharing, extending federal aid to 39,000 state, county and local governments for 4 years.

A bill authorizing \$18 billion for higher education and vocational training programs is sent to the White House. The House completed action on the bill last night.

The Senate approves by voice vote and sends to the White House a bill asking the Environmental Protection Agency to draw up minimum standards for solid chemical waste disposal.

The President signs the bill expanding the scope of antitrust legislation.

The President says he will sign 2 major employment bills.

### Political Scandal

Sept. 1—Representative Wayne Hays (D., Ohio) resigns from the House of Representatives as a result of the disclosure of his use of public funds to finance his sexual involvement with a member of his staff.

### Political Terrorism

Sept. 12—3 men are held in a federal district court in Springfield, Mass., on charges of conspiring to murder Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.).

Sept. 24—Patricia Hearst is sentenced to 7 years in prison after her conviction on charges of armed robbery and the use of a firearm to commit a felony.

Sept. 30—A federal district court judge dismisses the charges against the three men accused of attempting to assassinate Senator Kennedy.

### Politics

Sept. 1—The Federal Election Commission rules that every Republican and Democratic state, county, congressional district and city committee is permitted to raise \$1,000 for each major party's national ticket; potentially this

opens the way to \$4.5 million in additional legal private contributions.

Sept. 14—It is announced by the League of Women Voters that President Gerald Ford and former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, the Republican and Democratic candidates for the presidency, will debate on September 23 in Philadelphia under the auspices of the League of Women Voters. A second debate will be held on October 6 and a 3d and final debate on October 22.

Sept. 23—President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter debate on national television in Philadelphia, in the first such meeting between presidential candidates in 16 years. Toward the close of the debate, the audio system fails for 27 minutes.

Sept. 26—Speaking in Biloxi, Mississippi, President Ford says that "the law-abiding citizens of this country should not be deprived of the right to have firearms in their possession."

Sept. 30—In his first press conference since September 8, President Ford denies ever using campaign funds for personal expenditures. The office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor is currently investigating the financing of Republican campaigns in Kent County, Michigan, President Ford's congressional district.

### Science and Space

Sept. 3—The Viking II lander successfully touches down on the Utopia Plains of Mars and sends signals to earth; the landing site is 4,000 miles northeast of the Viking I lander site.

Sept. 9—Radar observations at the Arecibo Observatory of the National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center in Puerto Rico show the first detailed radar observations of the surface of the planet Venus, including an area of possible lava flow the size of Oklahoma.

Sept. 22—The Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, announces that reports from the Viking II spacecraft show that the northern polar cap of Mars is entirely frozen water.

Sept. 23—A new biology experiment performed by the Viking II lander indicates that the possibility of life on Mars is "marginally positive."

### URUGUAY

Sept. 1—In Montevideo, Aparicio Mendez is sworn in as President; following the military's orders, he cancels the rights of political leaders in all the traditional political parties.

### VIETNAM

(See also *Intl, U.N.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 6—In Paris, the Vietnamese embassy releases the names of 12 missing American pilots who were allegedly killed in action in Indochina.

### YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *Intl, Intl Terrorism*)

Sept. 8—In Belgrade, President Josip Broz-Tito meets with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu.

Sept. 16—On the advice of physicians, President Tito cancels all official functions for 2 months; the 84-year-old leader is suffering from "acute liver trouble."

### ZAMBIA

(See *Intl, African Crisis*)

# THE NATIONS OF AFRICA



JF

# AVAILABLE FROM Current History

Academic Year 1976-1977

- ☐ Women in America (5/76)
- ☐ Criminal Justice in America (6/76)
- ☐ Reforming the Criminal Justice System (7-8/76)
- ☐ The People's Republic of China, 1976 (9/76)
- ☐ The Soviet Union, 1976 (10/76)

- ☐ Africa, 1976 (11/76)
- ☐ Southeast Asia, 1976 (12/76)
- ☐ The Middle East, 1977 (1/77)
- ☐ Latin America, 1977 (2/77)
- ☐ Mexico, 1977 (3/77)
- ☐ Canada, 1977 (4/77)

Property of  
EMBASSADOR COLLEGE LIB  
Big Sandy, Texas

## Still Available

### AREA STUDIES

- ☐ Scandinavia and the Low Countries (4/76)
- ☐ Nations of East Europe (3/76)
- ☐ Latin America, 1976 (2/76)
- ☐ The Middle East, 1976 (1/76)
- ☐ Southeast Asia, 1975 (12/75)
- ☐ The Soviet Union, 1975 (10/75)
- ☐ The People's Republic of China, 1975 (9/75)
- ☐ World Food Resources (6/75)
- ☐ Nations of Africa (5/75)
- ☐ Japan in the Seventies (4/75)
- ☐ Nations of West Europe (3/75)
- ☐ The People's Republic of China, 1974 (9/74)
- ☐ Britain in the Seventies, 1974 (3/74)
- ☐ Nations of the Pacific, 1973 (11/73)

### AMERICAN ISSUES

- ☐ Women in America (5/76)
- ☐ The American Economy (11/75)
- ☐ The American Indian (12/74)
- ☐ Changing Black America (11/74)
- ☐ American Political Reform (8/74)
- ☐ The American Two-Party System (7/74)
- ☐ The American Presidency (6/74)
- ☐ Social Welfare in America Tomorrow (8/73)
- ☐ American Social Welfare in Perspective (7/73)
- ☐ The Dimensions of Poverty in America (6/73)
- ☐ Urban America (11/70)
- ☐ Options for a Cleaner America (8/70)
- ☐ America's Polluted Environment (7/70)
- ☐ U.S. Resources: A Tally Sheet (6/70)

### CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

A sturdy, hard-cover binder at a reasonable cost will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. Each issue can be placed in the binder every month. The easy-to-use binder holds 12 issues securely in place over flexible steel rods.

**ONE-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION:** \$13.50. **TWO-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION:** \$26.50.

**NINE-MONTH SUBSCRIPTION:** \$10.95.

**SEVEN-MONTH SUBSCRIPTION:** \$7.95.

**SPECIFIC ISSUE PRICE:** \$1.50 per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, \$1.25 per copy.

**BINDER PRICE:** \$4.95.

**BULK SUBSCRIPTIONS (in orders of 10 subscriptions or more mailed to the same address)**

**1-year subscriptions:** for 10 or more subscriptions: \$10.95 each.

**9-month subscriptions:** for 10 or more subscriptions: \$8.95 each.

**7-month subscriptions:** for 10 or more subscriptions: \$7.50 each.

**RATES FOR COPIES MORE THAN TWO YEARS OLD:** \$1.75 per copy; 5 or more copies, \$1.50 per copy.

*Current History* has a small inventory of many issues from 1941.

CURRENT HISTORY • 4225 Main Street • Philadelphia, Pa. 19127

**SPECIAL SUBSCRIPTION OFFER: your choice of 3 free issues.**

- ☐ 1 year \$13.50, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ 2 years \$26.50, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- ☐ Send me ..... 1-year subscriptions. ☐ Send me ..... 9-month subscriptions.
- ☐ Send me ..... 7-month subscriptions.

### CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

- ☐ Current History Binders at \$4.95 each.

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... State ..... Zip Code.....

☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Add \$1.00 per year for Canada; \$1.50 per year for foreign.

All these offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

Specific issue price and bulk subscriptions based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.